The industrial organization of transport markets: modeling pricing, investment and regulation in rail and road networks by Van Der Weijde, Harry
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The industrial organization of transport markets: modeling
pricing, investment and regulation in rail and road networks
Citation for published version:
Van Der Weijde, H 2015, 'The industrial organization of transport markets: modeling pricing, investment and
regulation in rail and road networks', Ph.D., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT MARKETS:
MODELING PRICING, INVESTMENT AND REGULATION IN RAIL AND
ROAD NETWORKS
This thesis is part of a European Research Council project
on ‘Optimizing Policies for Transport: Accounting for Industrial
Organization in Network Markets’ (OPTION), funded under the
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)
through Advanced Grant №246969. The ERC’s ﬁnancial support is
gratefully acknowledged.
ISBN 978 90 361 0430 2
Cover design: Crasborn Graphic Designers bno, Valkenburg a.d. Geul.
This book is no. 612 of the Tinbergen Institute Research Series, established through
cooperation between Rozenberg Publishers and the Tinbergen Institute. A list of books
which already appeared in the series can be found in the back.
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT
THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT MARKETS:
MODELING PRICING, INVESTMENT AND REGULATION IN RAIL AND
ROAD NETWORKS
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magniﬁcus
prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen en Bedrijfskunde
op woensdag 8 april 2015 om 11.45 uur
in het auditorium van de universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105
door
Adriaan Hendrik van der Weijde
geboren te Woerden
promotor: prof.dr. E.T. Verhoef
copromotor: dr. V.A.C. van den Berg
“. . . In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map
of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the
entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisﬁed, and the
Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire,
and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not
so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast
Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to
the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, still today, there are
Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the Land there is
no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.”
—Jorge Luis Borges, On Exactitude in Science. In: Collected Fictions (A. Hurley, Transl.), Penguin
Books, 1999.

Contents
Preface iii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Transport markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The industrial organization of transport markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Modeling pricing, investment and regulation in rail and road networks . . . . 3
1.4 Structure of this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Price diﬀerentiation and discrimination in transport networks 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Diﬀerentiation and discrimination on a single link . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Network eﬀects - serial links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Network eﬀects - parallel links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Competition in multi-modal transport networks: a dynamic approach 35
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Static model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Dynamic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.5 Numerical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 A Hotelling model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric distance costs: the
case of strategic transport scheduling 57
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 Social optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Full market separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 Equilibria with covered markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Other games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5 Stochastic user equilibrium traﬃc assignment with price-sensitive demand: do
methods matter (much?) 73
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3 Simulation methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.4 Simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
i
Contents
5.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
6 Modeling the formation of transport networks and its regulation 95
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 Modeling methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4 Numerical simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
6.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7 Conclusions 115
7.1 Results and implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.2 Avenues for future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Bibliography 121
Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 129
ii
Preface
The thesis you are about to read (or about to put back on the shelf after reading this preface)
has been four years in the making. Much has happened in those four years, and many people
deserve to be thanked for their roles in the coming together of this thesis, and in my life.
Before that, however, I want to thank those without whom I would never have started writing
this thesis at all. I was lucky enough to attend RA (now UCR) during the ﬁrst few years of
its existence. My lecturers and tutors there not only taught me what I needed to know to
get into a good Master’s programme, but also showed me how academic research can be fun.
Nevertheless, after my postgraduate studies, I had enough of being a student. I decided to
get a job instead of pursuing a doctoral degree, and managed to ﬁnd work at the University
of Cambridge. I was hired to provide research assistance to a visiting researcher from the US,
but rather than treating me as an assistant, he let me do my own research, introduced me
to lots of interesting people, let me present my work at conferences, and in general showed
me, again, how much fun academia is. Within six months, I was googling PhD programmes.
Many thanks for that, Ben; I hope to pay it forward by giving my own students and staﬀ
the same opportunities you gave me. Many thanks also to all others at the EPRG for all the
support I received.
Having decided I wanted to get a PhD, the two body problem started to kick in. For-
tunately, I found Erik Verhoef, who oﬀered me a position at the same university my wife
had already been accepted, although he would not have know that at the time. Erik and
Vincent, my second supervisor, turned out to be an excellent supervisory team, letting me do
my own thing where possible, and subtly challenging, correcting or changing the direction of
what I was doing when necessary. This thesis could not have been completed without them,
and I am very grateful for all their help. I am also grateful to my other colleagues at the
VU, particularly those who I shared an oﬃce with for all or most of the four years I was
there. Alexandros, Hugo, Jan, Maria, Ruben; thank you for the discussions about research,
discussions about anything but research, beer tastings, dinners, and everything else. It would
not have been fun without you. Thanks also to the RE secretaries, Elﬁe and Jenny, who were
always ready to help.
The ﬁnal months of a PhD programme are always diﬃcult, with lots of writing and for-
matting to do, forms to submit, and deadlines to remember. I am grateful to the Institute for
Energy Systems at the University of Edinburgh for promising me a job at the end of it, which
was an excellent incentive to wrap everything up as soon as possible and gave me something
to look forward to. Of course, when a draft version of a thesis is complete, there are still some
hurdles to take. I would therefore like to thank my committee: Adriaan Soetevent, André
de Palma, Bruno De Borger, Jos van Ommeren and Serge Hoogendoorn, for the time they
have invested in my thesis and their helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to my
paranymphs, Martin and Hugo (who agreed to be my paranymph despite having to defend
his own thesis immediately after me!), for their support.
PhD candidates in The Netherlands are employees of the university, which means that,
at least on paper, they have a ﬁxed number of working hours and a good work-life balance.
That does not always work well in real life, but it did for me, to a large extent because of
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family and friends, particularly all those at the Ruysdaelstraat, who gave me a reason to get
away from work and do completely diﬀerent things. But, of course, the most heartfelt thanks
are reserved for my wife, Jeanine. ‘For better, for worse’–we have certainly experienced both
in the past four years, and it was only because of you that the former far exceeded the latter.
I hope and trust that we will continue to live happily ever after!
Finally, thanks to you, reader! You have made it to the end of this preface; I cannot
realistically ask for more, but hope there will at least be some things in what follows that
will arouse your interest in what I think is a very interesting ﬁeld that will continue to be
important for the foreseeable future. If you were hoping to see your name mentioned here
but did not, that is only because of my forgetfulness, for which I apologize.
Edinburgh, February 2015
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1 Introduction
1.1 Transport markets
The ﬁeld of economics is concerned with the allocation of scarce resources, such as time,
money, goods, or services. Often, these scarce resources are allocated in markets: places,
physical or not, where buyers and sellers meet. For economists, markets are particularly
interesting if they fail to deliver the best possible outcomes. ‘Best possible’, in this context,
can mean multiple things: usually, a Pareto optimum (in which no single market participant
can be made better oﬀ without harming another) or a social optimum (society as a whole
cannot do better). In either case, any market outcome below the optimum gives regulators
a reason to intervene; the question is then, of course, which interventions can restore the
eﬃciency of the market in the best way.
Markets can fail to deliver Pareto- or socially optimal outcomes for various reasons, col-
lectively called ‘market failures’. In transport markets, the most common market failure is
the presence of externalities: costs or beneﬁts of, in this case, consumption, that are not
accrued by the market participant that decides how much to consume, but by others, who
do not have a direct inﬂuence on those decisions. Many transport markets have negative
environmental externalities: carbon emissions, local air pollution, and noise are primarily in-
curred by people other than those who drive, ﬂy, or transport goods. Most transport markets
also suﬀer from congestion externalities: an additional car on the road slows down all other
drivers (Pigou, 1920; Knight, 1924; Vickrey, 1969). Both externalities result in sub-optimal
market outcomes, and hence, large costs to society; consequently, they have been researched
extensively. Everything else equal, they increase consumption above its (social) optimum: if
car drivers were forced to pay for the decrease in travel time of all other road users, they
would travel less, or at diﬀerent moments; if air passengers had to pay for their share of
the plane’s carbon emissions, fewer people would ﬂy, and so on. Usually, these externalities
are analyzed on their own, assuming that there are no other market failures. For instance,
studies often assume that markets are perfectly competitive (e.g., there are so many airlines
that each airline cannot inﬂuence ticket prices on its own, but takes these prices as given),
that there is one monopolist who faces perfectly elastic demand (such that, again, it cannot
inﬂuence prices), or assume price-taking behavior in some other way.
However, in practice, market participants do often exhibit non-price taking behavior: there
are monopolists who face imperfectly elastic demand and oligopolists that are large enough
to inﬂuence prices on their own. This market failure, in many settings, cannot be assumed
away. As private investment in, and ownership of, transport networks is increasing, it will
only become more important. This thesis therefore aims to explore the industrial organization
of transport markets: that is, the decisions made by non-price taking market participants,
the outcomes of those decisions, and the ways in which regulators can inﬂuence them. It de-
velops methods to model these decisions, and uses those to investigate pricing and scheduling
behavior, investment, and regulation. In contrast to much of the existing literature, it does
so while explicitly taking the networked nature of transport markets into account.
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1.2 The industrial organization of transport markets
This thesis analyzes the industrial organization of transport network markets. As such, it
builds on the existing industrial organization literature, generalizing existing theories, apply-
ing them to transportation markets, and developing methodological advancements. Cournot
(1838) was one of the ﬁrst to develop mathematical models in which the behavior of suppliers
with market power could be analyzed. Modeling an oligopolistic market where several com-
petitors supply the same product, and choose the quantities they produce to maximize their
private proﬁts, Cournot shows how, in this setting, prices are lower than in a monopoly, but
still higher than the suppliers’ marginal costs. Only if the number of suppliers approaches
inﬁnity do prices approach marginal costs, and hence, the social optimum. Each supplier sets
its own quantity, but takes into account how this inﬂuences the decisions of other market
participants, since these, in turn, aﬀect market prices; in equilibrium, no supplier has an
incentive to unilaterally change its produced quantity.1
Bertrand (1883), in a review of Cournot’s work, proposed a diﬀerent model, in which com-
petitors do not set quantities, but prices. If this is the case, prices always equal marginal
costs if there is more than one supplier; private proﬁts are always equal to zero if marginal
costs care constant. Both models still form the basis for most analyses of oligopolistic mar-
kets, although they have been extended in all possible directions. One important direction,
taken by, amongst others, Hotelling (1929) and Salop (1979), extends oligopolistic theories to
include product diﬀerentiation. They show how, if suppliers can diﬀerentiate their products,
they can avoid head-on competition, and still make positive proﬁts even if they compete on
prices. This diﬀerentiation can also be spatial in nature; suppliers can be located in diﬀer-
ent places. Hotelling and Salop’s models only include one dimension; recently, these models
have been extended to more general networks (e.g. Heijnen and Soetevent, 2014). One of
the chapters of this thesis will apply a generalized version of Hotelling’s model to transport
scheduling: there, products are diﬀerentiated in time.
In many cases, and most deﬁnitely in transport markets, products can not only be substi-
tutes, but also complements, such that consumers derive more value from a combination of
products. Travelers may, for instance, travel to a railway station by bus, and then continue
their journey by train: they need both modes to reach their destination. Economides and
Salop (1992) study a situation where substitutes and complements are produced by compet-
ing suppliers. As one may expect, competition in the presence of substitutes decreases prices,
and increases social welfare. However, if competing operators oﬀer complements, this is not
the case. Rather, as each competitor disregards the negative eﬀect of a price increase on
its competitor’s proﬁts, all operators set prices that are higher than the prices a monopolist
would set. This eﬀect is called ‘double marginalization’, since more than one competitor ex-
erts market power. Hence, although increasing the number of competitors may be beneﬁcial
from a societal viewpoint if they oﬀer substitutes, this is not the case for complements.
These results are directly relevant to transport markets. In a transport network, links
and modes can be substitutes for each other, but they may also be complementary. Often,
however, the distinction may not be very clear: links are typically neither pure substitutes
nor pure complements for all travelers carried. There are other diﬀerences between transport
markets and other network markets. Not only does transport usually have external eﬀects;
demand- and supply structures are also often very complex. Travelers are not just consumers,
1Hence, in his book, Cournot also already develops the equilibrium concept that would, much later, be known
as the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
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but also supply some of the inputs for travel; most importantly, they supply their time. This
has important implications for optimal prices, investment, and regulation (see e.g., Mohring,
1972).
In the past decade, a separate literature on the industrial organization of transport networks
has therefore emerged. Usually, the models developed in these studies have a very simple
network representation. de Palma and Lindsey (2000) consider a network with one origin
and one destination, connected by multiple roads. They analyze several forms of ownership,
and show how important ownership is. Private ownership by competing operators can, for
instance, increase welfare relative to a situation in which a private operator competes with
publicly owned roads. Brueckner (2002), in the context of air transport, also illustrates
the importance of market power. If airlines are large enough, the congestion externalities
in the market should not simply be internalized by charging each airline a toll equal to its
marginal external costs (a classic result in the road pricing literature), since each airline
already internalizes the congestion it imposes on its own other ﬂights. The toll should thus
reﬂect external costs imposed on other airlines’ ﬂights.
De Borger et al. (2005) also look at parallel competition, but diﬀerentiate between long-
distance and short-distance travelers, in a setting where each link is regulated by a separate
government, which primarily cares about its own residents. De Borger et al. (2008) develop
a similar model that also includes serial links. Pels and Verhoef (2007) model a three-node
network, in which there is both parallel and serial competition. They consider pricing, ca-
pacity choices and regulation, and conclude that optimal regulation is highly dependent on
the competitive structure of the market.
Research on larger networks is scarce; although there is empirical work on the modeling
of traﬃc ﬂows, some of which will be discussed below, pricing, investment, and regulation
are not generally discussed. One exception is Adler et al. (2010), who analyze competition
between high-speed rail and air travel in Europe, using a large network model.
The present thesis adds to this developing literature, extending and combining it.
1.3 Modeling pricing, investment and regulation in rail and road
networks
This is not an empirical thesis; instead, it develops theoretical models: simpliﬁed mathe-
matical representations of transport markets, which can be used to develop theories about
markets that do not yet exist, or explore which eﬀects one would expect to ﬁnd in real-world
markets. Every model makes assumptions. Even if it would be possible to create a model
that captured a real-world market down to the smallest detail, that model would be of lim-
ited use: because of its complexity it would be diﬃcult to derive new insights from it, and
neither would it be able to predict what would happen to the market if something changed.
Naturally, some details are essential, and cannot be assumed away. The restrictiveness of the
assumptions, and hence, the level of detail in a model, is, as it should be, always a subject
of discussion. In the transportation community, engineers generally prefer models that are
more realistic, as these can be used to provide speciﬁc answers to questions about real-world
networks. Economists, conversely, prefer simpler models, with more restrictive assumptions,
as their outputs are easier to interpret, which can lead to more insight into the mechanisms
at play.
Although several chapters draw heavily on the transportation engineering literature, this
book is primarily an economic thesis. It therefore focuses more on insight than on detailed
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descriptions of reality, and to do so, it makes restrictive assumptions. Each chapter focuses
on a diﬀerent setting, and hence, each model is more detailed than others in at least one
dimension. When modeling transport markets, several classes of assumptions are particularly
important, and it is worth looking at those before moving on to speciﬁc models.
Assumptions about the physical network.
As already mentioned, transport markets rarely exist in isolation; they are usually part of
larger networks, which consist of several nodes, markets for travel between them, and links
that connect them. When building a model of a particular transport market, one must choose
how much of this network should be included. Speciﬁcally, one must choose how large the
network model will be, what the network conﬁguration will look like (in particular, how great
the degree of substitutability and complementarity will be, i.e., will the model have parallel
and/or serial links, substitute modes, etc.?), and whether, or how, the dynamic nature of
transportation networks will be considered.
In the transport economics literature, network models are usually small, to help derive
insight. Many papers focus on networks with just two nodes, and one or two links. Chapters
2 and 4 of this thesis also use such models. The addition of more complexity would make these
models less tractable, without necessarily giving more insight. Chapter 3 develops a slightly
larger model with two modes and three nodes, and thus four links in total: the minimum
number required to analyze parallel and serial competition together. Chapters 5 and 6, on
the other hand, analyze a much larger network, since this is necessary to analyze the eﬀects
of overlapping routes on user equilibria, and the spatial allocation of investment.
If the size of the network is important, the network conﬁguration is even more crucial. As
mentioned above, the presence of substitute links or modes, as well as complementary links
or modes, is one of the most important determinants of the social desirability of competition.
With the exception of chapter 2, which discusses a monopoly, all models developed in this
thesis therefore use networks that have both complementary and substitute links. In chapter
3, the substitute links are deﬁned as separate modes (rail and road); in the other chapters,
modes are not explicitly deﬁned. The larger networks in chapters 5 and 6 use meshed grid
networks, precisely because this type of network, by deﬁnition, includes a large number of
complementary and substitute links, of roughly equal sizes. It is worth noting that, in the
air transport literature, networks that are larger than one of two links are often of the ‘hub
and spoke’-variety: central nodes (the hubs) are connected to the other nodes, while these
other nodes are not connected to each other (see, e.g., Brueckner, 2004; Silva et al., 2014).
Although passenger rail and road networks sometimes also include hubs and spokes, these
networks are usually more meshed. Pure hub and spoke networks are therefore not considered
in this thesis.
As the title of this thesis suggests, it deals primarily with rail and road networks. What
sets these modes apart from others, and most importantly from air travel, is that there are
high costs associated with the construction of new links and with the destruction of existing
links. Naturally, there are also important diﬀerences between rail and road travel; in most
countries, for instance, infrastructure ownership and operation are decoupled in rail networks,
but not in road networks. Because of the nature of this thesis, many of these diﬀerences will
be ignored; indeed, in most chapters, the modes will not be explicitly deﬁned.
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Assumptions about user costs.
Transportation users face several diﬀerent types of costs. Of particular relevance here are the
monetary cost (the fare, road price, or petrol cost), the time cost, the crowding cost, and the
cost of arriving at a diﬀerent time than travelers prefer (the schedule delay cost). Monetary
costs are included in all models developed in this thesis, but always represent only road
prices or fares; petrol costs and other operational and maintenance costs are never included
explicitly. This simpliﬁcation is unlikely to aﬀect the results, as these costs are often rather
constant and hardly vary with pricing or capacity decisions.
The time costs of travel are also important in all chapters. All types of travel take time,
which usually comes at a cost to users. Using an exogenous value of time (VOT)2, these costs
can be monetized. Naturally, VOTs may diﬀer across travelers, which can have important
implications (see, e.g., Arnott et al., 1988; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011). This thesis will
disregard this complication, and instead assumes that all users have the same VOT. They
may, however, diﬀer in other respects, as we will discuss below.
For most public transport modes, travel times are ﬁxed: they do not, or not to a large
degree, depend on the number of users. For roads, the opposite is true. Road congestion has
a large impact on travel times: in the US alone, congestion has been estimated to cause an
additional 5.5 billion hours of travel time in 2011, amounting to a loss of $121 billion when
combined with the cost of wasted fuel (Schrank et al., 2012). It is therefore important to
include the relation between traﬃc ﬂows and travel speeds in theoretical models. Various
relationships have been proposed in the literature. Static models, which do not have a time
dimension, usually assume that travel times are a continuous function of travel ﬂows (see e.g.,
Vickrey, 1963); the static models in this thesis will make the same assumptions. Some chapters
use linear functions for simplicity; others, for road links, use the so-called BPR function (US
Bureau of Public Roads, 1964), which has been shown to be a good approximation of average
long-distance road travel costs.
There is more variety in the treatment of congestion in dynamic models. Many transport
studies use the bottleneck model (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1990), which assumes that
transport links have a ﬁxed capacity; if travel ﬂows exceed this capacity, a queue forms, which
dissipates only when ﬂows drop below the link capacity. This model is very useful in many
settings, but is problematic in larger network models. It is discontinuous (congestion only
has an eﬀect if ﬂows are above link capacities), and serial bottlenecks are diﬃcult to analyze
(if two bottlenecks in series have diﬀerent capacities, only one of them will be relevant). An
alternative approach, proposed ﬁrst by Lighthill and Whitham (1956) and Richards (1956),
and therefore often referred to as the ‘LWR’ model, instead uses ﬂow-concentration curves,
which are commonly used in kinematics, to relate changes in ﬂows to changes in speeds.
Chapter 3 of this thesis uses a simpliﬁed version of this model, as proposed by Henderson
(1974) and Chu (1995), which assumes that each individual user travels at a constant speed
and shockwaves travel at the same speed as the traﬃc that carries them. More detailed
classes of models exist (e.g., car-following models, which model the behavior of individual
drivers. See May (1990) for an example), but these are too complex to be used in the analyses
presented in this thesis.
Although public transport travel times may be ﬁxed, travelers using these modes may
experience crowding costs (see, e.g., Wardman and Whelan, 2011; Li and Hensher, 2011).
Crowding may occur on the platform, when entering the vehicle, and during travel in the
2Some (mostly empirical) studies prefer the term ‘value of travel time savings’ (VTTS)
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vehicle. This thesis only considers the last, and arguably the most important category:
in-vehicle crowding. For simplicity, crowding costs are assumed to be linear; the diﬀerence
between sitting down and standing is ignored.
Finally, users may face schedule delay costs; that is, costs that are incurred because users do
not arrive at their preferred arrival time, but earlier or later. These costs can be substantial
(Small, 1982). In the chapters that deal with static models, which do not include arrival
times, schedule delay costs are, naturally, not included; they do play an important role in
the other chapters. These assume that users have a ﬁxed unit cost of schedule delay (i.e.,
incur a cost for every minute they are late or early), such that the total schedule delay costs
are linear in the amount of schedule delay. This assumption has been made in most of the
existing literature. Chapter 3 assumes that the costs of being early and late are, per unit of
time, the same; chapter 4 speciﬁcally focuses on a situation in which the costs of being late
are higher than the costs of being early.
There are, of course, other types of user costs associated with transportation that are not
considered in this thesis. Travel times are, for instance, uncertain, and this uncertainty is
costly. This cost of travel time variation, or travel time uncertainty is currently receiving
more attention in the literature (see, e.g., Fosgerau and Karlstrom, 2010; Koster et al., 2011),
with very interesting results. However, uncertain travel times are beyond the scope of this
thesis, and hence, these costs will not play any role in the analyses presented below.
Assumptions about the behavior of individual users, and the formation of user
equilibria.
Specifying user costs is one thing; determining how they inﬂuence travel behavior is another.
Two assumptions are important here. The ﬁrst determines how users decide which of several
diﬀerent alternatives (e.g., routes though a network, modes, or departure times) they will
use. The most traditional approach (Wardrop, 1952) is to assume that, in equilibrium, all
alternatives that are used must have the same user cost, which is lower than the cost of all
unused routes. In the resulting Wardropian, or deterministic, equilibrium, no single user
can lower its costs by choosing another alternative. This concept is used in chapters 2–4.
Chapters 5 and 6 instead use stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) models, based on random
utility theory (McFadden, 1978). These assume that, in addition to the deterministic user
costs, each user’s costs also include a stochastic error term, which is unobservable, but comes
from a known distribution. Using that distribution, one can calculate the probability that
a given user prefers a certain alternative over another. These probabilities, summed across
all users, can then be used to calculate expected traﬃc ﬂows. Naturally, if the variance
of the error term approaches zero, the SUE collapses to the deterministic user equilibrium.
Stochastic user equilibrium models are useful; they arguably describe reality better, and can
be more computationally convenient. There are several types of SUEs, each with its own
assumptions about the distributions of the error terms; chapters 5 and 6 explain this in more
detail.
The second assumption deals with the price-sensitivity of demand. In chapter 3, the total
demand for travel is assumed to be ﬁxed, to isolate the eﬀects of departure time decisions. In
the other chapters, demand does vary with travel costs, either in a very general form (chapter
2), linearly (chapter 4), or in a more complex fashion (chapters 5–6, where the models include
an alternative to not travel, which is treated in the same way as the physical routes in the
description of choice behavior).
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Assumptions about operator costs, and the behavior of operators.
It costs money to maintain roads and railways, and to operate trains, and these costs have
been well-researched. Since this thesis focuses on competition between operators, it gener-
ally assumes that these operation and maintenance costs are negligible, or that the marginal
costs of transporting an extra user are constant, such that they do not inﬂuence the oper-
ators’ pricing rules. This is, obviously, a simpliﬁcation: in the real world, operators have
diﬀerent marginal costs. However, the inclusion of this complication in oligopolistic models
has disadvantages too, as diﬀerences in marginal costs can obscure other eﬀects, and make
drawing conclusions about other competitive mechanisms diﬃcult.
There are many ways to model competition in markets. Markets may be perfectly com-
petitive, such that each market participant takes market prices as given; this situation may
sometimes be a good benchmark, but real-world markets, and especially transport markets,
are rarely perfectly competitive. Perfect competition is therefore not the focus of this thesis.
The opposite situation, in which there is only one monopolist, is common in transport mar-
kets, and it is therefore discussed in this thesis, particularly in chapter 2. In between these
two extremes, oligopolistic markets have a (usually small) number of market participants;
chapters 3–4 and 6 analyze this situation. As explained above, there are diﬀerent forms of
oligopolistic competition. First of all, operators may compete on prices (Bertrand competi-
tion), or on quantities (Cournot competition). In road- and rail markets, arguably, Bertrand
competition better describes the market; quantities follow directly from travel decisions taken
by users, in response to prices set by operators. In air travel, conversely, Cournot competition
may be better, and is indeed used often used in theoretical studies. Secondly, there are diﬀer-
ent equilibrium concepts. This thesis, like most of the literature, will mostly consider Nash
equilibria: equilibria in which no market participant can do better by unilaterally changing its
decisions. Chapter 4 also considers Stackelberg equilibria, in which operators make decisions
sequentially, as may happen in some real-world settings. There are other, more exotic equi-
librium concepts, such as strong Nash equilibria and coalition-proof Nash equilibria. These
assume that there are possibilities for collusion between market participants, which is not
generally allowed, and therefore not taken into account here.
Assumptions about the regulatory environment
Few markets are completely unregulated; transport markets are no exception. All chapters in
this thesis therefore address regulation. Throughout, it is assumed that regulators maximize
social welfare, that there is only one such a regulator, and that market participants have no
choice but to obey it. In the real world, this is not always true: regulation takes place on
diﬀerent levels and may diﬀer across jurisdictions, regulators may not always maximize social
welfare, and there are diﬀerent levels of enforcement. Indeed, there is a substantial literature
on tax competition between authorities (e.g., De Borger et al., 2005), the presence of multiple
regulators (e.g., Pels and Verhoef, 2004), and related topics; this is outside the scope of this
thesis. As usual in the transport literature, social welfare is purely utilitarian: income eﬀects
are ignored. This is justiﬁable, as transportation costs do not usually constitute large parts
of consumers’ budgets.
Apart from social welfare maximization, real-world regulators might also be interested in
the acceptability and equity of their policies. In a perfect world, these would issues would
not change much, as the social welfare maximum is Kaldor-Hicks eﬃcient: if some groups are
unhappy with the policies but society as a whole beneﬁts, the winners can always be made
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to compensate the losers, such that everybody is better oﬀ. For this reason, the economic
models used in this thesis do not address acceptability or equity. Naturally, in models that
are more detailed representations of particular real-world settings, or that are used to directly
inform policy, they need to be considered, as redistribution may not always be possibile.
The diﬀerent chapters model diﬀerent types of regulation. First-best regulation, in which
the regulator chooses all relevant variables to maximize social welfare, without any con-
straints, is usually the benchmark. Second-best regulation, in which the regulator is somehow
constrained, because it cannot directly control some variables or is restricted in its choice of
values (e.g., because it can only levy positive taxes, and not give subsidies), but maximizes
welfare subject to these constraints, is also considered in most chapters. Chapter 6 also ad-
dresses quasi-ﬁrst-best regulation, in which the regulator cannot control some variables, but
ignores this, and uses the ﬁrst-best rules for the remaining instruments.
1.4 Structure of this book
This introductory chapter is followed by ﬁve technical chapters and a conclusion. As discussed
above, all models of transport markets can be categorized according to various characteris-
tics, related to assumptions about demand, costs, the behavior of market participants and
regulators, and the physical characteristics of the market. For the purposes of this thesis, it is
useful to focus on the distinction between static models, which do not have a time dimension,
and dynamic models, which do. Moreover, the models developed in the various chapters have
diﬀerent time horizons. Chapters 2 and 3 examine pricing strategies, assuming that capac-
ities are given. Chapter 4 also considers scheduling decisions. Chapter 5 develops methods
that can be used to analyze both pricing and longer-term decisions, such as investment, while
chapter 6 focuses on investment decisions. Table 1.1 shows how all technical chapters ﬁt into
this framework.
Naturally, other distinctions can be made, but Table 1.1 does show that the technical
chapters, together, span a wide modeling space. All chapters propose ways to model and
explain the eﬀects of the industrial organization of transport markets on prices, welfare,
and optimal regulatory strategies, but each chapter focuses on a diﬀerent aspect or setting.
Hence, they can also be read separately. All chapters have a dual purpose: they introduce
novel methods, or show how existing methods can be applied to answer questions related to
the industrial organization of transport markets, and then also apply these methods to gain
new insight.
Chapter 2 analyzes the eﬀects of price diﬀerentiation and discrimination by a monopolistic
transport operator, which sets fares in a congestible network. Using three models, with diﬀer-
ent spatial structures, it describes the operator’s optimal strategies in an unregulated market,
a market where price diﬀerentiation is not allowed (i.e., ticket prices must be the same for
all users), and a market where price discrimination is illegal (i.e., ticket prices must only
diﬀer with the marginal external costs of users), and analyze the welfare eﬀects of uniform
and non- discriminatory pricing policies. The three models allow for separate consideration
of the three diﬀerent forms of price diﬀerentiation and discrimination in networks: by user
class, by origin-destination pair, and by route. This chapter generalizes the existing liter-
ature on price discrimination, in which groups usually only diﬀer in their value of time to
also include diﬀerences in marginal external costs. In this setting, non-diﬀerentiated and
non-discriminatory policies may increase or decrease welfare, and non-discrimination can be
worse than non-diﬀerentiation. The results obtained for a single-link network can be general-
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ized to a situation where operators price-discriminate or diﬀerentiate based on users’ origins
and destinations, but not directly to a situation in which diﬀerentiation is based on the routes
users take.
Chapter 3 moves to networks in which transport operators compete. It analyzes the behav-
ior of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network, where roads are not priced,
but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the eﬀects on the roads into
account. In particular, it analyzes the diﬀerence between markets with a monopolistic pub-
lic transport operator, which operates all public transport links, and markets in which each
public transport link is owned by a separate operator. Importantly, users not only choose
which mode to use, but also decide when to travel. In this dynamic setting, even if the total
travel demand is inelastic, serial Bertrand-Nash competition on the public transport links
leads to diﬀerent fares than a serial monopoly. This results from the fact that trip timing
decisions, and therefore the generalized prices of all commuters, are inﬂuenced by all fares
in the network. The chapter ends with a numerical simulation, which shows that, contrary
to the results obtained in classic studies on vertical competition, monopolistic fares are not
always lower than duopolistic fares.
Like chapter 3, chapter 4 also considers departure time choices, but this time, with a focus
on how these choices aﬀect scheduling decisions made by transport operators. It proposes a
generalized Hotelling horizontal diﬀerentiation model with price-sensitive demand and asym-
metric distance costs. In this model, two competitors choose fares and departure times in a
ﬁxed time interval; consumers’ locations indicate their desired departure times. The model
is used to show how departure times can be strategic instruments, and how they are best
regulated.
Chapter 5 analyzes how user equilibrium assignment models impact outcomes, and which
assignment models are best. It compares three competing stochastic user equilibrium traﬃc
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assignment methodologies (multinomial probit, nested logit, and generalized nested logit),
using a congestible transport network. The models are used to evaluate policy decisions,
such as proﬁt-maximizing tolling or second-best socially optimal tolling. The results are then
used to investigate how these optimal tolls, and their performance, depend on the model
choice, and hence, how important the diﬀerences between models are. As it turns out, the
diﬀerences between models are small, as a result of the congestibility of the network, as
long as they are calibrated correctly. Hence, it may be better to use computationally more
eﬃcient logit models instead of probit models, in at least some applications, even if the latter
are preferable from a conceptual viewpoint.
Chapter 6 uses the results from chapter 5 to analyze investment in networks; hence, in
contrast to the earlier chapters, it focuses on long-term decisions. It proposes methods to
analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent policies that control the formation of transport networks by
private operators. These are then used to analyze investment in a simple network with
a limited number of nodes and routes, and possibilities to build congestible travel links
with discrete capacities between each pair of nodes. In this setting, fare regulation and
location-independent capacity subsidization are not always suﬃcient to achieve the ﬁrst-best
welfare-maximizing solution. Second-best fare regulation can be better than second-best
network regulation in some, but not all, situations.
Following the technical chapters, chapter 7 concludes the thesis.
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2 Price diﬀerentiation and discrimination in
transport networks1
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the eﬀects of allowing or disallowing transport operators to charge
diﬀerent users diﬀerent tolls or fares. Charging diﬀerent tolls or fares to diﬀerent users is
common practice in many transportation markets. This diﬀerentiation in prices is particularly
interesting in the context of transportation, as, unlike in markets for most consumer goods,
there usually consumption externalities associated with travel. Moreover, these externalities
are usually asymmetric: the congestion externality imposed by, for instance, a passenger car
driver on a truck driver using the same road at the same time is unlikely to be the same as the
externality imposed by the truck on the car driver. There may also be other reasons, apart
from these externalities, for diﬀerent users to have diﬀerent marginal costs: e.g., some types
of vehicles cause more road damage than others, drivers of cars outﬁtted with transponders
are easier to toll than drivers who pay in cash, and in air travel, the weight of passengers and
their luggage directly aﬀects fuel consumption. Travel products are also diﬃcult to resell, and
diﬀerent groups of users can often be easily distinguished, which makes it easy to diﬀerentiate
prices.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many existing studies look at these issues in the context
of transportation markets, both empirically and theoretically. Adachi (2005) formulates a
model with linear demand functions and consumption externalities, in which all users have
the same marginal external costs, but diﬀerent marginal private costs. In this linear model,
monopolistic third-degree price diﬀerentiation does not change output, but can increase wel-
fare if it improves the composition of users. Nocke et al. (2011) show how a monopolist can
use advance-purchase discounts to price-discriminate. Closest to this chapter, Czerny and
Zhang (2015), in the context of air travel, use a model with general demand- and cost func-
tions, in which diﬀerent users have diﬀerent values of time, but the same marginal external
cost. They conclude that ticket-price discrimination can increase welfare, even if it reduces
the total number of travelers. If all users have the same value of time, and their inverse
demand- and cost curves are linear, price discrimination does not change this total number
of travelers.
This chapter aims to make three contributions to this literature. First of all, we will
consider a situation in which users do not only have diﬀerent values of time (and thus,
diﬀerent marginal costs), but also diﬀerent marginal external costs. This diﬀerence can, for
instance, arise if vehicles have diﬀerent sizes (e.g. trucks and cars), and thus, impose diﬀerent
congestion externalities on other users. This is well-established in the empirical literature (see
e.g., Al-Kaisy et al., 2002), but not usually incorporated in studies on price discrimination.
Secondly, these diﬀerences in marginal external costs also allow us to distinguish between
1An earlier version of this chapter has been published in the Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper series (van
der Weijde, 2014). I thank Vincent van den Berg, Achim Czerny, Hugo Silva and Erik Verhoef for their
helpful comments.
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two situations in which diﬀerent users are charged diﬀerent fares or tolls. Rather than calling
all instances where diﬀerent users or user groups are charged diﬀerent prices for the same
product ‘price discrimination’, we will distinguish between price discrimination and price
diﬀerentiation, and examine both pricing regimes separately. If I is the set of all user classes
(or individual users if each class only has one member) and fi the toll or fare charged to a
particular class i, we say that price diﬀerentiation occurs if
∃{i, j} ∈ I2 fi = fj (2.1)
If, in addition ci is the cost of travel (not including tolls) faced by user class i and ni the
number of users from class i that travel, and assuming that the marginal costs of transport
provision are independent of the user class, price discrimination occurs when
∃{i, j} ∈ I2 fi −
∑
k
(∂ck/∂ni)nk = fj −
∑
k
(∂ck/∂nj)nk (2.2)
In other words, price diﬀerentiation occurs if diﬀerent user groups are charged diﬀerent tolls
or fares, and price discrimination occurs if groups are charged diﬀerent tolls based only on
their demand structures, rather than costs. This deﬁnition of price discrimination (Eq. 2.2)
is common in the microeconomics and industrial organization literature2 (see, e.g., Stigler,
1986; Tirole, 1988; Stole, 2007; Verboven, 2008); in the more recent transportation literature
(e.g. Czerny and Zhang, 2015), on the other hand ‘price discrimination’ is often deﬁned as
in Eq. 2.1: what we call ‘diﬀerentiation’.3 If there are no external costs associated with
consumption, or if the external costs are the same regardless of which consumer buys the
product, the two deﬁnitions are the same. In transportation markets, however, users often
have diﬀerent external costs (e.g., consider the example of truck- and car drivers). Hence,
price diﬀerentiation can occur without discrimination; indeed, disallowing diﬀerentiation can
lead to discrimination. We therefore think that, in our context, it is particularly important
to make a distinction between the two. Price diﬀerentiation occurs often, and can easily be
justiﬁed on the basis of ‘fairness’; trucks, for instance, are often charged higher tolls than
passenger cars. Price discrimination, on the other hand, is often perceived as ‘unfair’, since
it diﬀerentiates between users only on the basis of their willingness to pay, not on a diﬀerence
in costs. Nevertheless, it is also practiced in transportation markets, e.g., in the form of
discounts for users above a certain age.
The third contribution of this chapter is that we explicitly consider the networked nature
of transportation markets. Most studies look at one market in isolation. This allows for the
analysis of discrimination between users or user classes, and often produces tractable, inter-
pretable results. For this reason, we too will start our analysis with a simple single-market
model, in which several user classes travel on one link, and the operator discriminates and/or
diﬀerentiates between these classes. In a network, however, users from diﬀerent origins travel
to diﬀerent destinations. When deciding what to charge for use of a link, an operator can then
also diﬀerentiate and/or discriminate based on users’ origin-destination (OD) pairs. If there
are multiple links connecting two nodes, an operator could also diﬀerentiate by route. These
last two types of diﬀerentiation and discrimination can only be analyzed using a network
model.
2There, it is usually a diﬀerence in marginal production costs that leads to diﬀerentiation without discrimi-
nation, but the idea is the same.
3Our terminology is not new: see, for example, Chen and Schwartz (2013)
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Figure 2.1: Model 1: user classes
A model that combines all these forms of price discrimination and diﬀerentiation would
be far less tractable, so we examine three separate models. In the ﬁrst (Fig. 2.1), one
congestible link is shared by two classes of users, each with its own inverse demand function.
If the monopolistic operator is not allowed to diﬀerentiate between the two classes, it sets
one fare f , which is paid by all users. If it can diﬀerentiate, it sets two fares, f1 and f2, which
are paid only by the users from the ﬁrst and second class, respectively. If diﬀerentiation is
allowed, but discrimination is not, these two fares can diﬀer only as much as the marginal
costs of the two user groups diﬀer. In transport markets, this type of price diﬀerentiation
may be achieved by, for instance, charging cars and trucks diﬀerent road prices.
In the second model (Fig. 2.2), we include serial network eﬀects, and consider price dis-
crimination and diﬀerentiation by OD-pair. There are now three nodes, two links in series
connecting them, and three groups of users: two groups short-distance travelers traveling
from node 1 to node 2 and from node 2 to 3, and long-distance travelers traveling from 1
to 3; each has its own inverse demand function. Congestion functions may diﬀer between
links, and long-distance travelers incur congestion costs on both links. Hence, while in the
ﬁrst model two groups of users impose congestion externalities on each other, this model has
three groups, each of which imposes a congestion externality on some, but not all, others.
If the operator can diﬀerentiate between OD-pairs, it sets three fares, one for each class of
users. If the long-distance travelers pay more than the sum of the two short-distance fares,
there is diﬀerentiation on at least one of the two links.4 If the operator cannot diﬀerentiate,
all users pay the same for use of each link, and hence, long-distance fares are equal to the
sum of the two short-distance fares. Again, if diﬀerentiation is allowed, but discrimination
is not, the operator still sets three fares, but any diﬀerence between the long-distance fare
and the sum of the two short-distance fares has to be related to marginal cost diﬀerences.
This type of diﬀerentiation is similar to what is sometimes called ‘price discrimination by
bundling’ (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Zhang and Czerny, 2012). Although it is common in
public transport markets markets (the ticket price for travel from A to C via B is often dif-
ferent from the sum of the prices for travel from B to C and B to C), it is certainly not used
everywhere; road prices, for instance, are often additive.
In the third model (Fig. 2.3), we look at the eﬀects of parallelity in networks. There is
only one class of users, but two parallel links, and hence, two routes, with diﬀerent congestion
functions. Here, we consider price diﬀerentiation by route. In contrast to the previous two
4I.e., the ‘product’, here, is travel between two nodes. Since there are three nodes, and two links connecting
them, there are two products. One could formulate a model with four fares (two for each link, one for
long-distance travelers, and one for short-distance travelers). However, since long-distance travelers would
always pay the sum of the two long-distance fares, only this total long-distance fare would be unique; the
individual long-distance fares themselves would arbitrary, given their total. We therefore only use the total
long-distance fare.
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Figure 2.2: Model 2: OD-pairs
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Figure 2.3: Model 3: routes
models, users only impose congestion externalities on other users taking the same route;
however, the choices they make still aﬀect all users through the inverse demand function.
If the operator can diﬀerentiate between routes, it sets two fares f1 and f2, to be paid by
N1 users taking the ﬁrst route, and N2 users taking the second, respectively. If it cannot
diﬀerentiate, it sets one fare f , which is paid by all users, regardless of their route choice. If it
can diﬀerentiate but not discriminate, f1 and f2 diﬀer only with the marginal cost functions
of the two user classes.5 This type of price diﬀerentiation (or its absence) is also present in
many public transport markets: one ticket for travel between two cities may, or may not be,
valid on a number of routes.
Together, these three models encompass the range of options for price diﬀerentiation and
discrimination in public transport markets. They are, to some extent, variations on the
same theme, and could be incorporated in one, generalized network model. Treating them
separately, however, allows us to consider the diﬀerent eﬀects of price diﬀerentiation and
discrimination in isolation. In each of the models, we derive the ﬁrst-best socially optimal
fares, and three sets of private fares: 1) as they would be set by an unrestricted monopolist,
2) in a situation where the monopolist is not allowed to diﬀerentiate, and 3) in a situation
where the monopolist is allowed to diﬀerentiate, but cannot discriminate. We then compare
these outcomes, to see if and when price diﬀerentiation and/or discrimination can improve
welfare. As far as possible, we use general cost- and demand functions; in some cases, we
need to impose linearity to produce meaningful results.
Naturally, we can not consider all possible forms of diﬀerentiation and discrimination in
this chapter. Speciﬁcally, in line with most of the existing literature, we limit the scope of our
analysis in four ways. First, we restrict ourselves to third-degree discrimination (sometimes
called ‘group discrimination’) and diﬀerentiation; implying that diﬀerent groups or classes
of users with diﬀerent characteristics are charged diﬀerent tolls. This is not the only form
5Again, the ‘product’ is deﬁned as travel between two nodes.
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of discrimination. Under ﬁrst-degree price discrimination, or diﬀerentiation, each individual
consumer can be charged a diﬀerent price. Although this normally improves welfare, as
it allows the producer to capture the whole consumer surplus in addition to its producer
surplus, it is not usually allowed or even possible. Second-degree price discrimination, in
which consumers are charged a price based on the quantity they consume, is much more
common, but less so in passenger transportation markets.
Second, note that, in the transportation literature, a distinction is often made between
‘full prices’, i.e., private costs plus fares or tolls, and ‘ticket prices’, i.e., the fares or tolls
only. Hence, there are also two potential types of diﬀerentiation and discrimination: in full
prices and in ticket prices. If private costs depend on total usage levels, as they usually do in
transportation markets, these two types are not the same. As the deﬁnitions in Eqs. 2.1–2.2
already indicates, this chapter only considers ticket price discrimination and diﬀerentiation.
Although others have also looked at discrimination in full prices (e.g. Czerny and Zhang,
2015), this type of discrimination is not usually observed in real-world markets, and would
unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
Third, we only consider internal solutions: i.e., outcomes in which at least some users
from each class travel. Corner solutions, in which one group does not travel, are certainly
interesting, but diﬃcult to analyze in a general setting, and the inclusion of the various
corner solutions that exist would overcomplicate our exposition. We compare and contrast
four cases: the social optimum, a monopoly, a monopoly where price diﬀerentiation is not
allowed, and a monopoly where price discrimination is not allowed. We do not consider other
forms of competition (e.g. oligopolies). We also do not comment on the impacts of marginal
changes in price diﬀerences or discrimination on welfare, except where that is necessary to
analyze a monopoly.
This chapter shows that restricting a monopolist to charge uniform or non-discriminatory
prices may increase or decrease social welfare, depending on the parameters of the model.
Moreover, non-discriminatory pricing is not necessarily better than uniform pricing, even
though the former is arguably the most ‘fair’ policy. In contrast to the simpler models de-
veloped in the existing literature, here, both policies have an impact on the total number of
users even if all users have the same value of time. The results obtained from a single-link
model can be generalized to a situation with serial links, where discrimination or diﬀerenti-
ation is based on the origins and destinations of users. They cannot be generalized directly
to a setting with parallel links , where diﬀerentiation is based on the routes that users take.
2.2 Diﬀerentiation and discrimination on a single link
2.2.1 Social optimum
In this model, there are two user classes, each with its own inverse demand function (D1 (N1)
and D2 (N2)). Both inverse demand functions are continuously diﬀerentiable with ﬁrst-order
derivatives D1′ (N1) < 0 and D2′ (N2) < 0. The two classes share the same link, and hence,
impose negative congestion externalities on each other. Since the two classes may be com-
posed of diﬀerent types of vehicles, these externalities need not be symmetric; adding an
additional user of one class may have a much larger eﬀect on congestion than adding an
additional user of the other. Apart from this diﬀerence in external costs, the two classes
may also have diﬀerent marginal private cost functions. They may, for instance, have a dif-
ferent value of time; although subject to the same level of congestion, this would lead the
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two classes to face diﬀerent user costs. Reﬂecting these two potential diﬀerences, we deﬁne
two user cost functions c1 = αc (βN1 + N2), and c2 = c (βN1 + N2), where β is a relative
congestion coeﬃcient, which captures the marginal external costs of class 1 users relative to
this in class 2 (e.g., a passenger car equivalent6). The α parameter measures how class 1
users value congestion relative to class 2 (e.g., a relative value of time).7 We assume that c (·)
is continuously diﬀerentiable with c′ (·) > 0. Social welfare is then the sum of the integrals
of both demand functions minus the total user costs:
W =
ˆ N1
0
D1 (n) dn +
ˆ N2
0
D2 (n) dn − (αN1 + N2) c (βN1 + N2) (2.3)
Depending on the functional forms of the inverse demand and average user cost functions,
it may be optimal to have only one group traveling. Assuming that both groups travel, a
social planner sets fares f1 and f2 (charged to the ﬁrst and second user class, respectively)
and ﬂows N1 and N2 to maximize W s.t.
D1 (N1) − αc (βN1 + N2) − f1 = 0 (2.4)
D2 (N2) − c (βN1 + N2) − f2 = 0 (2.5)
where the constraints ensure that marginal user costs plus fares equal marginal beneﬁts, and
hence, that the resulting equilibrium is consistent with the users’ preferences.
Maximizing W subject to these constraints gives f1 = (αN1 + N2)βc′and f2 =
(αN1 + N2) c′, where, c′ = ∂c/∂n2 (i.e. if users in class 2 have passenger cars, the increase
in cost resulting from the addition of one extra passenger-car equivalent); fares are equal
to marginal costs, such that all external costs are internalized by the users (see also Pigou,
1920; Knight, 1924). Following these pricing rules leads to diﬀerentiation if β = 1 as, in that
case, users have diﬀerent marginal costs; there is no discrimination: any diﬀerences in fares
between the two groups are related to marginal cost diﬀerences.
2.2.2 Unrestricted monopoly
A monopolist maximizes π = f1N1 + f2N2 subject to the same constraints as the social
planner (Eqs. 2.4–2.5). The resulting fares are:
f1 = (αN1 + N2)βc′ − N1D′1 (2.6)
f2 = (αN1 + N2) c′ − N2D′2 (2.7)
where c′ = ∂c/∂n2 and D′i = ∂Di/∂ni. Again, this is not surprising. The monopolist
charges a markup, in addition to the user’s marginal external costs: both prices are higher
than socially optimal, while both N1 and N2 are lower. Importantly, there is price diﬀerenti-
ation if β = 1 and/or D1 (n) = D2 (n). Price discrimination only occurs if D1 (n) = D2 (n),
regardless of the value of β.
6Passenger car equivalents (PCEs), ﬁrst introduced in the 1965 Highway Capacity Manual (HRB, 1965) are
widely used in road transportation studies.
7E.g., both external and private costs of class 1 users are a linear function of those of class 2. In general,
this need not be the case, but without this assumption our models would become intractable.
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Comparing welfare under unrestricted monopolistic pricing to the more restrictive policies
without diﬀerentiation or discrimination that we will examine below is diﬃcult without strong
assumptions on the inverse demand- and cost functions. We can, however, analyze in which
situations the composition of users is optimal, and how the total number of users changes
with these policies.
Given a total number of users N1 + N2, the composition of users (or share of users from
each class) is optimal if A ≡ ∂W/∂N1 − ∂W/∂N2 = 0. As long as this equality holds, it
is not possible to increase welfare by decreasing the number of users from one class while
simultaneously increasing the number of users of the other class by the same amount. Using
2.3,
ΔA = (D1 − αc) − (D2 − c) + (αN1 + N2) (1 − β) c′ (2.8)
where the ﬁrst two terms give the marginal change in private user beneﬁts resulting from the
marginal composition change, and the third term gives the marginal change in total costs.
Substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions of the unrestricted monopoly in this expression, this
can be simpliﬁed to ΔA = N2D′2 −N1D′1. Unless N2D′2 = N1D′1 (which is unlikely to happen
unless the two demand functions are equal), ΔA = 0; the composition of users is not optimal
in an unrestricted monopoly. Whether ΔA is positive or negative (and hence, whether N1
or N2 is higher then optimal) depends on the relative cost- and demand functions of the two
classes. In theory then, a more restrictive pricing policy, which disallows price discrimination
or diﬀerentiation, can improve welfare, even if it does not increase (or even reduces) the total
number of travelers. This eﬀect of a policy on the composition of users is sometimes called
the ‘allocation eﬀect’ (see, e.g., Czerny and Zhang, 2015)
Besides this allocation eﬀect, a policy change may also aﬀect the total number of trav-
elers. This may be called the ‘output eﬀect’. Although it is theoretically possible to
analyze this output eﬀect in a similar way as the allocation eﬀect (i.e. by evaluating
(N1/ (N1 + N2)) ∂W/∂N1 +(N2/ (N1 + N2)) ∂W/∂N2: keeping the composition of users con-
stant, but increasing the total), this is not useful here, as the total usage level will never be
optimal in any of the monopolistic settings we examine. Using a metric like this, we could
therefore only conclude that welfare can, in all cases, be increased by increasing the number
of travelers, but not how it changes between two monopolistic settings. We can, however,
examine how the restrictive policies change total usage levels, as we will see below.
This approach, combining information about the eﬀect of restrictive policies on output
with an analysis of the allocative eﬃciency of the resulting equilibria, is useful, because it
does not need any assumptions about demand or congestion. It does, however, also have
disadvantages. We can only say that a policy unambiguously increases welfare if it leads to
an equilibrium where A = 0, and does not decrease the total usage level. If ΔA = 0, or the
total number of users changes, we can only describe the output- and allocation eﬀects, without
knowing how they combine to aﬀect aggregate welfare. Therefore, we will complement our
analytical approach with a numerical example, in which we can more explicitly show how
welfare changes when diﬀerentiation or discrimination is now allowed.
2.2.3 Monopoly without price diﬀerentiation
This situation is similar to the above, except that f1 = f2 = f . Hence, the monopolist now
maximizes π = f (N1 + N2) s.t.
D1 (N1) − αc (βN1 + N2) − f = 0 (2.9)
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D2 (N2) − c (βN1 + N2) − f = 0 (2.10)
The optimal monopolistic fare can, in this case, be written as
f = (N1 + N2) c′
D′1 + αβD′2
D′1 + D′2 − (α − 1) (β − 1) c′
(2.11)
−N1D′1
D′2
D′1 + D′2 − (α − 1) (β − 1) c′
−N2D′2
D′1
D′1 + D′2 − (α − 1) (β − 1) c′
This immediately shows why it is important to distinguish between price discrimination and
diﬀerentiation: although there is now no diﬀerentiation, there is still discrimination if β = 1.
More importantly, enforcement of uniform pricing usually leads to price discrimination: if
D1 (n) = D2 (n) (and hence, an unrestricted monopolist would not price discriminate, but
only diﬀerentiate), the uniform price in Eq. 2.11 is discriminatory.
In general, the single fare f consists of two parts. The ﬁrst internalizes (some of) the
marginal external costs. Since these diﬀer across the two classes, the monopolist uses a
weighted average, with the weights determined by the relative slopes of the inverse demand
curves, corrected for the fact that the second group has a diﬀerent congestion parameter
β and value of time α than the ﬁrst. These parameters are taken into account because
they co-determine the sensitivity of each class to sub-optimal prices. The second term is a
weighted average of the two monopolistic markups, where, again, the weights are determined
by the slopes of the inverse demand curves, and, if α = 1 or β = 1, the slope of the cost
function. Each class’ weight is inversely proportional to its relative inverse demand slope;
the more price-sensitive a class is (i.e., the ﬂatter its inverse demand curve is), the closer
the joint markup lies to what this class’ own markup would be in an unrestricted monopoly.
The weights also include the slope of the cost function such that they correctly reﬂect the
sensitivity of each class’ demand, taking the eﬀect of changes in congestion costs into account.
Eq. 2.11 also illustrates that it is important to consider diﬀerences in external costs and
internal cost functions together; only if both are present does the cost function inﬂuence the
markup. In that case, the weights on N1D′1 and N2D′2 do not add up to one: the monopolistic
markup is not just somewhere between the two markups in an unrestricted setting. This
happens because, if users diﬀer in two dimensions, it is not possible to charge the correct
average external cost and average markup; each average needs to take into account that the
other average is distortionary.
Under a uniform pricing policy, ΔA = (αN1 + N2) (1 − β) c′. Hence, if β = 1 (all users
have the same marginal external cost; e.g., all drive the same type of vehicle), uniform pricing
always leads to an optimal composition of users – a clear improvement over an unregulated
monopoly. If β < 1, N2 is larger than optimal; if β > 1, N1 is larger than optimal. In these
cases, uniform pricing could improve or deteriorate the composition of users, depending on
the model parameters.
Determining the eﬀect of uniform pricing on the total number of users is more complicated,
as this total number is determined by the user equilibrium constraints, and does not have a
closed form solution. Assuming, without loss of generality, that f2 ≥ f1 and following Czerny
and Zhang (2015), we can deﬁne direct demand functions N (f1, f2) ≡ N1 (f1, f2)+N2 (f1, f2)
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and a price diﬀerence φ ≡ f2 − f1 ≥ 0. The total derivative of N with respect to the price
diﬀerence can then be written as:
dN
dφ
= ∂N
∂f1
df1
dφ
+ ∂N
∂f2
df2
dφ
(2.12)
=
(
∂N
∂f1
+ ∂N
∂f2
)
df1
dφ
+ ∂N
∂f2
(2.13)
Totally diﬀerentiating the user equilibrium conditions and using Cramer’s Rule gives:
∂N1
∂f1
=
(
D′2 − c′
)
/Ω < 0 (2.14)
∂N2
∂f1
= βc′/Ω > 0 (2.15)
∂N1
∂f2
= αc′/Ω > 0 (2.16)
∂N2
∂f2
=
(
D′1 − αβc′
)
/Ω < 0 (2.17)
where Ω =
∣∣∣∣∣ D
′
1 − αβc′ −αc′
−βc′ D′2 − c′
∣∣∣∣∣ = (D′1 − αβc′) (D′2 − c′) − αβc′2 > 0. All partials and
cross-partials have the expected signs. Hence,
∂N
∂f1
=
(
D′2 − (1 − β) c′
)
/Ω (2.18)
∂N
∂f2
=
(
D′1 − α (β − 1) c′
)
/Ω (2.19)
Interestingly, it is theoretically possible that one (but not both) of these partial derivatives is
positive if β is either very small, or very large. Because the link is congested, a fare increase
for one user class will increase the number of users from the other. In some cases, this increase
may be larger than the decrease in users from the ﬁrst class.
Finally, totally diﬀerentiating the operator’s proﬁt function with respect to f1 and φ gives
df1
dφ
= −∂
2π/ (∂f1∂φ)
∂2π/ (∂f1)2
(2.20)
where
∂2π
(∂f1∂φ)
= ∂N
∂f2
+ ∂N2
∂f1
+ ∂N2
∂f2
+ f1
(
∂2N
∂f1∂f2
+ ∂
2N
(∂f2)2
)
(2.21)
+φ
(
∂2N2
∂f1∂f2
+ ∂
2N2
(∂f2)2
)
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and
∂2π
(∂f1)2
= 2
(
∂N
∂f1
+ ∂N
∂f2
)
+ f1
(
∂2N1
(∂f1)2
+ 2 ∂
2N1
∂f1∂f2
+ ∂
2N1
(∂f2)2
)
(2.22)
+ (f1 + φ)
(
∂2N2
(∂f1)2
+ 2 ∂
2N2
∂f1∂f2
+ ∂
2N2
(∂f2)2
)
In a linear case, then,
df1
dφ
= −(2D
′
1 + β (1 − α) c′ + α (1 − β) c′) /Ω
2
(
∂N
∂f1
+ ∂N∂f2
) (2.23)
and hence
dN
dφ
= (α − β) c
′
2Ω (2.24)
where Ω, in this linear case, is a positive constant. Since a uniform pricing policy reduces φ
from f2 − f1 to zero, it increases output by the negative of the integral of Eq. 2.24 which, in
a linear case, is (f2 − f1) (β − α) c′/2Ω.
Contrary Czerny and Zhang (2015) (which, itself, generalizes Robinson, 1933), even if time
valuations are the same for all users (α = 1), this is not enough for the output eﬀect to be
zero if cost- and demand functions are linear; this only holds if α = β (such that each user’s
relative value of time is equal to its relative external cost). This happens because, in their
model, all users have the same marginal external cost. Since we have assumed that f2 ≥ f1,
and the increase in the number of users for a speciﬁc fare diﬀerence is given by the integral
of Eq. 2.24, the number of users is higher under uniform pricing only if α < β; i.e., the
user class that is charged the highest fare has a relatively low value of time, compared to its
relative external cost.
For general demand- and cost functions, if β > 1 and df1/dφ > 0 (i.e.; the lowest un-
restricted fare is higher than the uniform fare), the total number of users always reduces if
prices are diﬀerentiated (i.e. increases if a uniform pricing policy is enforced). If df1/dφ < −1
(i.e. the highest unrestricted fare is lower than the uniform fare), output always increases
with price diﬀerentiation. Usually, though, one would expect −1 < df1/dφ < 0, in which case
the sign of the output eﬀect is then determined by the values of α, β, and the Hessians of
the two direct demand functions.
Taking the allocation and output eﬀect together: it is, even in a linear world, only possible
to determine that a uniform pricing policy is always welfare-enhancing if β = 1 (such that
the allocation eﬀect is deﬁnitely positive) and α < 1 while f2 ≥ f1 (such that the output
eﬀect is non-negative). In all other cases, a uniform pricing policy may or may not be
welfare-enhancing, depending on the model parameters. In the numerical example below, we
will explore this further.
2.2.4 Monopoly without price discrimination
Here, as in the unrestricted monopoly, the monopolist maximizes π = f1N1 + f2N2, now s.t.
Eqs. 2.4–2.5 and
f1 − (αN1 + N2)βc′ = f2 − (αN1 + N2) c′ (2.25)
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Assuming, for tractability, that users costs are linear, and thus, c′′ = 0,
f1 = (αN1 + N2)βc′ − N1D′1
D′2 + (α − β) c′
D′1 + D′2 − 2α (β − 1) c′
(2.26)
−N2
(
D′2 − (β − 1) c′
) D′1 + (α + β − 2αβ) c′
D′1 + D′2 − 2α (β − 1) c′
f2 = (αN1 + N2) c′ − N1D′1
D′2 + (α − β) c′
D′1 + D′2 − 2α (β − 1) c′
(2.27)
−N2
(
D′2 − (β − 1) c′
) D′1 + (α + β − 2αβ) c′
D′1 + D′2 − 2α (β − 1) c′
In the non-diﬀerentiated setting above, the monopolist charged all users an average
marginal cost, plus an average markup. Here, it charges each user class its actual marginal
costs. This, in turn, also aﬀects the markup. Even though this markup is, by deﬁnition, still
independent of class, the operator exploits the fact that it can at least charge every class its
own marginal costs, and consequently sets a higher markup than in Eq. 2.11. The weights on
N1D′1 and N2D′2 are now considerably more complex, but are still inversely related to each
class’ own inverse demand slope. If β ≥ 1, such that the ﬁrst user class pays the highest fare,
the average markup moves closer to the markup charged to the ﬁrst class in an unrestricted
monopoly when the relative value of time α of that class decreases.
The non-discrimination constraint ensures that ΔA = 0; by deﬁnition, the marginal change
in user beneﬁts (i.e., the diﬀerence between f1 and f2) resulting from a marginal change in
user composition is equal to the marginal change in social costs. Hence, under this policy,
the composition of users is always optimal and the allocation eﬀect is always positive. De-
termining the eﬀect of non-discriminatory pricing on output is more diﬃcult, as Eq. 2.24
can not be applied here. In this case, we cannot simply deﬁne φ as the diﬀerence in fares; φ
would then depend on N1 and N2, and cannot be treated as an exogenous variable. We must
now deﬁne φ ≡ f2 − f1 − mec. where mec = (N1 + αN2) (1 − β) c′. If discrimination is
not allowed, φ = 0. Using the same technique as before,
dN
dφ
= ∂N
∂f1
df1
dφ
+ ∂N
∂f2
df2
dφ
(2.28)
=
(
∂N
∂f1
+ ∂N
∂f2
)
df1
dφ
+ ∂N
∂f2
+ ∂N
∂f2
dmecc
dφ
(2.29)
Note the third term, which was not present in the no-diﬀerentiation analysis; this now appears
because φ is now not simply the diﬀerence in fares, but the diﬀerence in fares minus the
diﬀerence in marginal external costs. This term can be written as
dmecc
dφ
=
(
dN1
dφ
+ αdN2
dφ
)
(1 − β) c′ + (N1 + αN2) (1 − β) dc
′
dφ
(2.30)
which only disappears if β = 1, and has no clear cut sign. The addition of this term means
that, even if cost- and demand functions are linear, and α = β, the total usage level may
be diﬀerent under a non-discriminatory policy than under an unrestricted monopoly. As
we will show in the numerical example below, it may be higher or lower, depending on
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the model parameters. Hence, even though the absence or presence of price diﬀerentiation
does not change the total number of users when α = β, the absence or presence of price
discrimination does have an eﬀect.
In conclusion; a non-discriminatory policy always has a positive allocation eﬀect: it always
leads to an optimal composition of users. It may also increase the number of users, and
hence, would be socially beneﬁcial. In a linear world, this is guaranteed to happen if β = 1
(all users have the same marginal external cost) and the class that is charged the lowest fare
also has the lowest value of time. However, like uniform pricing, non-discriminatory pricing
may also decrease the number of users, and thus potentially lower welfare. Finally, there is
no guarantee that non-discriminatory pricing is always better policy than uniform pricing, as
we shall see in more detail below.
2.2.5 Numerical example
Fig. 2.4 illustrates the eﬀects described above, for a very simple linear case. In all panels, c =
10+0.1 (βN1 + N2). In the panels on the left, (a) and (c), D1 = 100−N1 and D2 = 65−N2.
In the other two panels, the inverse demand functions are reversed, such that D1 = 65 − N1
and D2 = 100 − N2. Finally, in the two top panels, (a) and (b), α = 1, whereas in the
bottom panels, α = 3. The vertical axis in both panels denotes the relative eﬃciency ω of the
non-diﬀerentiated and non-discriminatory monopolistic prices; i.e. the diﬀerence in welfare
between these settings and an unrestricted monopoly, relative to the diﬀerence in welfare
between the ﬁrst-best social optimum and an unrestricted monopoly (Verhoef et al., 1995).
If ω < 0, an unrestricted monopoly is better than the restrictive policy; a higher ω means
that a policy is closer to the social optimum.
Fig. 2.4 shows that, even with simple linear demand- and cost functions, the eﬀects of
uniform or non-discriminatory pricing policies are ambiguous. Either policy can potentially
increase or decrease welfare, relative to an unrestrictive monopoly, depending on the param-
eters of the model.
Looking at the results of uniform pricing: as we have shown above, the output eﬀect
disappears if α = β (at β = 1 in the top panels, and at β = 3 in the bottom panels). What
is left over can only be the allocation eﬀect. Clearly, this can be positive or negative. Hence,
uniform pricing can improve welfare, but it can also decrease it. In this linear example, the
latter is mostly likely to happen if the class with the highest reservation price also has a much
higher external cost than the other class.
For non-discriminatory pricing, the output eﬀect disappears only if α = β = 1; in that
case, only the positive allocation eﬀect remains. In other cases, the output eﬀect may be
negative, and large enough to oﬀset the allocation eﬀect; it may also be positive, and work in
the same direction as the allocation eﬀect. Hence, enforcing non-discrimination sometimes,
but certainly not always, improves welfare.
Uniform pricing is sometimes better than non-discriminatory pricing. In this linear ex-
ample, this happens if the class with the highest reservation price has a lower external cost
than the other class (e.g. a morning peak on a highway if the inverse demand function for
cars always lies above the inverse demand function for trucks, as may be expected) while
both classes have the same value of time. In that case, uniform pricing induces a monopo-
list to increase output, relative to an unrestricted setting, by so much that, even though a
non-discriminatory policy would lead to a better composition of users, uniform pricing is still
better. If the classes also have diﬀerent values of time, this eﬀect is parameter-dependent.
This does show, however, that a pricing strategy that is considered the most ‘fair’ may not be
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Figure 2.4: Model 1 – Numerical example
23
2 Price diﬀerentiation and discrimination in transport networks
the best in terms of social welfare. Naturally, if β = 1, uniform pricing and non-discrimination
are the same. As panel (c) shows, there may also be other β’s for which this holds, even in
this linear case.
2.3 Network eﬀects - serial links
2.3.1 Social optimum
In the previous model, we considered a situation in which multiple user classes travel between
the same two nodes, using one link. Here, we consider a setting with three nodes, connected
by two serial links, as shown in Fig. 2.2. As before, there are diﬀerent user classes; however,
these diﬀer not only in their values of time and congestion parameters, but also in origin and
destination. Users from the ﬁrst class travel between nodes 1 and 2, using only the ﬁrst link.
The second class uses the second link to travel between nodes 2 and 3, and, ﬁnally, the third
class travels from 1 to 3, using both links.
We simplify this model by assuming that the two links have the same congestion functions
c. We also assume that the inverse demand functions for short-distance travel (from 1 to
2 and from 2 to 3) are the same, such that the model becomes symmetric: fares and usage
levels will be the same on both links. The short-distance inverse demand functions are then
given by Ds (Ns), where Ns is the number of short-distance travelers on each of the two
links, while the long-distance inverse demand function is given by Dl (Nl). We do allow
for the possibility of long-distance travelers having a diﬀerent relative value of time α, and
a diﬀerent congestion coeﬃcient β, than short-distance travelers. Hence, all short-distance
travelers face costs c (βNl + Ns), while long-distance travelers incur costs 2αc (βNl + Ns).
The assumed symmetry of this model allows us to obtain more compact expressions for the
monopolistic fares, and for the welfare eﬀects. However, as we will discuss below, and show
in the appendix, the qualitative results do not depend on this assumption. A model with two
diﬀerent cost functions, one for each of the links, or diﬀerent inverse demand functions for
each of the three user classes, will not produce fundamentally diﬀerent insights, especially
when it comes to the eﬀect of price diﬀerentiation on the total number of users.
Given a symmetric solution, social welfare is given by
W = 2
ˆ Ns
0
Ds (n) dn +
ˆ Nl
0
Dl (n) dn − 2 (αNl + Ns) c (βNl + Ns) (2.31)
A social planner sets the fares for long-distance and short distance-travel, fs and fl, and
the corresponding usage levels, maximizing W . Similar to the previous model, there are two
user equilibrium constraints:
Ds (Ns) − c (βNl + Ns) − fs = 0 (2.32)
Dl (Nl) − 2αc (βNl + Ns) − fl = 0 (2.33)
Maximizing W subject to these constraints results in simple marginal-cost pricing rules:
fs = (αNl + Ns) c′ and fl = 2β (αNl + Ns) c′. Even if all users have the same congestion
coeﬃcient β, long-distance travelers still pay a higher fare than short-distance travelers,
simply because they cause congestion on two links instead of just one.
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2.3.2 Unrestricted monopoly
If it can set separate fares for short- and long-distance travelers, the monopolist maximizes
π = 2fsNs + flNl s.t. Eqs. 2.32–2.33. With no restrictions on these fares, the monopolist
can diﬀerentiate and discriminate between users from diﬀerent OD-pairs. If fl = 2fs, long-
distance travelers pay a diﬀerent fare for use of at least one of the two links than short-distance
travelers. This unrestricted setting is sometimes called ‘OD-based pricing’ (e.g., Ohazulike
et al., 2013), and leads to fares fs = (αNl + Ns) c′ −NsD′s and fl = 2β (αNl + Ns) c′ −NlD′l.
Again, these fares internalize external costs, and include a monopolistic demand-related
markup. As in the one-link model above, fares are diﬀerentiated if the inverse demand
functions of Dl and Ds diﬀer, or if β = 1; in this model, this means that diﬀerentiation takes
place on at least one of the two links.
To measure whether the composition of users on each link is optimal, given a total number
of users, we again deﬁne a A, as the change in welfare when the number of users from one
group is increased, while the total number of users is kept constant. There are now two of
these total usage levels, one on each link; both are kept constant if
A ≡ ∂W
∂Nl
− ∂W
∂Ns
Using the monopolistic fares and ﬁrst-order conditions, A = 2NsD′s − NlD′l. Hence, in
general, A = 0; a more restrictive policy can increase social welfare, even if does not change
the usage levels on both links, or even decreases them. Of course, as usual in a monopoly,
usage levels are also lower than optimal; increasing the total number of users on each link
will also increase welfare.
2.3.3 Monopoly without price diﬀerentiation
If the monopolist cannot discriminate between users traveling between diﬀerent OD-pairs, it
has to charge each user traveling on the same link the same price fs, and hence, fl = 2fs.
This situation is sometimes called ‘link-based pricing’; see chapters 3, 5, and 6 for examples.
The monopolist then maximizes π = 2fs (Ns + Nl) s.t.
Ds (Ns) − c (βNl + Ns) − fs = 0 (2.34)
Dl (Nl) − 2αc (βNl + Ns) − 2fs = 0 (2.35)
The proﬁt-maximizing fare is given by
f = (Nl + Ns) c′
D′l + 2αβD′s
D′l + 2D′s − 2c′ (α − 1) (β − 1)
(2.36)
−NlD′l
D′s
D′l + 2D′s − 2c′ (α − 1) (β − 1)
−NsD′s
D′l
D′l + 2D′s − 2c′ (α − 1) (β − 1)
which is almost the same expression as for our ﬁrst model; the only diﬀerence being the double
weight on Dl′ in the denominator of all three elements (as one long-distance traveler could
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replace two short-distance travelers), and in the numerator of the ﬁrst element. Naturally,
this will generally cause fares to be discriminatory on at least one of the links.
Under uniform pricing, A = 2 (αNl + Ns) (1 − β) c′. This means that, if β < 1, there too
many short-distance travelers on both links, while if β > 1, there are too many long-distance
travelers. Uniform pricing may have a positive or negative allocation eﬀect, depending on
the model parameters. If β = 1, the allocation of users is optimal; in that case, uniform
pricing always has a positive allocation eﬀect, as without uniform pricing the allocation of
user classes if generally suboptimal from a societal point of view.
Determining what happens to the total number of users on each link is somewhat more
complicated than for the one-link model above. However, it is still possible to deﬁne a fare
diﬀerence φ ≡ 2f2 − f1, and analyze the impact of an increase in φ on the usage levels
Ns +Nl. The derivations can be found in the appendix but, perhaps surprisingly, the results
are exactly the same as those obtained for the one-link model above: in a linear case
d (Ns + Nl)
dφ
= (α − β) c
′
2Ω (2.37)
where, here,
Ω =
∣∣∣∣∣ D
′
s − c′ −βc′
−2αc′ D′l − 2αβc′
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0 (2.38)
and hence, the total change in usage levels as a result of uniform pricing is given by
(2f2 − f1) (α − β) c′/2Ω. In a nonlinear case, the expressions are slightly diﬀerent than in a
linear case, as the cross-derivatives of the usage levels with respect to both fares are assigned
diﬀerent weights, but they are qualitatively the same. In the same way, it is possible to show
that, even if the two short-distance inverse demand functions are diﬀerent, and if the two
links have diﬀerent cost functions, φ still has no impact on the usage level of either of the
two links as long as α = β (see Appendix).
This has several implications for the welfare eﬀects of uniform pricing. Firstly, and most
importantly, the network context has no qualitative impact here: if all users’ values of time
are equal to their congestion coeﬃcients, uniform pricing does not change the usage levels of
the individual links. In other words, OD-based price discrimination in a network is exactly
the same as price diﬀerentiation between user classes traveling on the same link. This may
sound surprising, but it is important to remember that it is not the same as saying that the
total number of users in the network remains constant. The latter is obviously not the case
if there is also an allocation eﬀect.
This also means that, as before, output can be higher under uniform pricing than when
diﬀerentiation is allowed. Here, this happens if (2f2 − f1) (α − β) < 0, or, substituting in the
unrestricted monopolistic fares, if α − β and 2 (1 − β) (αNl + Ns) c′ − 2NsD′s + NlD′l have
opposite signs. There is nothing in the model that prevents this from happening; it is solely
determined by the model parameters.
2.3.4 Monopoly without price discrimination
If the monopolistic operator is not allowed to discriminate, it maximizes the same proﬁt
function as in an unrestricted setting, subject to the same user equilibrium constraints, as
well as a non-discrimination condition:
2fs − fl + 2 (β − 1) (αNl + Ns) c′ = 0 (2.39)
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If this equality does not hold, price discrimination occurs on at least one of the links.
The resulting fares are equal to
fs = (αNl + Ns) c′ − NsD′s
D′l − (3α − 2β − αβ) c′
D′l + 2D′s + c′ (4 + α) (β − 1)
(2.40)
−Nl
(
D′l + 3α (β − 1) c′
) D′s + (α + β − 2) c′
D′l + 2D′s + c′ (4 + α) (β − 1)
fl = 2 (αNl + Ns)βc′ − 2NsD′s
D′l − (3α − 2β − αβ) c′
D′l + 2D′s + c′ (4 + α) (β − 1)
(2.41)
−2Nl
(
D′l + 3α (β − 1) c′
) D′s + (α + β − 2) c′
D′1 + 2D′s + c′ (4 + α) (β − 1)
assuming, for tractability, that cost functions are linear such that c′′ = 0. Although the
expression for the uniform fare in this model was very similar to its corresponding expression
in the ﬁrst model above, the diﬀerence is larger here; in the weights multiplying the two
markups, the cost function is multiplied by a much more complex function of α and β. The
structure of the expressions is still the same: they consist of each class’ marginal costs,
plus a weighted average monopolistic markup. If β ≤ 1, such that long-distance travelers
have a lower relative congestion coeﬃcient, the average markup is closer to the unrestricted
long-distance markup if α is lower; this is also likely, though not guaranteed, to happen if
β > 1. As before, these non-discriminatory fares always lead to diﬀerentiation on at least
one of the two links if β = 1.
As in the one-link model, the non-discrimination condition ensures that A = 0. The
output eﬀect is ambiguous in sign, and not equal to zero even in a linear world where α = β,
as the fare diﬀerence φ is endogenous.
Because this setting is so very similar to the previous, we will not present a numerical
example. Instead, we directly turn to the third setting.
2.4 Network eﬀects - parallel links
2.4.1 Social optimum
In this model, there is only one inverse demand function, D (N1 + N2). However, users can
now take two routes, where each route has its own average user cost; c1 (N1) and c2 (N2),
respectively. Note that this is similar to some of the two-period models available in the liter-
ature (see e.g., Liu and McDonald, 1999); here, the two alternatives are perfect substitutes.
Social welfare is then given by
W =
ˆ N1+N2
0
D (n) dn − N1c1 (N1) − N2c2 (N2) (2.42)
A social planner chooses f1 (for route 1) and f2 (for route 2) to maximize W , subject to
two user equilibrium constraints that ensure that sum of the average user costs and the fare
is the same for both routes, and equal to the marginal user beneﬁts:
D (N1 + N2) − c1(N1) − f1 = 0 (2.43)
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D (N1 + N2) − c2(N2) − f2 = 0 (2.44)
and hence, naturally, f1 = N1c′1 and f2 = N2c′2
2.4.2 Unrestricted monopoly
A monopolist maximizes f1N1 + f2N2 s.t. the same two constraints as the social planner.
Hence,
f1 = N1c′1 − (N1 + N2)D′ (2.45)
f2 = N2c′2 − (N1 + N2)D′ (2.46)
These fares are always non-discriminatory; f1 − N1c′1 = f2 − N2c′2; a non-discriminatory
policy would not change anything. Moreover, the distribution of users over the two links
is always optimal, as ΔA ≡ ∂W/∂N1 − ∂W/∂N2 = 0. This means that a more restrictive
policy always has a negative allocation eﬀect; uniform pricing can only increase welfare if it
increases the total number of users.
2.4.3 Monopolistic pricing without diﬀerentiation
In this setting, f1 = f2 = f . Hence, the operator maximizes f(N1 + N2) s.t. D (N1 + N2) −
c1(N1) − f = 0 and D (N1 + N2) − c2(N1) − f = 0
This gives
f = N1c′1
c′2
c′1 + c′2
+ N2c′2
c′1
c′1 + c′2
− (N1 + N2)D′ (2.47)
In contrast to the two models above, the operator still charges the same demand-related
markup on both routes; this is natural, as there is only one demand function. The cost
functions are diﬀerent, so, instead of charging users of each route their marginal cost, the
operator charges a weighted average marginal cost, with weights determined by the relative
marginal costs. This time, the weights do sum to one: users only diﬀer in one dimension,
so only the part of the fare that is related to marginal costs needs to be averaged across
groups. There are no further distortions, and hence, the monopolistic markup does not
need any correction. If N1c′1 = N2c′2 (which will happen if c1 (·) = c2 (·)), these fares are
discriminatory.
Again, we consider the eﬀects of a non-diﬀerentiated pricing policy by separately looking
at the allocation and output eﬀects. In this model, ΔA = −N1c′1 + N2c′2, so, in general
ΔA = 0: the distribution of users over the two links is not optimal. As we have established,
an unrestricted monopoly does lead to an optimal composition, so uniform pricing always
has a negative allocation eﬀect.
As before, we can determine the eﬀect of price diﬀerentiation on the total number of users
by deﬁning a fare diﬀerence φ ≡ f2 − f1. Totally diﬀerentiating the direct demand function
N (f1, f1 + φ) ≡ N1 (f1, f1 + φ) + N2 (f1, f1 + φ) gives
dN
dφ
= ∂N
∂f1
df1
dφ
+ ∂N
∂f2
df2
dφ
=
(
∂N
∂f1
+ ∂N
∂f2
)
df1
dφ
+ ∂N
∂f2
(2.48)
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Totally diﬀerentiating the user equilibrium conditions and using Cramer’s rule gives expres-
sion for ∂N/∂f1 and ∂N/∂f2; substituting these in the expression above gives
dN
dφ
= − 1Ω
((
c′1 + c′2
) ∂f1
∂φ
+ c′1
)
(2.49)
where
Ω ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ D
′ − c′1 D′
D′ D′ − c′2
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0 (2.50)
This means that, if ∂f1∂φ > 0, the total number of users decreases in the amount of diﬀeren-
tiation (and hence, that a uniform pricing policy increases output). If ∂f1∂φ < −1, a uniform
pricing policy decreases output. More generally, as before
∂f1
∂φ
= −∂
2π/ (∂φ∂f1)
∂2π/ (∂f1)2
(2.51)
where the nominator can be written as
∂2π
(∂φ∂f1)
= −2c
′
1
Ω + f1
(
(∂N)2
∂f1∂f2
+ ∂
2N
(∂f2)2
)
+ φ
(
(∂N1)2
∂f1∂f2
+ ∂
2N1
∂2f2
)
(2.52)
and the denominator is positive. In a linear case,
∂f1
∂φ
= − −
1
Ω2c′1
2
(
∂N
∂f1
+ ∂N∂f2
) = − c′1
c′1 + c′2
(2.53)
and hence, dN/dφ = 0; there is no output eﬀect. As the allocation eﬀect is negative,
uniform pricing always decreases welfare. If the demand function is non-linear, the second
an third terms in Eq. 2.52 are nonzero, and the output eﬀect may be positive or negative,
depending on the Hessian of the direct demand functions.
2.4.4 Monopolistic pricing without discrimination
As already mentioned before, non-discrimination constraints would not be binding here; the
unrestricted monopoly is already non-discriminatory. Discrimination only occurs if diﬀerent
users are charged a diﬀerent monopolistic markup, which, in turn, can only happen if they
have diﬀerent demand structures.
2.4.5 Numerical example
Fig. 2.5 shows the results of a numerical simulation in which c1 = 10+ .1N1, c2 = 1.5+C ·N2
and D = 100 − (N1 + N2). As before, the vertical axis shows the relative eﬃciency of, in
this case, the uniform pricing policy, compared to an unrestricted monopoly. Naturally, ω is
always negative: in this linear example, N1 +N2 is the same, regardless of whether prices are
diﬀerentiated or uniform, while the socially optimal division of travelers over the two links is
optimal in the unrestricted monopoly. As C increases, the number of users on the second link
becomes smaller, and the uniform fare f is set closer to what f1 would be in an unrestricted
monopoly. This reduces the allocative ineﬃciency of the uniform pricing policy; eventually,
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Figure 2.5: Model 3 - Numerical example
if C becomes large enough, no travelers would take the second link, and price diﬀerentiation
would not aﬀect welfare at all.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have analyzed price discrimination and price diﬀerentiation in transport
networks. As we have shown, it is important to make the distinction between diﬀerentiation
and discrimination in this context, especially if users have diﬀerent values of time, or marginal
costs diﬀer for other reasons.
Our models conﬁrm that enforcing uniform or non-discriminatory pricing policies can, in
some circumstances, improve social welfare, but decrease welfare in others. Importantly,
although a non-discriminatory policy may be considered the most ‘fair’ by users, it may be
worse for welfare than uniform pricing, even if users have diﬀerent marginal costs.
Generalizing the existing literature, we have examined a situation in which users not only
have diﬀerent marginal private costs (e.g., as a result of diﬀerent values of time), but also
diﬀerent marginal external costs (e.g., because they are driving diﬀerent passenger-car equiv-
alents). This does matter: in a linear world, for instance, price diﬀerentiation still aﬀects
total usage levels even if all users have the same value of time. Only if each user’s rela-
tive value of time is equal to its relative marginal external cost does this eﬀect disappear.
Non-discrimination, on the other hand, always improves the composition of users, but may
increase or decrease the total number even in a linear model where each user’s relative value
of time is equal to its relative marginal cost, as marginal external costs depend on usage
levels.
In addition to this analysis of price discrimination and discrimination on a single link,
we have also considered situations in which there are parallel or serial links, and transport
operators can diﬀerentiate and/or discriminate based on the route users take, or on their
origin. In a network with serial links, a monopolistic operator may be able to discriminate
based on users’ origins and destinations. As we have shown, this type of discrimination is
not qualitatively diﬀerent than discrimination based on values of time or marginal external
costs. Although the monopolist’s fare setting rules are diﬀerent, all conclusions obtained in
a one-link model generalize to a network with serial links.
Route-based discrimination, as may occur in networks with parallel links, is diﬀerent than
OD-based discrimination. If demand is linear, enforcing uniform pricing over multiple routes
can never increase welfare. More generally, uniform pricing can only increase welfare if it
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substantially increases the usage level, because, if the only diﬀerence between users if the
route they take, an unrestricted monopolist will set fares such that the division of users over
the routes is optimal. An unregulated monopoly is already non-discriminatory if chosen route
is the only diﬀerence between users.
Naturally, all three models we have examined are highly stylized. Any real-world network
will simultaneously have parallel and serial links, and many diﬀerent user classes traveling
along them, between diﬀerent OD-pairs. However, our stylized models do highlight the need
for careful, situation-based analysis to evaluate the potential beneﬁts of restrictive pricing
policies. Neither uniform nor non-discriminatory pricing policies are universally welfare-
enhancing (as ﬁrst-degree price discrimination usually is) or universally decrease welfare (as
a single-link linear model where all users have the same value of time would suggest). They
also illustrate the need to distinguish between diﬀerentiation and discrimination. Although
non-discrimination may be perceived as more ‘fair’, it is not always the best.
Our results also have implications for network modeling. Because of its computational
advantages, link-based pricing, where operators do not diﬀerentiate based on OD-pairs, but
charge all users the same for use of a link, is often assumed. If real-world transport operators
are able to charge OD-based fares, these link-based models may understate or overstate the
beneﬁts of other types of regulation.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Output eﬀects in a model with two serial links
Symmetric model
Deﬁne φ ≡ 2fs − fl, and direct, link-based demand N (fs, 2fs − φ) ≡ Ns + Nl. Then,
dN
dφ
= ∂N
∂fs
dfs
dφ
+ ∂N
∂fl
dfl
dφ
= dfs
dφ
(
∂N
∂fs
+ 2∂N
∂fl
)
− ∂N
∂fl
Totally diﬀerentiating the two user equilibrium conditions and applying Cramer’s Rule
gives
∂Ns
∂fs
=
(
D′l − 2αβc′
)
/Ω
∂Nl
∂fs
= 2αc′/Ω
∂Ns
∂fl
= βc′/Ω
∂Nl
∂fl
=
(
D′s − c′
)
/Ω
where Ω ≡
∣∣∣∣∣ D
′
s − c′ −βc′
−2αc′ D′l − 2αβc′
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0
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Hence,
∂N
∂fs
=
(
D′l − 2α (β − 1) c′
)
/Ω
∂N
∂fl
=
(
D′s + (β − 1) c′
)
/Ω
Finally,
π (fs) = 2fsNs (fs, 2fs − φ) + (2fs − φ)Nl (fs, 2fs − φ)
π′ = 2N + 2fs
(
∂N
∂fs
+ 2∂N
∂fl
)
− φ
(
∂Nl
∂fs
+ 2∂Nl
∂fl
)
Treating φ as exogenous and totally diﬀerentiating this ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
φ gives
∂fs
∂φ
= −∂
2π/ (∂φ∂fs)
∂2π/ (∂fs)2
where
∂2π/ (∂φ∂fs) = 2
∂N
∂φ
− ∂Nl
∂fs
− 2∂Nl
∂fl
+ 2fs
(
∂2N
∂φ∂fs
+ 2 ∂
2N
∂φ∂fl
)
− φ
(
∂2Nl
∂φ∂fs
+ 2 ∂
2Nl
∂φ∂fl
)
= −2∂N
∂fl
− ∂Nl
∂fs
− 2∂Nl
∂fl
− 2fs
(
∂2N
∂fl∂fs
+ 2 ∂
2N
(∂fl)2
)
+ φ
(
∂2Nl
∂fl∂fs
+ 2 ∂
2Nl
(∂fl)2
)
and
∂2π/ (∂fs)2 = 4
∂N
∂fs
+ 8∂N
∂fl
+ 2fs
(
∂2N
(∂fs)2
+ 2 ∂
2N
∂fs∂fl
)
− φ
(
∂2Nl
(∂fs)2
+ 2 ∂
2Nl
∂fs∂fl
)
If demand- and cost functions are linear,
∂fs
∂φ
= 2D
′
s + (α + β − 2) c′
2
(
D′l + D′s − (2α − 1) (β − 1) c′
)
dN
dφ
= 1Ω
[
(2D′s + (α + β − 2) c′) (D′l + 2D′s − 2 (α − 1) (β − 1) c′)
2
(
D′l + D′s − (2α − 1) (β − 1) c′
) − (D′s + (β − 1) c′)
]
dN
dφ
= (α − β) c
′
2Ω
General model
In a more general model, with three inverse demand functions D12 (N12),
D23 (N23) ,D13 (N13), and cost functions c12 and c23 for the short-distance travelers,
and α (c12 + c23) for the long-distance travelers, it can be shown, in exactly the same way,
that the output eﬀect of an increase in φ is still zero if α = β.
In this case, there are three fares, and the price diﬀerence φ can be written as
φ ≡ f12 + f23 − f13 ⇐⇒ f13 = f12 + f23 − φ
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and there link-based total direct demand functions are given by
N1 (f12, f23, f12 + f23 − φ) ≡ N12 + N13
N2 (f12, f23, f12 + f23 − φ) ≡ N23 + N13
The impact of price diﬀerentiation on the usage level of ﬁrst link can then be written as
dN1
dφ
= ∂N1
∂f12
df12
dφ
+ ∂N1
∂f23
df23
dφ
+ ∂N1
∂f13
df13
dφ
= ∂N1
∂f12
df12
dφ
+ ∂N1
∂f23
df23
dφ
+ ∂N1
∂f13
(
df12
dφ
+ df23
dφ
− 1
)
=
(
∂N1
∂f12
+ ∂N1
∂f13
)
df12
dφ
+
(
∂N1
∂f23
+ ∂N1
∂f13
)
df23
dφ
− ∂N1
∂f13
In this case, there are three user equilibrium conditions. Totally diﬀerentiating those, and
using Cramer’s Rule gives:
∂N12
∂f12
=
((
D′23 − c′23
) (
D′13 − αβc′12 − αβc′23
)− αβc′223) /Ω < 0
∂N23
∂f12
= αβc′12c′23/Ω < 0
∂N13
∂f12
=
(
D′23 − c′23
) (
αc′12
)
/Ω > 0
∂N12
∂f23
= αβc′12c′23/Ω < 0
∂N23
∂f23
=
((
D′12 − c′12
) (
D′13 − αβc′12 − αβc′23
)− αβc′212) /Ω < 0
∂N13
∂f23
=
(
D′12 − c′12
) (
αc′23
)
/Ω > 0
∂N12
∂f13
=
(
D′23 − c′23
) (
βc′12
)
/Ω > 0
∂N23
∂f13
=
(
D′12 − c′12
) (
βc′23
)
/Ω > 0
∂N13
∂f13
=
(
D′12 − c′12
) (
D′23 − c′23
)
/Ω < 0
where Ω ≡
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
D′12 − c′12 0 −βc′12
0 D′23 − c′23 −βc′23
−αc′12 −αc′23 D′13 − αβ (c′12 + c′23)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 0
Finally, the ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization can be written as
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∂π
∂f12
= N1 + f12
(
∂N1
∂f12
+ ∂N1
∂f13
)
+ f23
(
∂N2
∂f12
+ ∂N2
∂f13
)
− φ
(
∂N13
∂f12
+ ∂N13
∂f13
)
= 0
∂π
∂f23
= N2 + f12
(
∂N1
∂f23
+ ∂N1
∂f13
)
+ f23
(
∂N2
∂f23
+ ∂N2
∂f13
)
− φ
(
∂N13
∂f23
+ ∂N13
∂f13
)
= 0
treating φ as exogenous and totally diﬀerentiating these ﬁrst-order conditions gives
d
dφ
∂π
∂f12
= ∂
2π
(∂f12)2
df12
dφ
+ ∂
2π
∂f23∂f12
df23
dφ
+ ∂
2π
∂φ∂f12
= 0
d
dφ
∂π
∂f23
= ∂
2π
∂f12∂f23
df12
dφ
+ ∂
2π
(∂f23)2
df23
dφ
+ ∂
2π
∂φ∂f23
= 0
Using Cramer’s Rule:
df12
dφ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
− ∂2π∂φ∂f12 ∂
2π
∂f23∂f12
− ∂2π∂φ∂f23 ∂
2π
(∂f23)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ / |H| ,
df23
dφ
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2π
(∂f12)2
− ∂2π∂φ∂f12
∂2π
∂f12∂f23
− ∂2π∂φ∂f23
∣∣∣∣∣∣ / |H|
where H is the Hessian of π:
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2π
(∂f12)2
∂2π
∂f23∂f12
∂2π
∂f12∂f23
∂2π
(∂f23)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∂2π
(∂f12)2
∂2π
(∂f23)2
−
(
∂2π
∂f12∂f23
)2
If demand- and cost functions are linear,
∂2π
∂φ∂f12
= −
(
∂N1
∂f13
+ ∂N13
∂f12
+ ∂N13
∂f13
)
∂2π
∂φ∂f23
= −
(
∂N2
∂f13
+ ∂N13
∂f23
+ ∂N13
∂f13
)
∂2π
(∂f12)2
= 2
(
∂N1
∂f12
+ ∂N1
∂f13
)
∂2π
∂f23∂f12
= ∂N1
∂f23
+ ∂N1
∂f13
+ ∂N2
∂f12
+ ∂N2
∂f13
∂2π
(∂f23)2
= 2
(
∂N2
∂f23
+ ∂N2
∂f13
)
These expressions can be substituted in ∂f12/∂φ and ∂f23/∂φ, and the result combined
with the partial derivatives of the usage levels with respect to the fares and the expression
for dN1/dφ given above. This straightforward substitution exercise is too tedious even for
this appendix, and the resulting expression is too long to print here. It is, however, equal to
zero when α = β.
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3 Competition in multi-modal transport
networks: a dynamic approach1
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter dealt with the behavior of a monopolistic transport operator, and
speciﬁcally focused on situations in which that operator charged diﬀerent groups of users
diﬀerent prices. Although some transport markets are indeed monopolistic, others operate
under varying levels of competition. This chapter therefore considers a competitive setting,
in which rail operators compete with each other and with parallel roads, and compares this
to a monopoly.
A substantial literature exists on road pricing, as well as on the eﬀects of road pricing
on public transport markets, and second-best pricing of roads in the presence of unpriced
substitutes. In reality, road pricing is politically diﬃcult to implement and, with a few
exceptions, roads remain unpriced. It is therefore interesting to consider the opposite, but
common situation, in which roads are unpriced, but public transport has a usage fee, which
is set while taking the eﬀects on the roads into account.
Recent decades have seen a shift from governmental provision of public transport to pro-
vision by private ﬁrms, thus reducing the government’s control over fares. However, not all
systems have been privatized in the same way and consequently, various market structures
have emerged. Although, in many countries, there is now at least some form of vertical sep-
aration between service operators and infrastructure managers, the amount of competition
between service operators diﬀers greatly. In some countries, such as The Netherlands, one
operator owns the exclusive rights to operate most or even all connections in the network; in
others, such as the UK, new operators can freely enter the market to oﬀer new services, or
directly compete for franchises to operate existing ones.
We therefore test how these diﬀerent market structures inﬂuence public transport fares and
social welfare, and how they compare with governmental provision. In particular, we analyze
the diﬀerence between markets with a monopolistic public transport operator, which operates
all public transport links, and markets in which separate operators own each public transport
link. Standard economic theory would predict that in normal markets, both Bertrand (price)
and Cournot (quantity) competition lead to lower prices than a monopoly; in the former,
prices would be driven down to marginal costs when there are at least two competitors; in
the latter, prices approach marginal costs only when the number of competitors approaches
inﬁnity.
Transport systems usually consist of several interacting markets, and there are unpriced
externalities associated with travel, so these standard results do not always apply. Previous
studies (Economides and Salop, 1992; see De Borger et al., 2008 for a transport application)
1This chapter is based on joint work with Erik Verhoef and Vincent van den Berg. An earlier version of this
chapter has been published in Transportation Research Part B (van der Weijde et al., 2013b). I thank
Hugo Silva, Sergej Gubins and the participants of the 2011 Kuhmo Nectar conference for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
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have shown that, generally, parallel (or horizontal) competition, where a number of competi-
tors oﬀer diﬀerent possibilities to travel between two points, is beneﬁcial, both to consumers
and to society. In contrast, serial (or vertical) competition, in which diﬀerent operators own
complementary links, increases fares and adversely aﬀect social welfare. In this situation,
each serial competitor exerts local market power, and is able to set a price above marginal
cost. If the overall demand is price-sensitive, this has a negative eﬀect on the patronage of
other links, but this externality is disregarded by the individual operators; a phenomenon
that is comparable to the mechanism of double marginalization.
However, these results have been obtained with static models. In these models, commuters
only choose a mode, or combination of modes, to travel; the models disregard the fact that
commuters can also choose the moment at which they travel. In most real-world applications,
commuters do have this choice, and empirical evidence suggests that this has non-negligible
eﬀects (Small, 1982). In contrast to the previous chapter, we will therefore use dynamic
modeling techniques, and examine how this aﬀects competition. In order to do so, we assume
that demand is ﬁxed, such that we can isolate dynamic interaction eﬀects from possible eﬀects
of price-sensitive demand.
To further improve tractability, we only examine networks in which commuters from dif-
ferent origins, located along one transportation corridor, travel to one destination; this may,
for example, represent a morning commute from a series of suburbs to a central business
district. More general network models exist (e.g. Pels and Verhoef, 2007), but are often
too complicated to yield the economic insights we are interested in. Simpler multi-modal
network models (e.g. Arnott and Yan, 2000; Verhoef, 2008) often assume that there are only
two nodes in the network, that only one mode is chosen for the entire journey, or that all
parallel links are exactly the same, which is too simple for our purposes. There is also some
earlier literature on the properties of congested many-to-one commuter networks similar to
ours (e.g. Tian et al., 2007; Arnott and DePalma, 2011), but these are usually concerned with
the user equilibrium only, and do not include competing parallel modes. Most recently, Li
et al. (2012) analyzed a multi-modal many-to-one transport corridor in which modes share the
same highway, but their model does not allow for serial competition between public transport
operators.
We therefore combine elements from diﬀerent contributions to this literature, to model a
simple dynamic multi-modal many-to-one commuter network where transfers between modes
are possible, but costless. In this way, we can capture the essence of serial competition,
parallel competition, mode choice and departure time choice in one analytical framework, and
study the eﬃciency of diﬀerent types of market organization. Using this model, we obtain a
reduced form of the public transport operator’s optimal fare setting problem, assuming that
its fare is constant over time. This reduced form is considerably simpler and easier to use
than the original optimal control problem, and we can use it to show that in this dynamic
model, even though the total travel demand is inelastic, serial Bertrand-Nash competition on
the public transport links leads to diﬀerent fares than a serial monopoly. However, contrary
to the results obtained in classic studies on vertical competition, the diﬀerence between
duopolistic and monopolistic fares is not necessarily positive. We also show why these results
cannot be observed in static models, and further examine these results in a series of numerical
simulations.
The following section will outline the methodology and assumptions. In section 3.3, we
examine the fare-setting behavior of public transport operators in a static model with ﬁxed
demand, and brieﬂy discuss why the monopolistic and serial Nash-Bertrand equilibrium fares
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are equal in that setting; this gives us a benchmark against which to compare the results of a
dynamic model. In section 3.4, we then formulate this dynamic model, derive a reduced form
of the public transport operator’s proﬁt optimization problem and again compare monopolis-
tic and serial Nash-Bertrand fares. Section 3.4 illustrates these issues with a numerical version
of the dynamic model, and examines which parameters inﬂuence the diﬀerence between the
monopolistic and duopolistic fares, and thus social welfare. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Methodology
Even our simple models require a signiﬁcant amount of notation. Table 3.1 summarizes the
main indexes, variables and parameters that will be used in our exposition.
To examine the eﬀects of diﬀerent market structures in a multi-modal network, we will
ﬁrst consider the simplest possible network in which this is possible, and later consider how
the results obtained can be generalized. This simple network, shown in Fig. 3.1, consists
of three nodes (two origins and one destination), which are connected by two segments.
Each segment consists of two links. We will call these two links “rail” and “road”, but
they could also represent other modes, as long as they are completely separate, such that
commuters using one node do not inﬂuence the travel costs of the commuters on the other
node. Importantly, we ignore the discrete nature of public transport, and instead assume
that passengers can depart and arrive continuously. Although it is theoretically possible to
include a limited number of departures, this major complication would not qualitatively aﬀect
the results.2 Both modes are congestible; roads, because travel speeds depend on the number
of passengers, and trains, because travelers experience discomfort as a result of in-vehicle
crowding (see Wardman and Whelan, 2011 and Li and Hensher, 2011 for an overview of the
literature on crowding in public transport).
Travelers treat the two modes as perfect substitutes, so that Wardropian equilibrium condi-
tions apply for used alternatives; their generalized prices should be equal in equilibrium, and
there are no unused alternatives with a lower price (Wardrop, 1952). If modes were imperfect
substitutes, this would reduce the eﬀects of competition, but it would not eliminate them.
We examine a typical morning commute, in which N commuters travel from node 1 to the
destination, and another N commuters from node 2 to the destination3. Commuters from
node 1 can transfer to a diﬀerent mode at node 2, although, as we will see in sections 3 and
4 below, this assumption does not inﬂuence the results in an interior equilibrium; it is also
possible to disallow all transfers or only allow transfers in one direction. Transfers are costless
since, in an interior equilibrium, a positive transfer cost would simply eliminate all transfers.
The total number of commuters traveling from each node, N , is ﬁxed, as we want to exclude
the eﬀects of elastic demand from our analysis, and in particular keep them from complicating
the comparison of equilibrium use levels across alternative market conﬁgurations.
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider a static model, in which departure time decisions are
ignored; the congestion costs commuters face are inﬂuenced by all commuters using the same
links. Afterwards, we will examine a dynamic model, in which commuters choose a departure
time to minimize the total cost of traveling, and only the number commuters traveling on
2Especially if passengers do not know the schedule and headways are exogenous; in that case, each passenger
would simply incur an additional cost, equal to the value of waiting time multiplied by the expected waiting
time. If passengers know the schedule or headways are endogenous, solutions will be very diﬃcult to obtain
(See also Tian et al., 2007).
3This assumed equality of commuter numbers simpliﬁes notation, but could otherwise easily be dropped.
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Indices
l Segments (1, 2)
m Modes (R = road, T =train)
t Time
Variables
cmon Operation and maintenance costs of a monopolistic
operator
cl Operation and maintenance costs of a duopolistic operator
on segment l
fml Usage fee for mode m on segment l (road price or rail fare)
nml Number of commuters traveling on mode m, segment l
tm1 Arrival time at the destination of the ﬁrst commuter from
the ﬁrst node who has used mode m
tm2 Arrival time at the destination of the ﬁrst commuter from
the second node who has used mode m
vml Arrival ﬂow on link l, mode m
rml Congestion costs faced by users of mode m on segment l
sml Travel speed on link l, mode m
πmon Proﬁt of a monopolistic operator
πl Proﬁt of a duopolistic operator on segment l
θ Schedule delay costs of a commuter arriving at the
destination
Parameters
N Number of commuters traveling from each node to the
destination
M Segment length
t∗ Desired arrival time (common to all travelers)
Table 3.1: Notation
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Figure 3.1: Network
the same links at the same time inﬂuences the congestion cost they face. In that model,
there is ﬂow congestion on the road, as in Chu (1995), a reformulation of Henderson (1974);
travel speeds of commuters depend on the traﬃc ﬂow at the moment of arrival, where there
are no speciﬁc restrictions on the functional form of this relation. This assumption allows
us to obtain reduced-form formulations that could not have been obtained if other forms of
congestion, such as bottleneck congestion, would have been present.
In the general formulation, we only examine interior solutions, in which all modes are
used from all origins; where necessary, we assume that such a solution exists. The numerical
analysis allows for all possible equilibria, and thus for the possibility that one or more links
may remain unused in equilibrium.
3.3 Static model
3.3.1 Generalized prices
Commuters traveling over segment l pay a road price fRl or rail fare fTl , where the index
T stands for train travel, and R for road travel. We will assume that these fares are time-
invariant, and that operators cannot discriminate between users traveling on a given link. In
addition to that, they also face a congestion cost rml , m ∈ {T,R}, which is a function of the
number of commuters traveling on that same link, nml . Since there is no time dimension in
the static model, schedule delay costs are not deﬁned.
3.3.2 Rail monopoly
A monopolistic rail operator, which operates both rail segments, maximizes the sum of the
revenues of both links minus operating and maintenance costs cmon:
Max πmon = fT1 nT1 + fT2 nT2 − cmon
(
nT1 , n
T
2
)
(3.1)
There are two Wardropian user equilibrium constraints for commuters from the upstream
node, as they can follow three possible mode choice patterns (train–train, car–car and car–
train), and one constraint ensuring user equilibrium for commuters from the downstream
node, as they can only choose between two modes (train or car). Two other constraints
apply, ensuring that all commuters from each origin travel. The Lagrangian for proﬁt opti-
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mization can therefore be written as
Lmon = fT1 nT1 + fT2 nT2 − cmon
(
nT1 , n
T
2
)
(3.2)
+λ1
[
rT1
(
nT1
)
+ fT1 − rR1
(
nR1
)
− fR1
]
+λ2
[
rT2
(
nT2
)
+ fT2 − rR2
(
nR2
)
− fR2
]
+λ3
[
nT1 + nR1 − N
]
+ λ4
[
nT2 + nR2 − 2N
]
where λ1 to λ4 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints mentioned above.
Combining and simplifying the ﬁrst-order conditions yields the optimal monopolistic rail
prices:
fTl =
∂cmon
∂nTl
+ nTl
∂rTl
∂nTl
+ nTl
∂rRl
∂nRl
(3.3)
Hence, the price on each link consists of the marginal cost of accommodating an extra
commuter on that link, and a congestion-related mark-up. This mark-up consists of two parts.
The second term in Eq. 3.3 is the increase in congestion costs that all rail users experience
as a result of an increase in the number of users; naturally, the monopolist internalizes these
costs. The third term in Eq. 3.3, which also internalizes part of the congestion on the road, is
the equivalent of a standard monopolistic mark-up in a market with price-sensitive demand.
With an inverse demand function dTl (nTl ) and in absence of an alternative mode, this mark-up
would be equal to –nTl
(
∂dTl /∂n
T
l
)
. Because, in our model, any rail traveler shifted away from
rail to road, the term ∂rRl ∂nRl in Eq. 3.3 is equivalent to what −∂dTl /∂nTl would be in this
conventional setting.
3.3.3 Rail Bertrand-Nash duopoly
If the two rail links are owned by separate operators, each operator maximizes its own proﬁts,
while both maximization problems are subject to the same constraints as those applying for
the monopolistic operator. Hence, the two Lagrangians are:
Lb1 = fT1 nT1 − c1
(
nT1
)
+ λb1
[
rT1
(
nT1
)
+ fT1 − rR1
(
nR1
)
− fR1
]
(3.4)
+λb2
[
rT2
(
nT2
)
+ fT2 − rR2
(
nR2
)
− fR2
]
+λb3
[
nT1 + nR1 − N
]
+ λb4
[
nT2 + nR2 − 2N
]
Lb2 = fT2 nT2 − c2
(
nT2
)
+ γb1
[
rT1
(
nT1
)
+ fT1 − rR1
(
nR1
)
− fR1
]
(3.5)
+γb2
[
rT2
(
nT2
)
+ fT2 − rR2
(
nR2
)
− fR2
]
+γb3
[
nT1 + nR1 − N
]
+ γb4
[
nT2 + nR2 − 2N
]
where λb1 to λb4 and γb1 to γb4 are Lagrangian multipliers. The sum of the two duopolists’
operation and maintenance costs may be larger than those of the monopolist if the latter can
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exploit economies of scale, so c1 + c2 ≥ cmon. The ﬁrst-order conditions yield:
fTl =
∂cl
∂nTl
+ nTl
∂rTl
∂nTl
+ nTl
∂rRl
∂nRl
(3.6)
With the exception of the ﬁrst term, Eq. 3.6 is equal to Eq. 3.3; contrary to a standard
Bertrand duopoly, both operators can raise their prices above marginal production cost cTl ,
for two reasons. The ﬁrst is that they internalize the congestion externality on their own link,
and collect the revenue from the associated toll. The second is that the serial setup implies
that they are not oﬀering pure substitutes, but rather complements, so that the parallel road
is their direct competition; not the other duopolist.
3.3.4 Price comparison
If the monopolistic operator does not beneﬁt from economies of scale in the number of rail
links it owns, and thus ∂cl/∂nTl = ∂cmon/∂nTl , Eqs. 3.3 and 3.6 are equal; there is no
diﬀerence between Bertrand-Nash and monopolistic prices. Only if ∂cl/∂nTl > ∂cmon/∂nTl ,
which may be the case if a monopolistic operator can save costs as a result of owning both
links, it is possible that monopolistic and duopolistic fares are diﬀerent. Since the exact
parameters of the model determine whether this happens or not, we will ignore this case in
the analyses below.
To some extent, the above results are intuitive. Since demand is perfectly inelastic, all
users have to travel, and all commuters from node 1 (the upstream node) pass through node
2, where they can take the train regardless of the mode they used to arrive there. Hence, the
number of train travelers between each pair of nodes does not depend on the rail fare on the
other link. In other words, a duopolistic operator does not have to take into account how
its customers arrived at the start of its segment or how they will depart at the end, nor how
much this costs the customers, since the number of customers arriving at and departing from
each segment is ﬁxed. The monopolistic optimization problem is therefore perfectly separable
in the two segments, and the two duopolists set exactly the same prices as the monopolist.
So far, we have allowed commuters from node 1 to transfer between modes in either way,
by not placing any restrictions on nT2 and nR2 . However, transfers between modes do not
have to be considered explicitly; it can be shown mathematically that the inclusion of an
additional constraint specifying that nT2 > nT1 (such that only transfers from road to train
are possible) or nT2 > nT1 and nR2 > nR1 (such that no transfers are possible) does not
change the results, as these constraints do not aﬀect the rail fares, and will apply to both
duopolists and to the monopolist. The reason that the fare setting problem is still separable,
even when transfers are not possible, is that commuters from the downstream node equalize
the generalized price of travel on both modes on the downstream segment. Hence, when
commuters from the upstream node decide which mode to use, it is suﬃcient for them to
only consider the road prices and rail fares on the upstream segment, since the full price of
traveling on the downstream segment is, thanks to the downstream commuters, independent
of the chosen mode.
3.4 Dynamic model
The static model above does not allow commuters to choose a departure time that minimizes
their generalized travel price. Although this may be realistic in some settings, departure
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time choices cannot be ignored in most real-world situations, especially in the context of
congestion, and it is important to consider if the model outcomes are diﬀerent if departure
time choices are indeed included.
The full dynamic formulation of the problem outlined above yields a complex optimal con-
trol problem, as rail operators should now maximize the time integral of proﬁts on each link,
subject to integral constraints and temporal Wardropian equilibrium conditions. However, it
is possible to derive a reduced-form formulation, under the assumption that fares are constant
over time, as is the case in many real-world situations. In order to do this, we ﬁrst establish
the arrival order of commuters from the diﬀerent origins and modes. We then divide the
time between the arrival of the ﬁrst and last commuters at the destination in four periods,
and subsequently solve the resulting reduced-form model as if it were a static optimization
problem.
3.4.1 Generalized prices and arrival order
As before, users face road prices or rail fares, and a congestion cost rml . In the dynamic
model, however, the congestion costs are a function of the number of commuters arriving at
the same time, so rml (t) = rml (vml (t)), were vml (t) is the number of commuters using mode
m arriving at time t at the end of link l. In addition, commuters also face a schedule delay
cost θ, which increases as commuters arrive further away from their preferred arrival time
t∗. For simplicity, we assume that late arrivals (after t∗) are not allowed.4 We also assume
that the free-ﬂow travel speed of a car is higher than the speed of a train; this allows for
establishment of the arrival order.5
Deﬁne tR1 as the time the ﬁrst road–road commuter from node 1 arrives at the destination,
and tR2 the time the ﬁrst road commuter from node 2 arrives. To ensure user equilibrium,
∂rR1
∂vR1
∂vR1
∂t +
∂rR2
∂vR2
∂vR2
∂t +
∂θ
∂t = 0 when commuters from node 1 are traveling, and
∂rR2
∂vR2
∂vR2
∂t +
∂θ
∂t = 0
when commuters from node 2 are traveling, such that generalized prices are constant over
time and no commuters want to change their arrival time. Moreover, generalized prices faced
by users from both nodes have to be lower when they are traveling then when they are not
traveling.
Using these facts, it can be shown that tR2 > tR1 , that the ﬂow of road-road commuters from
node 1 is positive from tR1 to t∗ and that the ﬂow of road commuters from node 2 is positive
from tR2 to t∗. Moreover, as soon as road commuters from node 2 start to arrive, the arrival
ﬂow of commuters from node 1 becomes constant.
These properties are not diﬃcult to prove. Commuters from node 2 increase their arrival
ﬂow over time to exactly oﬀset the decrease in their schedule delay costs. If commuters from
node 1 travel at the same time, the ﬂow on the ﬁrst segment must be constant to keep the
generalized prices for these commuters constant over time. This also implies that commuters
from node 1 must start to travel ﬁrst, such that their arrival ﬂow is strictly positive when
commuters from node 2 start to travel.6
4It is also possible to allow late arrivals, which is more realistic, but this complicates the analysis without
yielding additional insights. In line with some of the previous literature, (e.g. Arnott and Kraus, 1995,
1993; Kraus and Yoshida, 2002) late arrivals are therefore prohibited.
5In the absence of a road price, this assumption could be relaxed; the ﬁrst road user would depart earlier
than the ﬁrst rail user even if the free-ﬂow speeds of both these modes were equal.
6Tian et al. (2007) more rigorously show some of these properties for a single-mode many-to-one network
with discrete departure times. Arnott and DePalma (2011) do the same for a single-mode many-to-one
network where origins are distributed continuously.
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Road RI t
R
1 ≤ t < tR2
RII tR2 ≤ t ≤ t∗
Train TI t
T
1 ≤ t < tT2
TII tT2 ≤ t ≤ t∗
Table 3.2: Time periods
Deﬁne tT1 as the time the ﬁrst rail–rail commuter from node 1 arrives at the destination,
and tT2 the time the ﬁrst rail commuter from node 2 arrives. Assuming that the free-ﬂow travel
speed on the road is higher than or equal to the travel speed of the train, tT1 ≥ tR1 . As on the
road, the ﬁrst upstream commuter arrives ﬁrst, so tT2 > tT1 . Hence, tR1 ≤ tT1 , tR2 , tT2 < t∗. Fig.
3.2 shows an example of the user equilibrium arrival ﬂows in model with linear congestion
costs and linear costs of schedule delay.
Using these insights, we can divide period between the ﬁrst and last arrival into four
partially overlapping periods; two for road travel and two for rail travel, as summarized in
Table 3.2. Within each time period, the generalized price faced by commuters using the
indicated mode is constant, to satisfy the Wardropian user equilibrium constraints.
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium arrival order and arrival ﬂows at destination
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3.4.2 Price setting – monopolistic rail operator
Period RI
As explained above, the generalized user price for road-road commuters from the upstream
node arriving at the destination at time t is given by:
fR1 + fR2 + rR1
(
vR1
(
t − M
sR2 (t)
))
+ rR2
(
vR2 (t)
)
+ θ (t;β) (3.7)
Note that commuters arriving at the destination at time t enter the second segment at time
t−M/sR2 (t), as M/sR2 (t) is the time needed to traverse the second segment; hence, congestion
costs, which are assumed to be a function of the ﬂow of commuters out of the segment, are
incurred at that time.
In a Wardropian equilibrium, these generalized prices are time-invariant, so the time-
derivative of Eq. 3.7 is equal to zero during the whole period. Moreover, since no commuters
from another node use the road in this period and both links are identical, each individual
commuter’s speed is constant along the whole route, so vR1
(
t − M
sR2 (t)
)
= vR2 (t), and therefore
∂vR1
(
t − M
sR2 (t)
)
/∂t = ∂vR2 (t) /∂t = −
∂θ (t)
∂t
/
(
∂rR1
∂vR1
+ ∂r
R
2
∂vR2
)
(3.8)
An expression for the road travel ﬂow in this period can be obtained by integrating Eq.
3.8:
vR1
(
t − M
sR2 (t)
)
= vR2 (t) = −
ˆ
∂θ (t)
∂t
/
(
∂rR1
∂vR1
+ ∂r
R
2
∂vR2
)
dt (3.9)
where, by construction, vR1
(
tR1 − MsR2
(
tR1
)) = vR2 (tR1 ) = 0; there a no arrivals before tR1 . Using
this, the total numbers of commuters using both roads during this interval, NRI1 (for the ﬁrst
segment) and NRI2 (for the second segment) can be written as the integral of the arrival ﬂow,
which is now a function of tR1 and tR2 only:
NRI1 = NRI2 =
tR2ˆ
tR1
vR2 (t) = NRI1
(
tR1 , t
R
2
)
dt (3.10)
Period TI
In this period, the generalized user costs for train–train commuters are constant over time.
Moreover, since only commuters from the upstream node use the train, vT1
(
t − M
sT2 (t)
)
=
vT2 (t). vT1 and vT2 are therefore given by:
vT1
(
t − M
sT2 (t)
)
= vT2 (t) = −
ˆ
∂θ (t)
∂t
/
(
∂rT1
∂vT1
+ ∂r
T
2
∂vT2
)
dt (3.11)
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where, by construction, vT1
(
tT1 − MsT2
(
tT1
)) = vT2 (tT1 ) = 0 Hence, the total number of com-
muters traveling by train on the ﬁrst and second segment, respectively, can be written as:
NTI1 = NTI2 =
tT2ˆ
tT1
vT2 (t) = NTI1
(
tT1 , t
T
2
)
dt (3.12)
Period RII
Now, the generalized user costs for road–road commuters from the upstream node and road
commuters from the downstream node are constant over time, and equal to those of users in
the previous period. Moreover, the ﬂow of road–road commuters from the upstream node is
constant, so ∂vR1
(
t − M
sR2 (t)
)
/∂t = 0. Hence, the total number of commuters using the ﬁrst
road segment in this period can be obtained through multiplication of the commuter ﬂow
at tR2 − MsR2
(
tR2
) (since commuters exiting the ﬁrst segment at that time will arrive at their
destination at tR2 ) with the length of the period:
NRII1 =
((
t∗ − M
sR2 (t∗)
)
−
(
tR2 −
M
sR2
(
tR2
)
))
vR1
(
tR2 −
M
sR2
(
tR2
)
)
(3.13)
= NRII1
(
tR1 , t
R
2
)
On the downstream link, ∂v
R
2 (t)
∂t = −∂θ(t)∂t /
∂rR2
∂vR2
, and therefore
vR2 (t) = −
ˆ
∂θ (t)
∂t
/
∂rR2
∂vR2
dt (3.14)
where vR2
(
tR2
)
is given by Eq. 3.9. Thus,
NRII2 =
t∗ˆ
tR2
vR2 (t) dt = NRII2
(
tR1 , t
R
2
)
(3.15)
Period TII
Here, the generalized user costs for all types of commuters are constant over time, and equal
to those of users in the previous period. Moreover,
∂vT1
(
t − M
sT2 (t)
)
/∂t = 0. Hence,
NTII1 =
((
t∗ − M
sT2 (t∗)
)
−
(
tT2 −
M
sT2
(
tT2
)
))
vT1
(
tT2 −
M
sT2
(
tT2
)
)
(3.16)
= NTII1
(
tT1 , t
T
2
)
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NTII2 =
t∗ˆ
tT2
vT2 (t) dt = NTII2
(
tT1 , t
T
2
)
(3.17)
where vT2 (t) = −
´ ∂θ(t)
∂t /
∂rT2
∂vT2
dt and vT2
(
tT2
)
is given by Eq. 3.11.
3.4.3 Monopolistic rail fares
A monopolistic operator chooses the four earliest arrival times
{
tR1 , t
R
2 , t
T
1 , t
T
2
}
and both fares
to maximize the sum of proﬁts in all four periods:7
max πm =
(
NTI1 + NTII2
)
fT1 +
(
NTI2 + NTII2
)
fT2 (3.18)
Since we have expressed the numbers of commuters using each mode as a function of the
arrival times of all groups of commuters, using the Wardropian user equilibrium conditions,
these four arrival times are now decision variables, instead of the original commuter numbers.
Since fares are time- invariant, no further temporal user equilibrium constraints are necessary,
because they have already been substituted in the total commuter numbers. However, two
intermodal user equilibrium constraints are needed to ensure that, for users from both nodes,
the generalized prices of both modes are equal. These constraints can be evaluated at a
number of points in time, but, since all groups commuters are traveling at t = t∗, it is
convenient to use that point:
fT1 + rT1
(
v¯T1
(
tT1 , t
T
2
))
= fR1 + rR1
(
v¯R1
(
tR1 , t
R
2
))
(3.19)
fT2 + rT2
(
v¯T2
(
tT1 , t
T
2
))
= fR2 + rR2
(
v¯R2
(
tR1 , t
R
2
))
(3.20)
where v¯ml if the ﬂow on mode m, link l at time t = t∗. The ﬁnal two constraints ensure that
all commuters travel:
NTI1 + NTII1 + NRI1 + NRII1 = N (3.21)
NTI2 + NTII2 + NRI2 + NRII2 = 2N (3.22)
The Lagrangian for proﬁt maximization then becomes:
Lm = πm + λ1
(
fT1 + rT1
(
v¯T1
)
− fR1 − rR1
(
v¯R1
))
(3.23)
+λ2
(
fT2 + rT2
(
v¯T2
)
− fR2 − rR2
(
v¯R2
))
+λ3
(
NTI1 + NTII1 + NRI1 + NRII1 − N
)
+λ4
(
NTI2 + NTII2 + NRI2 + NRII2 − 2N
)
where λ1 to λ4 are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints 3.19–3.22. The
relevant ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂Lm
∂fT1
= NTI1 + NTII1 + λ1 = 0 (3.24)
7For simplicity, we assume that costs have no inﬂuence on the diﬀerence between the optimal monopolistic
and duopolistic prices, and thus that there are no economies of scale in the number of links owned. If this
were not the case, general conclusions are impossible (see also the static model above).
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∂Lm
∂fT2
= NTI2 + NTII2 + λ2 = 0 (3.25)
∂Lm
∂tR1
= −λ1 ∂r
R
1
∂v¯R1
∂v¯R1
∂tR1
− λ2 ∂r
R
2
∂v¯R2
∂v¯R2
∂tR1
+ λ3
(
∂NRI1
∂tR1
+ ∂N
RII
1
∂tR1
)
(3.26)
+λ4
(
∂NRI2
∂tR1
+ ∂N
RII
2
∂tR1
)
= 0
∂Lm
∂tT1
= fT1
(
∂NTI1
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT1
)
+ fT2
(
∂NTI2
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT1
)
(3.27)
+λ1
∂rT1
∂v¯T1
∂v¯T1
∂tT1
+ λ2
∂rT2
∂v¯T2
∂v¯T2
∂tT1
+λ3
(
∂NTI1
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT1
)
+ λ4
(
∂NTI2
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT1
)
= 0
∂Lm
∂tR2
= −λ1 ∂r
R
1
∂v¯R1
∂v¯R1
∂tR2
− λ2 ∂r
R
2
∂v¯R2
∂v¯R2
∂tR2
+ λ3
(
∂NRI1
∂tR2
+ ∂N
RII
1
∂tR2
)
(3.28)
+λ4
(
∂NRI2
∂tR2
+ ∂N
RII
2
∂tR2
)
= 0
∂Lm
∂tT2
= fT1
(
∂NTI1
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT2
)
+ fT2
(
∂NTI2
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT2
)
(3.29)
+λ1
∂rT1
∂v¯T1
∂v¯T1
∂tT2
+ λ2
∂rT2
∂v¯T2
∂v¯T2
∂tT2
+λ3
(
∂NTI1
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT2
)
+ λ4
(
∂NTI2
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT2
)
= 0
Using Eqs. 3.24–3.29, it is possible to obtain closed-form solutions for fT1 and fT2 ; however,
the resulting expressions are very tedious, and economic interpretation is therefore hard to
give.
3.4.4 Duopolistic rail fares
A Bertrand operator on the ﬁrst segment maximizes its own proﬁt, subject to the same
constraints as the monopolistic operator. The relevant ﬁrst-order conditions for the two
duopolists are very similar to the ones for the monopolist; Eqs. 3.24–3.26 and 3.28 are
unchanged, although the shadow prices are diﬀerent. Eqs. 3.27 and 3.29 are replaced by:
∂Lb1
∂tT1
= fT1
(
∂NTI1
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT1
)
+ γ1
∂rT1
∂v¯T1
∂v¯T1
∂tT1
+ γ2
∂rT2
∂v¯T2
∂v¯T2
∂tT1
(3.30)
+γ3
(
∂NTI1
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT1
)
+ γ4
(
∂NTI2
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT1
)
= 0
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∂Lb1
∂tT2
= fT1
(
∂NTI1
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT2
)
+ γ1
∂rT1
∂v¯T1
∂v¯T1
∂tT2
+ γ2
∂rT2
∂v¯T2
∂v¯T2
∂tT2
(3.31)
+γ3
(
∂NTI1
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT2
)
+ γ4
(
∂NTI2
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT2
)
= 0
∂Lb2
∂tT1
= fT2
(
∂NTI2
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT1
)
+ ϕ1
∂rT1
∂v¯T1
∂v¯T1
∂tT1
+ ϕ2
∂rT2
∂v¯T2
∂v¯T2
∂tT1
(3.32)
+ϕ3
(
∂NTI1
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT1
)
+ ϕ4
(
∂NTI2
∂tT1
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT1
)
= 0
∂Lb1
∂tT2
= fT2
(
∂NTI1
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT2
)
+ ϕ1
∂rT1
∂v¯T1
∂v¯T1
∂tT2
+ ϕ2
∂rT2
∂v¯T2
∂v¯T2
∂tT2
(3.33)
+ϕ3
(
∂NTI1
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
1
∂tT2
)
+ ϕ4
(
∂NTI2
∂tT2
+ ∂N
TII
2
∂tT2
)
= 0
Again, it is possible to solve for fT1 and fT2 , but this does not yield helpful results.
3.4.5 Fare comparison and comparison with static model
Although, in this general setting, it is not possible to determine in which cases the fare
diﬀerentials between the monopolistic and duopolistic settings is positive or negative, the
diﬀerence between Eqs. 3.27–3.29 and 3.30–3.33 clearly shows that there is no reason that
this diﬀerential will be zero, as it was in the static model. Each duopolist disregards the eﬀect
that a change in its fare will have on its competitor’s patronage. Fares on one link inﬂuence
patronage on the other, because a change in one fare aﬀects the trip timing of all commuters
using that link, which indirectly aﬀects the trip timing of all commuters, and therefore all
generalized prices. A monopolist internalizes these eﬀects.
This phenomenon is not unrelated to the ‘double marginalization’ in static networks with
price- sensitive demand, but it is diﬀerent. In that case, competitors reduce demand to a
level below the social optimum, by charging fares that are too high. Here, competitors shift
demand to sub-optimal times, by charging fares that, in principle, could be either too high
or too low. Naturally then, a static model does not capture this eﬀect, as it disregards trip
timing, and hence only allows for ineﬃciencies in the total commuter ﬂow rather than the ﬂow
at any point in time. If demand is ﬁxed, the monopolist’s fare setting problem is no longer
perfectly separable in two duopolistic problems if there are possibilities for intertemporal
substitution. If, in addition, demand is price-sensitive, both the total number of commuters
using each mode and their arrival times can be suboptimal; both the eﬀect discussed above
and the static ‘double marginalization’ are present.
There is, however, an important diﬀerence between the two. The static ‘double-
marginalization’-eﬀect always leads to duopolistic fares that are too high. If one of the
two operators increases its price, that will always reduce its competitor’s proﬁt; any fare
increase carries a negative externality on the other operator’s proﬁt. Here, the externality
may also be positive, which would decrease duopolistic fares. To see this, consider the eﬀect
of an increase in fT1 on the linear model in Fig. 3.2. Since this increase makes the train
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more expensive, relative to the road, the ﬁrst rail commuter will arrive later; tT1 will move to
the right, decreasing the ﬂow of rail–rail commuters from node 1 for all points in time. Rail
commuters from the downstream node are not directly aﬀected by this fare increase, but they
are aﬀected by the reduced ﬂow of commuters from the upstream node. This reduces their
costs, so their ﬂow will increase, and they will start to arrive earlier; tT2 will move to the left.
If the congestion and schedule delay functions are such that the change in tT2 is large, proﬁts
on the second segment may increase, rather than decrease.
An increase in fT2 has a diﬀerent eﬀect. Again, if the behavior of travelers from node 2
would not change, it makes rail travel more expensive, relative to the road, for commuters
from node 1; they will arrive later, which reduces the incoming ﬂow into node 2. However,
rail commuters from that node now also face a higher fare, so tT2 may move to the left or
right. If it moves far enough to the right, ﬂows on the ﬁrst segment may in fact continue to
increase for longer than before, and hence, the ﬁrst operator’s proﬁts may increase. Again,
this depends on the exact form of the congestion and schedule delay functions. It is more
likely to happen if the schedule delay function has a steep slope, such that ﬂows increase
more rapidly, and a small change in tT2 has a larger eﬀect on the total number of rail–rail
commuters from node 1.
In Section 3.5, we analyze these eﬀects in a numerical model. There, we do indeed ﬁnd
that the externality one operator imposes on its competitor can be both negative or positive,
and hence, that duopolistic fares can be higher or lower than monopolistic fares, depending
on the parameters of the model.
3.4.6 Towards a general network
The above results, and the reduced-form optimization problem used to obtain them, also
apply to a more general multi-modal many-to-one commuter network. The only assumption
needed is that, in equilibrium, all routes are used at least some time. As long as this is the
case, adding more serial origin nodes, or adding more parallel modes between all nodes will
not qualitatively change the results. It is also possible to allow the total number of commuters
per node to diﬀer across nodes. Although this will complicate the derivations, the qualitative
results will again not change.
It is signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult to also allow for travel to more destinations; for example,
from node 1 to 2. In this case, travel time growth on a downstream link cannot at the same
time compensate for schedule delay cost developments for travelers using only that link, and
travelers using that link together with other links, when travel delays are time-varying. This
would lead to a temporal separation of travelers from diﬀerent OD-pairs, and diﬀerent models
have to be developed to address this. It is also diﬃcult to allow for other network structures,
where not all nodes can be placed on a straight line; in that case, establishing an arrival order
ex-ante may be impossible, and numerical simulations would have to be performed for every
possible combination. Also for the present setting, however, numerical modeling can produce
additional insights, as we will see in the next section.
3.5 Numerical analysis
The above analysis shows how a reduced-form of the dynamic user equilibrium can be derived
analytically. This reduced form was then used to prove that, in a dynamic model, there is
likely to be a diﬀerence between monopolistic and duopolistic fares. It is possible to obtain
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closed-form expressions for the user equilibrium ﬂows, as functions of the fares. However,
these allow for little, if any, economic interpretation. Closed-form expressions for the optimal
fares are more diﬃcult to obtain, and even more diﬃcult to interpret. It is not possible
to derive when this diﬀerence is positive or negative, nor how exactly it is inﬂuenced by
the various model parameters, without specifying the congestion functions rml (vml ), and the
schedule delay function θ (t). However, these questions are important, particularly to assess
whether they lead to fares and commuter ﬂows that are further away from the optimum, or
whether they could cancel out some of the negative eﬀects of the traditional static ‘double
marginalization’-phenomenon in a more realistic network setting with price-sensitive demand.
We therefore present the results of a numerical analysis, and use those results to identify
how the various model parameters inﬂuence optimal monopolistic and duopolistic fares. Al-
though much of the previous literature has focused on fares only, it is equally important to
examine the welfare implications of the two market structures. To do so, we also consider the
relative social costs under both market structures; since demand is ﬁxed, this is the negative
of social surplus.
3.5.1 Functions and base case parameters
Train speeds, ST , are constant. However, commuters face in-vehicle crowding costs, which we
assume to increase linearly in the commuter ﬂow. Fares are constant over time. A traveler’s
total costs of traveling on a link are then:
rTl (t) + fTl = α
M
ST
+ Mξ1vTl (t) + fTl (3.34)
where α is the value of travel time, M the segment length, and ξ1 a parameter. Link-based
congestion costs for road users consist only of the costs of travel time and, as before, roads
are not priced:
rRl (t) = α
M
sRl (t)
(3.35)
where sRl (t) is the road speed on segment l at time t. Travel times increase linearly in the
commuter ﬂow8with a maximum (free-ﬂow) speed SR:
1
sRl (t)
= 1
SR
+ ξ2vRl (t) (3.36)
where ξ2 is a parameter. Finally, schedule delay costs θ (t) are linear in t:
θ (t) = β (t∗ − t) (3.37)
where β is the value of schedule delay early. As before, late arrivals are prohibited. Base
case parameters are listed in Table 3.3; they are chosen to result in realistic fares and costs
of congestion.
For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of transporting passengers is zero; as-
suming a constant positive marginal cost would complicate the analysis without qualitatively
changing the results. Without loss of generality, ﬁxed costs are also set to zero. The total
8I.e., there is ﬂow congestion as in Chu (1995). Since the network consists of two serial segments, the more
popular bottleneck congestion is diﬃcult to implement. For simplicity, the congestion function is linear;
there is no hypercongestion.
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Parameter Value
α 5 /hr
β 3 /hr
M 10 km
ST 100 km/h
SR 120 km/h
ξ1 .002 (/pass.)(km/h)-1
ξ2 .002 (pass./hr)-1(km/h)-1
N 100 pass.
Table 3.3: Base case parameters
social costs are then
C =
∑
m
∑
l
ˆ
rml (t) + θ(t)dt (3.38)
= N
(
rR1 (t∗) + 2rR2 (t∗)
)
−
(
NTI1 + NTII2
)
fT1 −
(
NTI2 + NTII2
)
fT2
as generalized prices are equal on both modes, while only rail travelers pay a fare.
3.5.2 Value of time and value of schedule delay
We ﬁrst vary the value of schedule delay, ﬁxing all other parameters to the values listed in
Table 3.3; in eﬀect, we therefore vary the ratio between the value of schedule delay and the
value of time. The left panel in Fig. 3.3 shows the diﬀerence between the duopolistic and
monopolistic price for each segment, as a fraction of the monopolistic price. The right panel
shows the social cost diﬀerence as a fraction of monopolistic welfare; positive values indicate
that social costs are higher in a duopoly.
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Figure 3.3: Varying the value of schedule delay
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An increase in β has two eﬀects. Since being early at work is now more expensive, com-
muters will want to arrive closer to their desired arrival time, and the total network-wide
congestion costs will be higher (see Eqs. 3.9 and further above, where now ∂θ (t) /∂t = β).
Both the monopolist and the duopolists take advantage of the increased level of conges-
tion to raise fares, but the duopolists disregard the eﬀect on each other’s patronage, and
consequently raise fares by a higher amount than the monopolist. This increases the fare
diﬀerential. However, an increased value of schedule aﬀects rail and road users in diﬀerent
ways. While, in this linear model, road travel ﬂows increase at rate β/2αMξ2 in period
RI and twice as fast in period RII (see Eqs. 3.8 and 3.35–3.36), rail ﬂows increase at rate
β/2Mξ1 in period TI and twice as fast in period TII (see Eqs. 3.11 and 3.34). Since rail
ﬂows increase at a higher rate to begin with, an increase in the value of schedule delay also
has a higher impact on train users. Hence, an increase in β reduces the market power of rail
operators, and thus the tendency of the duopolists to charge higher fares, which reduces the
price diﬀerential. As Fig. 3.3 shows, the second eﬀect is clearly stronger on the more heavily
congested downstream segment, as well as on the downstream segment for large values of β.
The ﬁrst eﬀect dominates for very small values of β. However, both are small; although the
relative fare diﬀerences do vary in β, they do not vary by large amounts.
The ﬁgure also shows that, whatever the value of schedule delay, the fare diﬀerential is
much higher on the upstream segment. This results from the fact that all fares are lower
on this segment due to the lower number of commuter traversing it; the same absolute fare
diﬀerence therefore leads to much higher fractions on the upstream segment.
Finally, although the diﬀerence is small in relative terms, the duopolistic fare on the down-
stream segment can be lower than the monopolistic fare. This is more likely to happen as
the value of schedule delay approaches the value of time, and implies that commuters from
node 2 can be worse oﬀ in the monopolistic situation. This is an important observation, as it
is a clear diﬀerence with the static ‘double marginalization’ eﬀect; while the latter can only
lead to higher duopolistic fares, the dynamic eﬀect can reduce fares and hence, work in the
opposite direction. However, although the numerical results therefore conﬁrm the analytical
ﬁnding that the duopolistic fare may be smaller than the monopolistic fare, this eﬀect may
have a limited quantitative impact in practice, despite its qualitative signiﬁcance. The right
panel in Fig. 3.3 also shows that, for society as a whole, a monopoly is still preferable. Al-
though the relative social costs do vary with the value of schedule delay, as a result of varying
fares and commuter ﬂows, social costs remain between 4% and 5% higher in the duopolistic
situation.
3.5.3 Congestion
Fig. 3.4 shows the results of a similar exercise as above, in which ξ1, the rail congestion
parameter, is varied from 1/1000 to 1/100. This parameter multiplies the commuter ﬂow
in the link-based rail cost functions, so an increase in ξ1 increases the cost of in-vehicle
crowding. Since ξ2 is held constant, this increases the importance of congestion in the train
relative to the importance of congestion on the road. We can therefore again expect two
eﬀects: ﬁrstly, as ξ1 increases, rail operators face tougher competition from the road, which
will decrease fares, and the tendency of duopolistic competitors to charge higher fares than
a monopolist. However, the congestion costs increase in the whole network, as commuters
equate the generalized prices of the two nodes. This increases the tendency of duopolistic
competitors to charge higher fares.
All fares do indeed decrease in ξ1; as congestion in the train is more costly, competition from
52
3.5 Numerical analysis
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
Ξ1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
f d f m
f m
0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
Ξ1
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
C dC m
C m
Segment 1 Segment 2
Figure 3.4: Varying the costs of congestion
the road increases, and rail fares subsequently decrease. The relative fare diﬀerence between
duopoly and monopoly, however, increases in ξ1 on both segments; the total congestion eﬀect
is, in this case, stronger. Again, however, this eﬀect is relatively small in the observed range.
Again, also, a monopoly is always more eﬃcient than a duopoly, although the cost diﬀerence
between the two is very small for a very high unit cost of congestion. This shows that the
social surplus eﬀects of a parameter change can be rather diﬀerent from the eﬀects on fares.
3.5.4 Congestion and value of schedule delay
So far, we have considered the inﬂuence of the congestion parameter and the value of schedule
delay separately. Of course, there are also interaction eﬀects between these two parameters.
Fig. 3.5 therefore shows the eﬀects of a change in the value of schedule delay for a congestion
parameter twice as high as the value used in Fig. 3.3 (ξ1 = .004)
Comparing Figs. 3.3 and 3.5, it is clear that this interaction eﬀect is important. With
this higher congestion parameter, the ﬁrst, direct eﬀect of an increase in β on congestion (see
above) and thus on the ability of operators to charge higher fares, is much more important.
However, the ranges of relative fare diﬀerences have not changed much. The inﬂuence of
the value of schedule delay on the fare diﬀerential is still limited and social cost diﬀerences,
although lower, also do not change by large amounts when β is varied.
3.5.5 Commuter numbers
Fig. 3.6 shows the results of a simulation in which the number of commuters departing from
each node was increased to up to ten times the base case value. Naturally, all fares increase
in the number of commuters, as an increased number of commuters increases the congestion
costs in the system. Both the monopolist and the duopolists are able to increase their fares
as a result of a higher number of commuters. The duopolists, disregarding the externality
they impose on their competitor’s patronage, increase their fares more than the monopolist;
hence, absolute fare diﬀerences increase in N. However, the relative fare diﬀerence changes
53
3 Competition in multi-modal transport networks
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
Β
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
f d f m
f m
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5
Β
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
C dC m
C m
Segment 1 Segment 2
Figure 3.5: Varying the value of schedule delay (ξ1 = 004)
very little, and the same is true for the relative welfare diﬀerence.
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Figure 3.6: Varying the number of commuters
3.5.6 Numerical conclusions
The relative fares and relative cost diﬀerences appear to be remarkably robust in this numer-
ical exercise. That suggests that lessons on desirable market organization one can draw for
this particular spatial setup are quite generic, which is good news if policies are to be devel-
oped in a changing world or under conditions of uncertainty on parameter values. Moreover,
although duopolistic fares are smaller than monopolistic fares for at least some parameter
ranges, this eﬀect, though qualitatively signiﬁcant, may only have a limited quantitative im-
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pact. From a social perspective, a monopoly is still preferable, in terms of global welfare, in
all observed parameter ranges, although there may be distributional eﬀects: social welfare in
one of the nodes may be higher under a duopoly.
3.6 Conclusions
We have shown that, in a multi-modal many-to-one commuter network where rail operators
compete with unpriced roads, serial competition can inﬂuence fares, even in the absence
of elastic demand. This results from the fact that, in a dynamic model, commuters have
possibilities for intertemporal substitution, even if they do not have the option not to travel.
Therefore, a fare change on one rail link changes not only the number of rail commuters
relative to the number of road commuters, but also their trip timing decisions. If demand is
ﬁxed, the former will not necessarily aﬀect anyone traveling on other links in the network,
as we have shown with a simple static model, but the latter will change passengers ﬂows in
the whole network and through those, other operators’ patronages and proﬁts. Naturally, a
monopolistic operator internalizes the eﬀect a price increase on one link has on the patronage
of the other links, but a Bertrand-Nash operator disregards this, which leads to diﬀerent, and
potentially higher fares.
However, compared to static models, dynamic models are much more diﬃcult to solve.
For the many-to-one network described above, we have derived a reduced form under the
assumption that fares are time-invariant, in which the rail operators optimize their fares
and the boundaries of arrival time intervals, rather than the commuter ﬂows. This makes
subsequent calculations considerably easier, although general analytical solutions are still
diﬃcult to obtain.
Our numerical simulations show that, although duopolistic fares are higher than monopo-
listic for a wide range of parameters, this need not always be the case. Especially if the value
of time approaches the value of schedule delay, and the unit cost of congestion in the train is
higher than on the road, fares on at least one link may in fact be lower in a duopoly. This is
a distinct diﬀerence with the static ‘double marginalization’-eﬀect observed in models with
price-sensitive demand. However, the simulations also show that model parameters, such as
the value of schedule delay and the cost of congestion have only a limited eﬀect on the fare
diﬀerence between a monopoly and a duopoly and on the diﬀerences in social costs. This
indicates that the conclusions drawn above are robust to assumption changes, and may also
apply in many other spatial setups.
More research is necessary to explore these issues in at least three directions. Firstly,
the eﬀect of ownership on the substitute mode (the road) should be examined, especially in
situations where the road is owned by a public operator, who sets a second-best road price to
oﬀset the negative eﬀects of serial competition in the rail market. Secondly, as the numerical
simulation shows that the fare increases may not aﬀect all groups of commuters equally, local
policy makers may try to inﬂuence the rail market to compensate the commuters in their
area by, for example, subsidizing rail commuters from traveling from one node, or limiting the
number of train services on one link. This could be modeled by adding an additional level,
in which local governments maximize the social beneﬁt in one node only by manipulating
the variables over which they have control. Finally, a more general network setting, in which
there is more than one destination, should be explored, as spatial interactions are clearly
important.
However, despite the relative simplicity of the models outlined above, they do show that it
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is important to consider the eﬀects of market structures in a situation where rail operators
compete with an unpriced road, and to consider them in a dynamic setting. This introduces
another reason for fare diﬀerences between diﬀerent forms of competition, through the com-
muter’s departure timing choices. As we have shown, although these eﬀects often work in
the same direction as the classic ‘double marginalization’ that occurs when demand is elastic,
there is a potential for it to work in the opposite direction. In any case, it should not be
ignored, and we have shown ways to facilitate implementation.
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4 A Hotelling model with price-sensitive
demand and asymmetric distance costs: the
case of strategic transport scheduling1
4.1 Introduction
The Hotelling model is probably the most well-known model for studying product diﬀeren-
tiation in markets with multiple competitors. Although originally framed in the context of
locational choice along a linear market, it has various possible interpretations. One of these is
to consider timing as the relevant measure of product diﬀerentiation, in which case Hotelling’s
‘space’ becomes ‘clock time’, and ‘transport costs’ between consumers and suppliers become
‘schedule delay costs’. In this chapter, we propose a general formulation of the Hotelling
model that has exactly this interpretation.
In particular, we study how competing transport operators, active in the same market, can
use the departure times of their services as strategic instruments. This has, so far, received
relatively little attention in the literature; usually, only fares and frequencies are considered.
In the previous chapters, scheduling decisions have also been ignored. However, a better
understanding of strategic scheduling is important, not only because it could help explain
observed changes in service stability as a result of deregulation (see, for example, Douglas,
1987), but also because departure time choices can have a large impact on transport users,
and hence, regulators should know how to deal with them.
There is some existing literature on scheduling, mostly related to the deregulation of the
British bus industry in the 1980s. These studies often assume an inﬁnitely repeating schedule
(for example, Foster and Golay, 1986; Evans, 1987), such that headways are constant, or
focus on head-running and other short-term scheduling decisions (for example, Ellis and
Silva, 1998). Most similar to our approach, van Reeven and Janssen (2006) analyze transport
scheduling decisions using a circular Salop model. This model builds upon the Hotelling model
and avoids its endpoints by making the market circular rather than having two end points that
have the maximum distance in the market. In this way, schedules are still inﬁnitely repeated.
If there are no transport services during the day, or if there is a distinct oﬀ-peak period, this
is less appropriate; moreover, van Reeven and Janssen need an additional attribute, such as
service quality, for a stable equilibrium to emerge, and travelers have to care more about
that attribute than about fares or departure times. This makes the model less attractive. We
therefore propose a Hotelling model, in which operators schedule services in a discrete time
interval.
Hotelling’s (1929) classic paper on horizontal diﬀerentiation argues that, when two ﬁrms
compete on locations only, and a given number of consumers distributed along a linear market
1This chapter is based on joint work with Erik Verhoef and Vincent van den Berg. An earlier version of
this chapter has been published in the Journal of Transport Economics and Policy (van der Weijde et al.,
2014). I thank the participants of the 2012 Kuhmo Nectar conference and the 2014 ASSA Meetings for
helpful comments.
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buy from the closest ﬁrm, the two ﬁrms locate as closely together as possible. Later work has
generalized Hotelling’s model in several ways; most importantly (d’Aspremont et al., 1979)
have shown that that Hotelling’s original result was invalid if ﬁrms set prices, in addition to
locations. Price-setting behavior results in the absence of a pure-strategy equilibrium when
combined with linear transport costs, and to maximum diﬀerentiation when combined with
quadratic transport costs.
Most analyses have kept the assumptions that demand at every location is perfectly inelas-
tic, and that the user costs of traveling are independent of direction. There are exceptions;
Wauthy (1996b) formulates a two-stage model with elastic demand in the context of verti-
cal diﬀerentiation. Puu (2002) proposes a Hotelling model with elastic demand, in which
locations and prices are determined simultaneously (a mathematical formulation of Smithies,
1941), but his calculations have been shown to be ﬂawed (Sanner, 2005). Colombo (2011)
includes elastic demand and asymmetric distance costs, but his model is unidirectional: travel
costs in one direction are inﬁnite. Nilssen (1997) and Nilssen and Sørgard (2002) formulate lo-
cation choice models with asymmetric distance costs, but assume that prices are exogenously
ﬁxed, and that there is only one consumer with unit demand at each location. Finally,
Gu and Wenzel (2012) formulate a Salop model with elastic demand, but their formulation
is unfortunate, in that the distance between consumers and their suppliers negatively af-
fects consumer utility, while their demand is a function of the price only; not of the transport
costs. To our knowledge, there are no existing horizontal diﬀerentiation models which include
price-sensitive demand at every location, allow for asymmetric distance costs, and include
price-setting in addition to location choice.
The assumptions mentioned above may yield good approximations in many applications,
but for transport scheduling, they are oversimpliﬁcations. Transport demand is usually price-
sensitive, since people can choose not to travel, or alternative modes of transport may be
available. Furthermore, Hotelling’s ‘distance’ or ‘travel costs’ in this setting represent the
costs of schedule delay, and the cost of being late is usually higher than the cost of being
early (Small, 1982). Our models generalize Hotelling’s horizontal diﬀerentiation model to in-
clude price-sensitive demand and allow for asymmetric schedule delay costs. Although we do
so in the context of transport scheduling, our models can be applied in other instances, such
as telecommunications markets (for example, as a generalization of Cancian et al., 1995).
As in a traditional horizontal diﬀerentiation model, two competitors choose a location on
a ﬁxed interval. In our case, this is an interval in time, such that the two locations are
departure times of transport services. The two competitors also set their fares. Consumers
are distributed uniformly along the interval; their location indicates their desired departure
time, such that they face a schedule delay cost that increases in the deviation from their
desired departure time. Hence, they minimize their generalized price, which is the sum of the
fare and their schedule delay costs. Because we focus on longer-term scheduling decisions,
we assume that consumers know exactly when each service will depart, which avoids ‘bus
bunching’ and other short-term eﬀects that rely on consumers taking being unable to use a
service that departs before their desired departure time.
Most Hotelling models assume that the two competitors choose their locations or departure
times ﬁrst, after which fares are set. In scheduling, the opposite order is also conceivable,
but we show that this game does not have a Nash equilibrium; the same is true for a game in
which fares and departure times are chosen simultaneously. We ﬁnd the equilibrium fares and
departure times, examine under which conditions equilibria exist, and also compare them to
the social optimum, assuming that schedule delay costs early and late are equal. Contrary
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to other horizontal diﬀerentiation models, notably that of d’Aspremont et al. (1979), the
competitors schedule their services closer together than optimal. We then analyze how these
equilibria change if the schedule delay cost late is higher than the schedule delay cost early,
and show that the resulting equilibria can still be stable. Finally, we analyze Stackelberg
games, which increase the parameter space in which equilibria exist, and comment on optimal
second-best regulation.
4.2 Methodology
Consider a departure time and fare choice game between two duopolistic suppliers of a sched-
uled transport service. Consumers have diﬀerent preferences over desirable departure times
and, given this desired departure time, there is an elastic demand for trips. Speciﬁcally, travel
demand d (t), at any time t ∈ [−1, 1], is a linear function2 of the generalized price p(t). Since
demand cannot be negative
d(t) = Max [a − bp(t), 0] (4.1)
which holds for all t. The total consumer surplus can then be calculated as
CS = 12
ˆ 1
−1
d (t)
(
a
b
− p(t)
)
dt = 12b
ˆ 1
−1
(d(t)) 2dt (4.2)
Operators choose a fare fi and departure time ti; this assumes that each operator schedules
only one service in the observed time interval. Operator proﬁts are given by
πi = Difi − F (4.3)
where Di is the total demand for its service and F is the ﬁxed cost associated with the
operation of the service; marginal per-passenger costs are assumed to be zero. Social welfare
is then simply the sum of consumer surplus and operator proﬁts, CS +∑i πi.
The generalized price pi (t) of service i, taken by a consumer with preferred departure time
t, is the sum of the fare and the schedule delay cost. Schedule delay costs are assumed to
be linear, but not necessarily symmetric, such that the unit cost of schedule delay when a
passenger is late (γ) can diﬀer from the unit cost of schedule delay when a passenger is early
(β):
pi(t) = fi + Max [γ(ti − t), 0] + Max [β(t − ti), 0] (4.4)
Passengers choose the service that minimizes the generalized price they pay, so in equilib-
rium, their generalized price p(t) = Min[p1 (t) , p2 (t)]. If the equilibrium demand for each
operator’s service is strictly positive, we can deﬁne the inner market boundary point t∗, at
which passengers are indiﬀerent between the two operators as
t∗ = (f2 − f1 + βt1 + γt2)/(β + γ) (4.5)
where, by construction, operator 1 schedules the ﬁrst service. The total demand for each
operator’s service, D1 and D2, can then be calculated as
2In some Hotelling models, t ∈ [0, 1], but the present speciﬁcation yields more compact expressions, without
aﬀecting the conclusions.
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D1 =
ˆ t1
−1
Max[a − b(f1 + γ(t1 − t), 0]dt +
ˆ t∗
t1
Max[a − b(f1 + β(t − t1), 0]dt (4.6)
and
D2 =
ˆ t2
t∗
Max[a − b(f2 + γ(t2 − t), 0]dt +
ˆ 1
t2
Max[a − b(f2 + β(t − t2), 0]dt (4.7)
where t∗ is given by Eq. 4.5.
4.3 Social optimum
Since there are no externalities associated with demand, and assuming that the operator’s
marginal costs are zero, the social optimum can be found by simply maximizing total demand.
This implies that both fares should be equal to zero3. Assuming that, in the social optimum,
d(−1), d(t∗), d(1) > 0, meaning that there is positive demand from all preferred arrival times,
maximizing the sum of Eqs. 4.6 and 4.7 gives the social welfare-maximizing departure times:
{
tSW1 , t
SW
2
}
=
{
− γ
β + γ ,
β
β + γ
}
(4.8)
This implies that, if β = γ, the socially optimal departure times are at −1/2 and 1/2. If the
cost of departing late is higher than the cost of departing early, both departures shift to an
earlier time, such that more passengers depart early. Note, however, that this assumes that
demand is strictly positive for any t ∈ [−1, 1]. Substituting the zero fares and Eq. 4.8 into
Eq. 4.1, this implies that
a
b
− βγ
β + γ > 0 (4.9)
If this condition is not met, the social optimum must be a fully separated equilibrium, such
that there exists a t ∈ [−1, 1] for which demand is zero. In that case, the optimal fares are
still equal to zero, so any {t1, t2} that satisﬁes d(−1) = d(t∗) = d(1) = 0 is an equilibrium, as
social welfare does not depend on the exact departure times, and therewith the exact desired
arrival times served. Shifting to an earlier time will allow more passengers with an earlier
desired departure time to travel, but keeps exactly the same number of passengers with later
desired departure times from traveling, such that the net eﬀect on welfare is zero.
4.4 Full market separation
If the market is served by two private operators, two types of equilibria may emerge: either the
two operators serve fully separated markets, such that they do not compete for a marginal
passenger, or the market is fully covered. We will consider these two types of equilibria
separately, starting with full market separation.
It may be optimal for two operators to set their fares and departure times such that
d(−1) = d(t∗) = d(1) = 0, so that their markets are fully separated and each operator acts
as a monopolist on its own segment. In this case, there exists a desired departure time that
3We will disregard the possibility of setting an inﬁnitely negative fare.
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is so far away from both services that nobody with this desired departure time travels. To
examine when this would happen, consider a single monopolistic operator who can set any
departure time and fare, and faces the linear demand function in Eq. 4.1 for all t ∈ R, such
that it is not constrained by a ﬁxed time period.
Solving Eq. 4.1 to obtain the passengers with the earliest and latest desired departure
times that are traveling in this situation gives
{t, t¯} =
{
t1 − a − bf1
γb
, t1 +
a − bf1
βb
}
(4.10)
This operator’s proﬁts are then
π1 =
ˆ t¯
t
d(t)dt − F = f1 (β + γ)(a − bf1)
2
2βγb − F (4.11)
Naturally, these proﬁts do not depend on the operator’s departure time choice, as long as
both are within the {−1, 1} interval, since there is now no unique ﬁxed time period. The
operator’s proﬁt in Eq. 4.11 is maximized when
f1 = a/(3b) (4.12)
Substituting this back in Eq. 4.10 gives the passengers with the earliest and latest desired
departure times, as a function of the parameters:
{
t, t¯
}
=
{
t1 − 2a3γb, t1 +
2a
3βb
}
(4.13)
Only if t − t ≤ 1 can two fully separated monopolists with fares as in Eq. 4.12 operate
between t = −1 and t = 1. This implies that the equilibrium is fully separated if
2(β + γ)a
3βγb ≤ 1 (4.14)
since, in that case, a fully separated equilibrium always results in higher proﬁts than an
equilibrium with a covered market. If this condition does not hold, the market is fully covered.
Hence, a fully separated equilibrium is more likely to occur when the maximum number of
passengers (a), for a given t, is smaller, when the demand sensitivity (b) is higher4, for higher
costs of schedule delay, and for a larger diﬀerence between the cost of schedule delay late and
the cost of schedule delay earlier. However, operators can only recover their costs if πi ≥ 0.
Using Eq. 4.10, this implies that
2(β + γ)a3
27βγb2 ≥ F (4.15)
This, conversely, is less likely to occur when the maximum number of passengers is smaller,
the demand sensitivity is higher, and for higher costs of schedule delay. In the absence of any
subsidies, Eqs. 4.14 and 4.15 can only hold simultaneously if F ≤ a2/(9b).
4Note that the eﬀect of b runs via its impact on demand, given a. In particular, for a given price and with
equal a, the demand elasticity is independent of b
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4.5 Equilibria with covered markets
Having derived when a separated equilibrium occurs, we can now examine the various possibil-
ities for an equilibrium in which the market is entirely covered, such that the two operators
compete for the marginal customer. If Eq. 4.14 does not hold, D(−1), D(t∗), D(1) > 0,
since it would be suboptimal to stay in a situation where D1(−1) or D2(1) equal zero while
D(t∗) > 0, and vice versa. The resulting equilibrium is considerably more complicated that
the fully separated one, which is why we will start by assuming that β = γ, in order to derive
tractable results, before we consider asymmetric schedule delay costs.
If markets are covered, the equilibrium fares and departure times depend on the order
in which they are chosen if a sequential game structure is allowed. We will examine three
possibilities: either fares and departure times are chosen simultaneously, or departure times
are chosen ﬁrst, while fares are chosen only after the departure times have been ﬁxed, or
vice versa. In all cases, we initially assume Nash behavior, moving to Stackelberg games in
section 4.6.
4.5.1 Simultaneous departure time and fare choice
Puu (2002) analyses a Hotelling game in which locations and prices are chosen simultaneously,
and derives an equilibrium where both suppliers charge equal prices, and t1 = −t2. However,
as Sanner (2005) shows, this equilibrium only appears to be stable because of a calculation
error. In reality, each operator could obtain a higher proﬁt by choosing the same location as
its competitor, while undercutting its competitor’s price with an arbitrarily small amount.
It would then serve the entire market of its competitor, plus at least part of its own original
market. Hence, in this situation, no stable equilibrium exists.
This result continues to hold if there are more than two competitors or if demand functions
are nonlinear, for the same reason; it is always possible for one competitor to take its direct
neighbor’s place and undercut its price by an arbitrarily small amount, and then obtain the
full market. As long as the two operators were competing for the marginal customer, the
proﬁt of the undercutting competitor will then increase. Only if one of the operators sets
its fares and locations before the other can an equilibrium exist; we will brieﬂy examine this
game in section 4.6 below.
4.5.2 Fares chosen before departure times
We can ﬁnd the equilibrium by backward induction, by ﬁrst solving ∂πi∂ti = 0 for i = {1, 2} to
obtain the optimal departure times, substituting these in the operators’ proﬁt functions, and
then solving for the optimal fares. The optimal timing response functions for both operators
are
t1 = −45 +
1
5β
(
2a
b
− 3f1 + f2
)
+ t25 (4.16)
t2 =
4
5 −
1
5β
(
2a
b
+ f1 − 3f2
)
+ t15
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Solving Eq. 4.16 to obtain the equilibrium departure times t∗i (f1, f2) gives
t∗1 = −
2
3 +
1
3β
(
a
b
− 2f1 + f2
)
(4.17)
t∗2 =
2
3 −
1
3β
(
a
b
+ f1 − 2f2
)
The equilibrium fares can then be obtained by solving ∂πi|{t1=t
∗
1,t2=t∗2}
∂fi
= 0, which gives
optimal response functions5
fi =
16a
39b +
10
39(fj + β) −
1
39
√
334
(
a
b
)2
− 460(fj + β)a
b
+ 295(fj + β)2 (4.18)
These derivations are tedious, and the resulting expressions have no intuitive interpretation.
The optimal response functions can be solved to obtain the equilibrium fares. However, this
equilibrium is not stable. Substituting the equilibrium fares into the cross-partial derivatives
of Eq. 4.18, ∂fi/∂fj , results in a tedious expression which, however, is smaller than one
for any positive β. This means that undercutting strategies are proﬁtable as long as the
operators are making positive proﬁts. Instead of setting a fare equal to Eq. 4.18, any of the
two competitors could set its fare an arbitrarily small amount lower. The other would then
also adjust its fare, but by a smaller amount, since ∂fi/∂fj < 1. In the timing subgame, this
competitor could then simply choose the other’s departure time; with its lower fare, it would
get the entire market. Since both competitors can use this undercutting strategy proﬁtably
as long as positive proﬁts are made, the equilibrium is never stable.
This result continues to hold if the value of schedule delay early is higher than the value
of schedule delay late. In that case, equilibrium proﬁts are likely to be asymmetric, so
undercutting may only be a proﬁtable strategy for one of the operators, but this still results
in instability. The same is true if demand or schedule delay function are non-linear; as long
as ∂fi/∂fj < 1 for at least one of the operators, and as long as the operators compete for the
marginal traveler, any equilibrium where positive proﬁts are made is unstable.
4.5.3 Departure times chosen before fares
Symmetric schedule delay costs (β = γ)
Again, we ﬁnd the equilibrium by backward induction. Solving ∂πi∂fi = 0 for i = {1, 2} gives the
optimal fare response functions for both operators. Solving these gives the fare equilibrium:
f∗1 =
a
2β + β
(
2 + 54 t1 +
3
4 t2
)
− 14b√
4
(
a
b
)2
+ 4βa
b
(t1 − t2) + β2
(
80 + 112t1 + 45t21 + 48t2 + 22t1t2 + 13t22
)
(4.19)
5As well as one other root, which corresponds to the minimum proﬁt.
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f∗2 =
a
2β + β
(
2 − 34 t1 −
5
4 t2
)
− 14b√
4
(
a
b
)2
+ 4βa
b
(t1 − t2) + β2
(
80 − 112t2 + 45t22 − 48t1 + 22t1t2 + 13t21
)
(4.20)
Again, these derivations are tedious, and the resulting equations have no straightforward intu-
itive interpretation. Substituting them back in the original proﬁt functions and maximizing
each operator’s proﬁt with respect to its departure times gives the equilibrium departure
times. These do not have a closed form, and can only be evaluated numerically, which we
will do below. What is important to note here is that in this game undercutting is not a
proﬁtable strategy. Rather than an arbitrarily small deviation from the ﬁrst-stage subgame
equilibrium, the only potentially successful undercutting strategy now requires an operator
to take its competitor’s place; a major deviation. However, in the pricing stage, the only pos-
sible equilibrium is then the Bertrand equilibrium where both operators make zero proﬁts.
This is a less attractive option than the diﬀerentiated equilibrium above, and will therefore
not be chosen.
We can also establish the interval in which an equilibrium exists. By construction, −1 ≤
t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1. In this game, these conditions are met only when β ≥ 6a31b . For a smaller β, there
is no equilibrium. For β ≥ 4a3b , the equilibrium is separated. Using these bounds, it is also
possible to calculate the range of {t∗1, t∗2}:
lim
β→ 4a3b
t∗1 = −
1
2 , limβ→ 6a31b
t∗1 =
1
2 (4.21)
So, the two services are closer together than socially optimal. This is an important diﬀerence
from many other horizontal diﬀerentiation models, notably that of d’Aspremont et al. (1979),
in which competitors locate as far apart from each other as possible, such that they can exert
local market power. The reason that this does not happen here is that, in our model, demand
is price-sensitive. If one operator schedules its service further from the other, this does indeed
decrease competition at the inner market boundary, allowing it to increase its fares in the
second stage, as Eqs. 4.19–4.20 show. However, by doing so, it will also lose costumers with a
desired departure time between the two services since, for these travelers, both schedule delay
costs and fares have increased. Of course, this will also shift the inner market boundary.
Hence, each operator’s departure time must be closer to the inner market boundary than
to the closest outer market boundary, precisely because the latter is ﬁxed, while the former
moves in the same direction as a change in one operator’s departure time. How close it must
be exactly depends on the optimal fare, and hence, on the value of schedule delay. When β
approaches 6a/(31b), the optimal two departure times approach 0, and when β is even smaller,
the two operators will continuously swap places; no stable equilibrium emerges. When β is
large, however, market areas are small, so the incentive to try and steal a competitor’s
customers is smaller, and hence, the departure times are set further apart.
Fig. 4.1 shows the equilibrium fares, proﬁts, departure times and social welfare relative
to the optimum, for the range of values of schedule delay where an equilibrium exists. As
already indicated by Eq. 4.21, departure times move further apart if the value of schedule
delay increases. Fares and proﬁts, however, are non-monotonic in β. This is because an
increase in the value of schedule delay has two eﬀects. Firstly, an increase in β directly
decreases the number of travelers, for any set of fares and departure times, as travel costs for
all commuters increase. This will reduce optimal fares and proﬁts. However, if travel costs
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Figure 4.1: Setting departure times before fares (a/b = 10, γ = β)
for all commuters increase, they also increase for the marginal commuters, who have a desired
departure time t = t∗. Hence, there will also be fewer marginal commuters, which will reduce
competition. This allows operators to increase their fares and proﬁts. As Fig. 4.1 shows,
this competitive eﬀect dominates for smaller values of schedule delay. For larger values, the
optimal departure times are already so far apart that the demand eﬀect is stronger.
Social welfare, relative to the optimum, always decreases in the value of schedule delay. For
low values of schedule delay, this is because fares are increasing in β and thus moving away
from the optimum; although the departure times are moving closer to the optimum, this is
less important, given that the values of schedule delay are relatively low. For higher values
of schedule delay fares start decreasing slightly, but deviations from the optimal departure
time are now so costly that although the departure times are moving towards the optimum,
they are moving too slowly to oﬀset the negative eﬀect of an increase in β on welfare.
Asymmetric schedule delay functions (γ > β)
If schedule delay functions are not symmetric in each commuter’s desired departure time,
operators in the resulting equilibrium will charge diﬀerent fares, and their departure times
will not be at equal distances from zero. This complicates the analysis and, hence, this
situation can only be evaluated numerically. Fig. 4.2 shows, for β = 5 and a/b = 10,
the fares, departure times, operator proﬁts and social welfare for a range of γ. Although,
naturally, the exact functions are speciﬁc to these particular parameters, other parameters
result in very similar ﬁgures. Moreover, all variables only depend on the ratio between β and
a/b; not on the individual levels of these parameters.
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Figure 4.2: Eﬀects of γ > β (a/b = 10, β = 5)
Naturally, if the value of schedule delay late increases relative to the value of schedule delay
early, both departures will move to an earlier time, such that fewer commuters are late. In an
eﬀort to gain the largest market share, both do so at a faster rate than the socially optimal
departure times tSi . Hence, the ﬁrst operator’s departure time initially moves closer to the
optimum, while the second operator’s departure time, which is already earlier than optimal,
continuously moves away from the optimum.
For moderate deviations of γ from β, this allows both operators to increase their fares.
However, the ﬁrst operator’s market size decreases as it is squeezed towards its outer market
boundary, and this reduces its proﬁts. For large increases in γ, even the second operator
loses, as demand for its service decreases too fast to be oﬀset by its favorable position. Social
welfare decreases in γ, relative to the ﬁrst-best, as a result of higher prices, a less optimal
departure time of the second operator and of course, in the same way as an increase in β,
simply because suboptimal departure times become more costly.
4.6 Other games
As we have seen, games with simultaneous fare and timing choices, and games where fares
are chosen ﬁrst, never have pure strategy Nash equilibria. In games where departure times
are chosen ﬁrst equilibria only exist for limited ranges of parameters. It is therefore worth in-
vestigating which other game structures could result in equilibria where the above games fail.
For the sake of brevity and simplicity, will limit our attention to situations with symmetric
schedule delay cost functions, although, like before, it is possible to include asymmetries.
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4.6.1 Stackelberg games
Stackelberg games, in which one operator sets its fare, departure time, or both before the
other operator, may be a realistic representation of some real-world transport markets. A
large operator, which is active not just in one market but operates many routes may, for
example, have to decide on its fares and departure times much earlier than a small, ﬂexible
operator that only participates in one market. In this case, the operator that publishes its
decisions ﬁrst can choose them in such a way that it cannot be proﬁtably undercut by the
second operator. We will examine the Stackelberg equivalents of the three Nash games above:
one situation in which the ﬁrst operator sets its fare and departure time before the other, one
in which the ﬁrst operator sets its departure time before the other, followed by a separate
second stage in which the operators set their fares in the same order, and the reverse, one
in which the ﬁrst operator sets its fare before the other, followed by a sequential departure
time choice.
Fares and departure times set simultaneously per ﬁrm, and sequentially between ﬁrms
If the ﬁrst operator decides on both its fare and its departure time before the other, and
can commit to these decisions, it will choose them such that undercutting is not a proﬁtable
strategy for the second operator. This does mean that it has to accept a lower proﬁt than it
would get in some of the other games. Starting with the second stage, the second operator’s
optimal fares and departure times {t∗2(t1, f1), f∗2 (t1, f1)} can be found by simply setting ∂π2∂t2 =
∂π2
∂f2
= 0. The ﬁrst operator than maximizes its own proﬁts subject to not only {t∗2, f∗2 }, but
also another constraint, which speciﬁes that the second operator’s proﬁt must be greater or
equal to the proﬁt it would get if it took the ﬁrst operator’s departure time, and set its fare
an arbitrarily small amount lower:
π∗2 ≥
ˆ t¯
−1
a − b(f1 + Max[γ(t1 − t), 0] + Max[β(t − t1), 0]dt − F (4.22)
where π∗2 is the send operator’s equilibrium proﬁt, and t¯ = Min
[
t1 + a−bf1βb , 1
]
. Since this
constraint will be binding for any set of parameters, Eq. 4.22 can be solved as a strict
equality and used to substitute out one of the ﬁrst operator’s decision variables. Since the
constraint is nonlinear, and the resulting equilibrium will have asymmetric departure times
and unequal fares, this game can only be solved numerically. It does have a unique pure
strategy equilibrium for a large parameter space. Fig. 4.3 shows the equilibrium fares,
proﬁts, departure times and relative welfare for a range of β.
As expected, the second mover in this game has an advantage, since the ﬁrst mover has to
choose a position that can not be undercut proﬁtably. Hence, the ﬁrst operator’s departure
time is close to the outer market boundary, and its price is lower than in the corresponding
Nash game. Naturally, it is therefore optimal for the second operator to set an earlier depar-
ture time and higher fare than it would do in a Nash game. As the value of schedule delay
increases, resulting in a lower travel demand, the ﬁrst operator can choose a more favorable
position, as undercutting becomes less proﬁtable. For very high values of schedule delay, the
second-mover advantage all but disappears, and the equilibrium locations approach those of
the Nash game.
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Figure 4.3: Varying β in a Stackelberg game (a/b = 10, γ = β)
Fares chosen before departure times
This game is similar to the previous, but has four separate stages; f1, f2, t1 and t2 are
chosen in that order. Again, the resulting equilibrium is asymmetric; the second operator
has a second-mover advantage, so π∗1 < π∗2. Undercutting is still possible, and can still be
proﬁtable, especially for small values of schedule delay, but the ﬁrst operator can again avoid
this. It can be shown numerically that this game has an equilibrium for at least some values
of β.
Departure times chosen before fares
The equilibrium of this game, in which t1, t2, f1 and f2 are chosen in that order, is the
most tedious to compute, as only the last subgame has a closed form. However, numerical
simulations show that, for all β ≥ 0.32a/b, a pure-strategy equilibrium exists; this is a
considerably smaller space than in the Nash game in which both operators set their departure
times at the same time, followed by a simultaneous fare decision.
4.6.2 Regulation
As we have seen, operators can use their departure times as strategic instruments, and hence,
regulation may be desired. Even if the ﬁrst-best solution, in which fares are zero and departure
times given by Eq. 4.8, is not feasible, it may be possible for the regulator to set either fares or
departure times. The operators would then be free to set the remaining variables afterwards.
This requires that regulators can commit to the choices they announce; operators must be
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convinced that the announced fares or departure times will not be changed after they have
announced their own decisions. If, for any reason, the regulator cannot commit, the game
collapses from a two-stage game to a simultaneous game, in which the regulator and the
operators eﬀectively set fares and departure times simultaneously.
Hence, at least four diﬀerent games should be considered; two sequential games, in which
regulators set either fares (FST , where the subscript S denotes a second-best social optimum)
or departure times (TSF ), and two simultaneous games. Fig. 4.4 shows the performance of
each game, relative to the ﬁrst-best social optimum, for the range of β in which each game
has an equilibrium.
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Figure 4.4: Relative welfare of regulatory games
Interestingly, all four games have stable equilibria over a large range of values of schedule
delay, while only the ﬁrst, in which the regulator sets the departure times, followed by a
competitive pricing stage, has a stable equivalent in an unregulated market. In reality,
completely unregulated transport markets are a rare occurrence, so this may explain why we
usually observe stable equilibria. Indeed, there is some evidence that deregulation can lead
to service instability (see, for example, Douglas, 1987). However, even the regulatory games
do not have equilibria for all possible values of schedule delay. In particular, the games in
which the regulator sets fares are unstable for small values of β.
As Fig. 4.4 shows, regulators have a ﬁrst-mover advantage, regardless of which variable
they are controlling; welfare in each sequential games is always higher than welfare in the
corresponding simultaneous game. However, this advantage is relatively small for most pa-
rameters. A game in which departure times are chosen by the regulator is preferred, from a
social perspective, if values of schedule delay are low. Conversely, when values of schedule
delay are high, a game in which the regulator chooses fares performs better. This may sound
counterintuitive since, when values of schedule delay are low, suboptimal departure times are
relatively unimportant compared to suboptimal fares, so one would expect a more eﬃcient
outcome if the regulator set the latter. This does not happen because, for low values of
schedule delay, the private operators set low fares anyway; it is better for the regulator to
set the departure times, even if they are relatively unimportant. If values of schedule delay
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are high, on the other hand, the operators would exercise their increased market power and
raise fares far above the optimum; it would then be better for the regulator to set the fares
instead, even though suboptimal departure times are also relatively costly.
Of the four games in Fig. 4.4, only the ﬁrst, in which the regulator sets the departure times,
followed by a competitive pricing stage, has a stable equivalent in an unregulated market. A
comparison of the relative welfare in this game to the bottom right-hand panel in Fig. 4.1
shows that the increase in social welfare that results from regulatory intervention is relatively
modest, especially for small values of schedule delay. Only when β is very high, such that
small deviations from the optimal departure times have a large eﬀect on social welfare, is the
regulatory game much more eﬃcient.
4.7 Discussion
Naturally, our quantitative results depend on the assumptions we have made. One obvious
way to generalize the models described above further would be to allow for non-uniform
desired departure time distributions (see, for example, Tabuchi and Thisse, 1995; Janssen
et al., 2005). This could, for instance, be achieved if Eq. 4.1 was replaced by
d(t) = Max [a(t) − bp(t), 0] (4.23)
Naturally, the integration in Eqs. 4.6–4.7 would be much more complex, though not neces-
sarily impossible, depending on the exact functional form of a (t).
Depending on the chosen distribution, this generalization would change the relative im-
portance of the inner and outer market boundaries. If, for instance, the distribution was
triangular, such that the largest number of passengers preferred a departure time somewhere
in the middle of the time interval (for example, a(t) = a0 − |x|), this would increase com-
petition at the inner market boundary, as there would be more potential passengers there.
Consequently, we would expect operators to move closer together than they do in the mod-
els above. This increased competition at the inner market boundary would also make the
parameter space in which a stable equilibrium emerges smaller; in that regard, it could be
expected to have a similar eﬀect as a decrease in β in section 4.5.3.
The addition of more competitors (see, for example, Brenner, 2005), capacity constraints
(as in Wauthy, 1996a), nonlinearities, or crowding costs will, of course, also aﬀect the results.
However, the qualitative results, and the mechanisms of competition behind them, will remain
the same. Circular Salop models, in which the time interval does not have endpoints, are
much more diﬃcult to use together with price-sensitive demand (see Gu and Wenzel, 2012,
where demand is independent of the distance costs; a more general formulation would be
even more complicated), since they have two inner market boundaries, where the operators
compete for the marginal customer.
Our models are, themselves, generalizations of earlier Hotelling models. The inclusion of
price-sensitive demand and asymmetric distance costs, although adding realism, do create
more complexity. One major drawback of our approach is that closed-form solutions can not
always be obtained, and if they can, their interpretation is diﬃcult. This is particularly true
for the models with asymmetric distance costs. These asymmetries are important in some
markets, such as transport, but in others, this generalization will unnecessarily complicate
analyses. Price-sensitive demand also makes the results less intuitive, but, contrary to the
asymmetric distance costs, it helps establish equilibria in situations where models with ﬁxed
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demand are unstable. Since the inclusion of price-sensitive demand is less arbitrary than
some other measures to prevent instability (such as particular nonlinear formulations for the
distance cost function), it might still be an attractive modeling choice.
Naturally, real-world transportation problems are more complex than the stylized models
we have presented. In many settings, departure times will not only be driven by link-based
competition, but also by the arrival and departure of connecting services. Hence, services
can be complements as well as substitutes. It is, however, still important to ﬁrst understand
what happens on single links, especially since models that include connecting services will
need to make other restrictive assumptions to remain tractable.
4.8 Conclusions
We have proposed a methodology to model the scheduling decisions of competing trans-
port operators, using a generalization of Hotelling’s horizontal diﬀerentiation model. This
model, which includes price-sensitive demand, often has equilibria where other models are
unstable. Equilibria in our model can be interior and do not necessarily result in minimum
diﬀerentiation, and never in maximum diﬀerentiation. Indeed, the two competitors normally
schedule their services closer together than optimal. This happens because, when demand is
price-sensitive, operators have incentives to schedule their services closer to the inner market
boundary than to the outer edges of the market, since the inner market boundary can be
pushed in the direction of the competitor, while the outer edges of the market are ﬁxed.
Games where prices are chosen before or simultaneously with locations, on the other hand,
have no stable Nash equilibria.
We have also shown that it is possible to include asymmetric schedule delay functions in
our model. Asymmetric schedule delay functions generally lower the relative welfare of the
game. Since asymmetric schedule delay functions result in asymmetric equilibria, they do
make the calculation of the equilibria much more involved, and for some parameters cause
unstability if undercutting is proﬁtable.
A Stackelberg structure, in which one operator sets its decision variables before the other
often helps to establish equilibria in games where they are not present with Nash behavior.
In these games, the ﬁrst mover can deliberately choose a position such that its competitor has
no incentives to undercut; a consequence is that there is a second-mover advantage. Similarly,
regulation can create equilibria in situations where an unregulated market fails to do so. If the
socially optimal locations and prices are not attainable, regulating one of these two variables
can result in a modest eﬃciency improvement; the value of schedule delay determines which
of the two results in the greatest gain.
Although our quantitative results depend on our assumptions, the qualitative results, and
the mechanisms of competition that drive them, are valid for a much larger class of models.
Most importantly, the models proposed above show that departure times can be strategic
instruments, and should therefore be of interest to regulators.
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5 Stochastic user equilibrium traﬃc
assignment with price-sensitive demand: do
methods matter (much?)1
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have discussed pricing, scheduling, and regulation in transport net-
works. In these chapters, user equilibria were always deterministic. As mentioned in the
introduction, deterministic user equilibrium models have important disadvantages, particu-
larly in larger network models. The analysis of transport infrastructure investment in Chapter
6 will therefore use stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) models. SUE traﬃc assignment models
are used in a wide range of applications. Starting with Dial (1971), who proposed a simple
logit model to analyze route choice in a network, many diﬀerent formulations have been de-
veloped. These range from highly simpliﬁed, tractable models to very complex models that
can only be solved with numerical methods. Most are static, although some dynamic formu-
lations have also been proposed (Ben-Akiva et al., 1984, 1986). Choosing a SUE model for a
speciﬁc application is not straightforward. In preparation of Chapter 6, the present chapter
will compare several popular models, to determine which of them are best.
In a deterministic Wardropian equilibrium Wardrop (1952), the generalized prices (i.e.
costs plus tolls) of all used routes are equal, and lower than those of all unused routes.
This implicitly assumes that users have perfect knowledge about the costs of all routes,
and that all relevant user attributes can be perfectly observed. SUE models instead use
random utility discrete choice theory, which assumes that the utility users derive from a given
route has a stochastic part, which cannot be explained by an observer, but which follows a
known distribution. The resulting equilibrium diﬀers from the Wardropian equilibrium in
that the systematic (or, deterministic) generalized prices of all routes are typically not equal.
Moreover, although the probability that a route will be used can approach 0 arbitrarily
closely, it never reaches it. Besides being more realistic in many settings, this is also often
computationally convenient.
In this chapter, we ﬁrst consider two ‘workhorse’ user equilibrium models: a multinomial
probit, and a logit model. Both models are used regularly in the recent literature (see e.g.
for logit: Meng et al., 2004; Yang, 1999; Yang et al., 2001, and for probit: Connors et al.,
2007; Uchida et al., 2007; Meng et al., 2012). Probit models can account for partially over-
lapping routes and routes with signiﬁcantly diﬀerent lengths, while simple logit models can
not properly handle overlap, and assume that all route costs are subject to the same level of
stochasticity. However, logit models have closed form solutions for choice probabilities, while
probit equilibria can only be determined using sampling techniques or numerical integration,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Vincent van den Berg and Erik Verhoef. An earlier version of this
chapter has been published as a Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper (van der Weijde et al., 2013a). I
thank Paul Koster, Andrew Koh, and the participants of the 2013 INFORMS Annual Meeting for helpful
comments.
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and are therefore highly computationally intensive. It is therefore very useful to know how
important the diﬀerences between these models are likely to be in real-world situations.
Although these standard logit and probit models are widely used, several generalizations
and extensions have been proposed. As an example of such an advanced logit model, we also
include the generalized nested logit (GNL) model in our analysis. A relatively novel model,
the GNL (Wen and Koppelman, 2001) can partially account for overlapping routes (though
it does so in a diﬀerent way than the probit model); for this reason, it has been proposed as
a possible SUE assignment model (Bekhor and Prashker, 2002). Unlike the probit model, it
cannot properly account for the fact that routes have diﬀerent lengths; however, it does have
closed-form probabilities. Naturally, there are many other SUE models, some of which have
been developed more recently, and many of which are substantially more complex than the
models used in this chapter (see e.g. Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire, 2003 for a review of some of
those). However, as this chapter aims to analyze models that can be used as the lowest level
of larger, theoretical economic models, we will not consider these.
Although many studies investigate the diﬀerences between competing discrete choice mod-
els, none of these are directly applicable to our setting. Many focus only on estimation or
calibration, rather than simulation (e.g. Cascetta et al., 1996). For estimation, it is impor-
tant that models ﬁt existing data well. For simulation, the representation of one particular
ﬂow pattern is not of primary concern, as most models can be calibrated so as to achieve
that. Instead, it is important to see what happens if we move away from the calibrated state,
through, for instance, tolling. The diﬀerent models imply diﬀerent substitution patterns, so
the eﬀects of these changes could be diﬀerent. This could have important implications for
operational decisions and policies.
Others compare models in highly simpliﬁed settings; as we will see, their results do not
necessarily carry over to more realistic situations (e.g. Florian and Fox, 1976; Daganzo and
Sheﬃ, 1977; Prashker and Bekhor, 2004). Finally, some studies compare the very complex
SUE models mentioned above (a good example of this last category is the extensive work
byRamming (2001)). Most studies in all of these categories compare models based only on
route choice choice probabilities, or route ﬂows. For an economic analysis, these variables are
interesting, but often other variables may be more important. If, for instance, the models are
used to derive optimal road prices, pure traﬃc ﬂows are arguably less important than proﬁts.
We therefore compare the diﬀerent SUE models in a setting that has:
1. A network that is more representative of real-world situations than the simplest ‘toy’
networks that have been used in the past. Speciﬁcally, we model a network with several
pairs of origins and destinations (ODs) and multiple overlapping routes between each
OD-pair, which share links with routes that are used between other OD-pairs. Using
this network, we can not only look at the eﬀects of diﬀerent SUE models on an OD-level,
but also examine how these eﬀects interact in a network.
2. Congestion; speciﬁcally, we use the realistic congestion function proposed by US Bureau
of Public Roads (1964). As we will show in section 5.2.2, congestion can have a large
eﬀect on the diﬀerences between SUE models.
3. Price-sensitive demand, through the addition of an alternative ‘virtual’, uncongested
route between each OD-pair, that does not overlap with any others.
4. Parameters that are calibrated correctly. If all assignment models are calibrated to the
same traﬃc ﬂows, as would happen in reality, this might give diﬀerent results than a
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situation where the assignment models have the same parameters, where this is possible
(i.e., if the models have the same marginal utility of money and the same average vari-
ance; naturally, they will still have a diﬀerent variance-covariance matrix). Therefore,
we consider two cases: one in which the assignment models have equivalent parameters,
and one in which the logit models are calibrated to the ﬂows resulting from the probit
model. We also investigate how the introduction of additional (alternative-speciﬁc) pa-
rameters, which can be used for calibration, aﬀects the diﬀerences between the models.
To examine the diﬀerences between the assignment models, we test their performance in
a 12-node network. In particular, we evaluate how the diﬀerent assignment models aﬀect
policy decisions, such as proﬁt-maximizing and welfare-maximizing tolls, and the eﬀects of
such policies. As we will show, the diﬀerences between models are, in many instances, small.
However, improper calibration can lead to large diﬀerences, and signiﬁcant reductions in
welfare. This indicates that, in larger networks, where it is much more diﬃcult to use
probit-based assignment models, it may be justiﬁed to use simpler logit-based models.
The next section deﬁnes the assignment models, and explores the theoretical diﬀerences
between them, using a very simple network model with only one origin and one destination.
Section 5.3 gives an overview of the methodology we use for the more realistic simulations,
the results of which are presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Theory
5.2.1 SUE assignment models
All the stochastic user equilibrium assignment models we examine are based on random
utility theory. In these models, the utility users derive from an alternative (which, in traﬃc
assignment, can be a route through a network, the use of a speciﬁc link, or the option to stay
home and not travel) consists of a deterministic, and a stochastic part:
Uir = V (−cr) + εir (5.1)
where Uir is the utility user i derives from alternative r, which is made up of a deterministic
value function V and a stochastic term εir. For simplicity, we deﬁne the value as a function
of the generalized price cr of an alternative only; we assume that beneﬁts are the same
for all alternatives. Since we have only one user class, V is also independent of personal
characteristics. Although, in much of the recent literature, this random term is assumed
to capture the uncertainty that transport users face, it was originally intended to capture
measurement errors made by the observer (reﬂecting, for instance, the fact that users diﬀer
in unobservable characteristics, which inﬂuence the utility they derive from the use of an
alternative). Diﬀerent assignment models assume diﬀerent joint distributions for the random
terms.
Multinomial probit (MNP)
The ﬁrst discrete choice model we consider is one of the most ﬂexible. In the multinomial pro-
bit (MNP) model, the random terms ε follow a multivariate normal distribution; ε ∼ N (0,Σ).
Importantly, if Σ = I, random terms are allowed to be correlated across all alternatives, and
the variances can diﬀer across alternatives. We can therefore set Σ such that the covariances
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between diﬀerent routes, 0 ≤ σrr′ < 1, indicate to what extent routes overlap, and variances
σ2r that vary with the length of each route.
As already stated, we will model the price-sensitivity of demand through the inclusion
of a no-travel alternative, which has a given cost (or disutility). This is not the only way
to make travel demand price-sensitive. It is also possible to make the total travel demand
between an origin and a destination a direct function of the expected utility of the discrete
choice. However, particularly in probit models, this is considerably more complicated, and
for our purposes, it yields few advantages. Our approach still results in a downward-sloping
demand curve, which is non-linear, and whose slope reﬂects by the elasticity of the no-travel
alternative choice probability.
There are several ways to derive the covariances σrr′ and variances σ2r . The most straight-
forward way, which we will use, is to formulate link-based random terms εil. The total random
utility faced by a user who takes a given route r, εir is then the sum of all link-based random
terms, over all links that constitute the route. Since the sum of two or more independent nor-
mal distributions is also a normal distribution, the covariance between two routes is then the
sum of the variances of the links they share. We set link-based variances σl = sKl, where Kl
is the length of link l, and s a parameter. For simplicity, we set the variance of the no-travel
alternative to 1. The variance of route r is then simply ∑l alrσ2l , where alr = 1 if link l is part
of route r, and zero otherwise. The covariance between routes r and r′ is ∑l alralr′σ2l ; the
covariance between any route and the no-travel alternative is zero. We use s to control the
average route variance σ˜2, which we normalize to 1. Finally, we set V (−cr) = −cr/10, where
the coeﬃcient is chosen such that, in equilibrium, a signiﬁcant number of routes is used.
However, note that, in this model, we cannot diﬀerentiate between the average variance of
the random terms and this coeﬃcient. Setting σ˜2 = 10 and V (−cr) = −cr would yield the
same results.
MNP models models do not have closed-form probabilities; instead, numerical methods are
necessary to determine them. We use a Monte Carlo simulation, where random terms ε are
sampled from the multivariate normal distribution described above. Based on these sampled
random terms and the deterministic route costs, probabilities can be estimated. Naturally,
since these probabilities depend on traﬃc volumes, we need an iterative procedure to ﬁnd
the user equilibrium assignment. We use the Method of Successive Averages (MSA), which
consists of the following steps:
1. Determine initial link ﬂows vl0 (e.g. estimate probabilities based on free-ﬂow travel
costs) and obtain link-based travel costs χl. Set n = 1.
2. Calculate auxiliary link ﬂows vAl based on costs χl.
3. Set vln+1 = vln + n−1
(
vAl − vln
)
and recalculate costs χl. Set n = n + 1.
4. Repeat steps 2–3 until |vln+1 − vln| becomes suﬃciently small.
Since step 2 requires a Monte-Carlo simulation, and the number of iterations the MSA needs
to converge can be high, this model can be computationally intensive. It can, however,
account for both overlapping routes, and routes of diﬀerent lengths, which the other models
we will examine can not fully take into account.
Since we are interested only in the diﬀerences between the assignment models, and the
MNP is the most natural benchmark, we will use the MNP ﬂows to calibrate the other
assignment models. Alternatively, one could obtain ﬂows from some other, external model,
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and calibrate all assignment models using those ﬂows; this would not add anything to our
analysis.2 This does imply that our results can only be used to analyze the diﬀerences
between assignment models; it does not indicate which model is better at approximating
some particular real-world dataset.
Logit
The simplest logit model assumes that all random terms εir are independent. However, the
introduction of elastic demand through the addition of a no-travel alternative makes this
assumption particularly unrealistic; it is logical to assume that routes more similar to each
other than to the no-travel alternative. We therefore use a somewhat more advanced nested
logit (NL) model (Ben-Akiva, 1974), in which one nest contains all the physical routes, and
the other the no-travel alternative. In the NL model, the random terms follow a multi-variate
extreme value distribution, and there is correlation within, but not between, nests. Hence, if
we only consider the users that have already chosen to travel, the traﬃc assignment model is
still a standard logit model; the NL formulation just allows us to model the demand elasticity
correctly. To avoid confusion, however, we will refer to this model as an NL model in what
follows.
The Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) function of this model (see McFadden, 1978) for a
given OD-pair (or market) m is
Gm
(
eV (−C), eV (−c1), ..., eV (−cR)
)
= eV (−C) +
(∑
r
arm
(
eV (−cr)
) 1
μ
)μ
(5.2)
where arm = 1 if route r serves market m and zero otherwise, cr is the cost of route r and C
the cost incurred by a user who decides not to travel. 0 < μ ≤ 1 is a parameter, indicating
the dissimilarity between the option to not travel on the one side, and all possible routes on
the other (more precisely, this implies a correlation of (1 − μ)2 between the random terms
attributed to diﬀerent routes (Daganzo and Kusnic, 1993). We use linear value functions
V (−C) = −βC and V (−cr) = −βcr.
As stated before, we will examine two versions of this model. In the ﬁrst version, we set
β = π/
√
10 × 6 to achieve the same variance as MNP model: since logit models assume
that the random terms follow a Gumbel distribution, which has a variance of π2/6, and
the MNP model deﬁned above has an average variance σ˜2 = 1 and β = 1/10, we have to
correct for this in the NL model. We also set μ such that (1 − μ)2 is equal to the average
overlap between routes. In the second version, we instead estimate β and μ, using Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) on the route ﬂows resulting from the MNP model; the resulting
parameters are diﬀerent than those in the ﬁrst model.
Whatever the value of β, the resulting route choice probabilities have closed forms:
pmr =
(
e−βcr
) 1
μ
∑
r′ ar′m (e−βcr′)
1
μ
(∑
r′ ar′m
(
e−βcr′
) 1
μ
)μ
(∑
r′ ar′m (e−βcr′)
1
μ
)μ
+ e−βC
(5.3)
and consist of two parts. The ﬁrst gives the probability that a randomly selected user chooses
2Real-world data would be the most appropriate external source. However, to compare diﬀerent assignment
models, it is not enough to have link ﬂow data for a particular network. One would need to have this data
for a number of diﬀerent situations, with diﬀerent user costs (e.g. diﬀerent road prices), to see how well a
model that is calibrated for one situation can predict ﬂows when user costs change.
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route r, given that that particular traveler has already decided to travel. The second part
gives the probability that this user travels at all. Note that, in this case, ∑r pmr < 1, since
some users will choose not to travel.
Although this NL model allows for correlation within nests, and can therefore control for
the diﬀerence between traveling and not traveling, it still assumes that, given the choice of a
nest, the alternatives are independent. Hence, contrary to the MNP, overlapping routes are
not properly accounted for. Moreover, the variance is the same for all alternatives, so it is
also impossible to properly account for the fact that routes have diﬀerent lengths.
Nested logit with alternative-speciﬁc constants (NL-ASC)
To see how better calibration aﬀects the diﬀerence between models, we also examine a version
of the NL model that has additional parameters, which can be used for calibration. We do
this by deﬁning an alternative-speciﬁc constant (ASC) Ar for every route (not including the
no-travel option), such that the value functions become:
V (−cr) = Ar − βcr (5.4)
Using MLE, these constants are then estimated, together with the β and μ. There is no
constant for the no-travel alternative, to avoid overspeciﬁcation.3
Naturally, the ﬂow pattern resulting from this model will be closer to the MNP ﬂows in the
calibrated state, as there are many additional parameters to use for calibration. However, as
the MNP model does not have alternative-speciﬁc constants, the NL-ASC model may perform
worse when we move away from the calibrated state, for instance, when a link in the network
is tolled. The direction and magnitude of this eﬀect depends on how the introduction of these
ASCs changes the calibrated values of β and μ.
Generalized nested logit (GNL)
Like the MNP model, the GNL model (Wen and Koppelman, 2001; see Daly and Bierlaire,
2006 for an alternative formulation), also sometimes called the cross-nested logit model, can
control for overlap in routes. In the GNL, alternatives can belong to several nests; inclusion
parameters αrl indicate which share of alternative r belongs to nest l. In a traﬃc assignment
model, each link would be a nest (with an additional nest containing the option not to travel),
and the share of a route that uses a speciﬁc link can be approximated using free-ﬂow travel
speeds (Bekhor and Prashker, 2002). The GEV function for market m is then
Gm
(
eV (−C), eV (−c1), ..., eV (−cR)
)
= eV (−C) +
∑
l
(∑
r
arm
(
αrle
V (−cr)
) 1
μl
)μl
(5.5)
where
αrl =
χl
cr
∣∣∣∣
nl ∀l
(5.6)
3The inclusion of alternative-speciﬁc constants is an often-used way to account for diﬀerences between routes
that are not easily observed. The number of constant is usually more limited, for computational reasons.
In our context, it is possible to include an ASC for all but one alternative; this will give the largest number
of calibration parameters possible without overidentiﬁcation. Hence, this is a useful benchmark; a model
with fewer ASCs will, likely, give results that are somewhere in between our NL model, and our NL-ASC
model.
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and χl if the cost of using link l. Again, we deﬁne V (−C) = −βC and V (−cr) = −βcr.
Probabilities still have a closed form, and are given by
pmr =
∑
l
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
(
αrle
−βcr
) 1
μl
∑
r′ ar′m (αr′le−βcr)
1
μl
(∑
r′ ar′m
(
αr′le−βcr
) 1
μl
)μl
∑
l
(∑
r′ ar′m (αr′le−βcr)
1
μl
)μl
+ e−βC
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ (5.7)
Note that, although this expression is very similar to Eq. 5.3, the crucial diﬀerence is that
there are now no longer two nests per market (travel and no travel); instead the number
of nests is equal to the number of links plus one. Again, Eq. 5.7 only gives the route
choice probabilities; there is also the option to not travel, so ∑r pmr < 1. Bekhor and
Prashker (2002) propose to directly relate μl to the network topology, by making it an
inverse function of the average inclusion coeﬃcient of routes using link l. In our setting, all
links share the exact same characteristics, so we also average over all links to get a single
μ = ∑l (1/L) (1 − (1/Rl)∑r αrl), where L is the total number of links, and Rl the number
of routes passing through link. We then set μl = μ ∀l, while β has the same value as in
the parameter-equivalent NL model. As with the NL model, we also examine a calibrated
version, in which we use MLE to ﬁnd a β and μ that provides the best ﬁt with the probit
route ﬂows.
Although GNL models have closed-form probabilities, which is very convenient for a traﬃc
assignment model, the implied covariances between alternatives do not, and are not easy to
calculate. They are given by
Cov (εr, εr′) =
¨
R
(F (εr, εr′) − F (εr)F (εr′)) dεrdεr′ (5.8)
where
F (εr) = exp (− exp (−βεr)) (5.9)
and
F (εr, εr′) = exp
(
−
∑
l
((
αrle
−βεr
) 1
μl +
(
αr′le−βεr
) 1
μl
)μl)
(5.10)
(Marzano and Papola, 2008; Lemp et al., 2010). These covariances are diﬀerent than those
of the MNP model, but do capture some of the overlap between routes.
5.2.2 Model diﬀerences
Before considering a more complex setting, it is useful to look at the simplest possible network
in which the diﬀerences between the models above can be illustrated. This simple network,
which is often used in the early literature on discrete choice models (e.g. Florian and Fox,
1976; Daganzo and Sheﬃ, 1977) has three routes, of which two partially overlap. Fig. 5.1
gives a graphical representation of such a network, where all routes between A and C have a
length of 1, and the two routes that pass through B share a length of 1− x. We will have an
independent route 1; the others routes are denoted 2 and 3. For simplicity we assume, for a
moment, that the no-travel alternative is not available, such that the NL model collapses to
the simplest possible multinomial logit model.
If there is no congestion, and hence, all link costs are constant and equal, the logit model
will assign 1/3 of the total ﬂow to each of the routes, which, arguably, is unrealistic. A probit
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A B C
1
x
x
1x
Figure 5.1: Simple network
model can account for the overlap, by setting
∑
=
⎡
⎢⎣ σ
2 0 0
0 σ2 (1 − x)σ2
0 (1 − x)σ2 σ2
⎤
⎥⎦ (5.11)
The probabilities of the two overlapping routes will then increase in x, and the probability
of the independent route will decrease, as shown in the left-hand panel of Fig. 5.2. Daganzo
and Sheﬃ (1977) show a similar ﬁgure, and assuming that the MNP model is the correct
one, argue that the logit model is often highly biased, because it fails to take the correlations
between routes into account.
However, in traﬃc assignment models, links are usually congestible, so the costs of each
route depend on the fraction of travelers that uses it. In our simple model, we can introduce
congestion by, for instance, making link costs per unit of distance a linear function of link
ﬂows. The user costs are then
c =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1 + 3p11 + 3 (xp2 + (1 − x) (p2 + p3))
1 + 3 (xp3 + (1 − x) (p2 + p3))
⎤
⎥⎦ (5.12)
where pl is the probability, or fraction of the total ﬂow assigned to route l, and the gradient
of the congestion cost function is set at 3 to generate a realistic fraction of congestion costs
to total costs. The right-hand panel of Fig. 5.2 shows the fraction of the total ﬂow assigned
to route 1 that results from these route costs.
As the right-hand side of Fig. 5.2 shows, the introduction of congestion signiﬁcantly reduces
the diﬀerence between the logit and probit models. This happens because, when the links
are congestible, users of the two overlapping routes impose a congestion externality on each
other, since they both use link BC. This makes routes 2 and 3 less attractive, especially if x is
small. The random terms in the logit model are still independent, but the systematic utilities
V (−cr) now share a common term. Hence, the diﬀerence between the logit and probit models
becomes less important. It does not completely disappear, however, and is still signiﬁcant if
the amount of overlap between routes 2 and 3 is big.
So far, we have only compared the simplest possible logit model with the probit model.
The left-hand panel in Fig. 5.3 shows the results of a similar exercise, without congestion,
80
5.2 Theory
Without congestion With congestion
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
p1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
x
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
p1
probit logit
Figure 5.2: Logit vs. probit
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this time including the GNL model, with
α =
⎡
⎢⎣ 1 0 0 00 x 0 1 − x
0 0 x 1 − x
⎤
⎥⎦ (5.13)
and μ = 2x/3, which is chosen to generate route choice probabilities close to the MNP
model. As Fig. 5.3 shows, the MNP and GNL fractions are very close, even in the model
without congestion. The right-hand panel of Fig. 5.3 shows the covariance between the two
overlapping routes in both models, which are calculated using Eqs. 5.8 and 5.11; they are
also very close. Hence, the GNL model seems to approximate the MNP model well, at least
in this simple example. Moreover, there is no clear relation between the amount of overlap
and the diﬀerence between the two models.
The simple network in Fig. 5.1, has only one market; travel from A to C. In more realistic
models, there are more complex network eﬀects; links are used by travelers in multiple mar-
kets. Depending on the network structure, this can further reduce the diﬀerence between the
assignment models. If, for instance, the top link in Fig. 5.1 is also part of route that serves
another market, and that route partially overlaps another, the two diﬀerences between logit
and probit probabilities may cancel each other out. Moreover, note that, for there to be a
diﬀerence between the models, all three routes (two overlapping, and one separate) must not
only exist, but also be used by a signiﬁcant fraction of travelers. In a larger congested net-
work, this is not necessarily the case; a large amount of congestion on a major link between
two large nodes could, for instance, make that link so unattractive to travelers between other
nodes, that all routes using it would be assigned very low choice probabilities.
The introduction of an additional alternative, representing the option not to travel, aﬀects
the models in diﬀerent ways. On the one hand, the addition of a non-overlapping alternative
in every market makes it more likely that a situation such as the one in Fig. 5.1 exists, and
hence, that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between assignment models. On the other hand,
however, if that alternative is added as a separate nest in a nested logit model, as we will do,
this gives an extra parameter (the dissimilarity between traveling and not traveling) which
can be used to calibrate the logit model, and hence, reduce the diﬀerence with the probit
model.
5.3 Simulation methodology
5.3.1 Network
To compare our three assignment models, we will apply them to the simple network shown
in Fig. 5.4, where all links are bidirectional (and congestion levels are direction-speciﬁc),
and the size of each node indicates the potential demand for travel. Nodes indicated with
asterisks are connection nodes only. All links are 10 km long, and we consider all possible
non-circular routes.4 This network layout allows us to examine partially overlapping routes,
and interactions between markets. Importantly, there is not only overlap of potential but
unused routes; in the base case equilibrium, which we will present below, there is still a
signiﬁcant amount of overlap if we only consider routes that are used by signiﬁcant fractions
4In larger models, the set of potential routes is usually restricted, to reduce the computational intensity of
models; a large literature proposes methods to do this eﬃciently. Since this is a separate problem from
the choice of the assignment model, we will not discuss it here.
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(e.g., > 5%) of travelers.
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Figure 5.4: Network
All links in the network are congestible; we model congestion using the well-known Bu-
reau of Public Roads (BPR) function (US Bureau of Public Roads, 1964), a widely used
approximation of the congestion costs of highway travel:
χl = vot · K
Sf
(
1 + 0.15 (vl/V )4
)
+ fl (5.14)
where vot is the value of time, K the link length, Sf the free-ﬂow travel speed (here, all these
parameters are assumed to be the same for all links), fl a potential toll (or fare), and vl/V
the volume-capacity ratio on link l. We set the latter set such that the ratio of congestion
costs to total costs remains within realistic limits; speciﬁcally, such that the term multiplying
the value of time in Eq. 5.14 is between 2 and 12. The traﬃc volume on a link is the sum of
the realized demand of every route using the link:
vl =
∑
m
∑
r
armalrpmrDm (5.15)
In the logit models, route choice probabilities pmr and route ﬂows pmrDm can be calculated
directly. In the probit model, this is more involved. Each iteration of the MSA uses new
multivariate draws, which are independent of the previous one; hence, there is simulation
noise in every iteration. Link ﬂows are calculated as a weighted average of all auxiliary ﬂows
in previous iterations, which averages out the simulation noise. Route ﬂows can be calculated
in every iteration, but as they are not averaged, they will contain a much larger amount of
noise.
The most straightforward way to accurately estimate route ﬂows is to run one last iteration
with a large sample size, after the link ﬂows have converged, and calculate route ﬂows in
that iteration. This can be highly computationally intensive, especially in larger networks.
Another solution, which we will use, is to calculate a successive average of route ﬂows in all
iterations; a similar procedure as the one followed to obtain link ﬂows (except for the fact
that averaged link ﬂows are used in the following iterations, whereas route ﬂows are just
stored). This method uses information that is already available, and gives consistent results,
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provided that the number of iterations is large enough, such that the remaining simulation
noise in the resulting average route ﬂow is suﬃciently small.
Finally, the cost of taking a given route is simply the sum of the the link-based costs over
all links that make up the route
cr =
∑
l
alrχl (5.16)
5.3.2 Demand
The potential demand (or demand function intercept) in market m is calculated with a simple
gravity model, such that it increases in the size Ni of each of the two nodes that form the
market, and decreases in the distance Km between them:
Dm =
∏
i∈m Ni
δKm
(5.17)
where δ is a parameter. The realized demand depends on the generalized price of travel,
trough the SUE models.
5.3.3 Welfare and proﬁt
It is diﬃcult to deﬁne a consistent welfare measure across all models. Logsums are a natural
choice for the logit models, but the lack of a closed form in the probit model makes calculating
an equivalent measure there more complicated. We therefore use the Rule of Half, which is
often used for policy analyses. It approximates the welfare gains from a certain policy policy
change (in our case, a change in toll) by
ΔW =
∑
r
1
2
(
q1r + q2r
) (
c1r − c2r
)
+
(
π2 − π1
)
(5.18)
where
(
π2 − π1) is the proﬁt change resulting from the change in toll, c1r and c2r the route
costs before and after the change respectively, and q1r and q2r the numbers of users choosing
each route (this includes the no-travel alternative) before and after the change. Hence, it
approximates the demand curve between q1r and q2r with a linear function. To calculate the
welfare gains of a speciﬁc toll f , we use the cumulative beneﬁts of all changes, up to a toll of
f . This is a signiﬁcantly better approximation than simply using the Rule of Half once, where
the situation before the policy change would have a zero toll (see Nellthorp and Hyman, 2003).
In the latter case, the whole demand function between a zero toll and a toll of f would be
approximated with a linear function, which is particularly inappropriate in a discrete choice
setting, where demand functions are usually highly convex. Our approach uses a piecewise
linear approximation. The step size is, to some extent, arbitrary, but the decision to use just
a single step would be too; moreover, increasing the number of steps has a quickly decreasing
impact on the results.
Although this piecewise linearization is obviously a simpliﬁcation, it performs well. Figure
5.5 shows, for the calibrated NL model, how the approximation compares to the expected
welfare when we vary the toll one of the links in the network; the diﬀerence between the two
is only substantial if the toll is so high that the ﬂow on the tolled link approaches zero, which
is generally not a situation of interest. Since the expected welfare is much more diﬃcult to
calculate in a probit model, we use the approximation in what follows.
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Figure 5.5: Expected welfare and Rule of Half approximation
Parameter Value
c 35
vot 10
V 15000
K 10
Sf 120
Ni
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
225000 0 0
0 200000 0
0 0 275000
350000 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
δ 50000
Table 5.1: Initial parameters
5.3.4 Parameters
Initial parameters are shown in Table 5.1. We initially also set all fl = 0, and estimate the
parameters in the calibrated versions of the logit models using the ﬂows resulting from the
probit model in that situation. We then increase one of the fares, and use the calibrated
models to examine the eﬀects of this change.
5.4 Simulation results
5.4.1 Parameter-equivalent models
We ﬁrst compare link ﬂows resulting from the three theoretically equivalent models: the
MNP, NL with comparable coeﬃcients, and GNL with comparable coeﬃcients. Starting
from a situation where no links are tolled, we increase the toll on the link between nodes 5
and 8, in both directions. Fig. 5.6 shows the resulting ﬂows v, as a function of these tolls
f58 = f85, for four representative links. Flow patterns on the other links either do not vary
signiﬁcantly with this toll, or display similar patterns as those in Fig. 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Link ﬂows in parameter-equivalent models
Since these three models imply diﬀerent substitution patterns, their resulting ﬂows are,
of course, not exactly the same. However, the diﬀerences between the models are relatively
small, even on the link that is tolled (the top left panel in Fig. 5.6). As we have shown
in section 5.2.2, this is, to a large extent, the result of congestion. Because all links are
congested, the utilities users derive from routes always correlate if routes overlap, even in
the NL model. The presence or absence of correlation between the stochastic parts of the
utilities still has an impact, but not nearly as big as one might expect. Moreover, since most
links are used in several markets, OD-level diﬀerences may partially cancel each other out on
the network level.
Fig. 5.6 also shows that the GNL model, which allows for some correlation between random
terms of routes, often results in ﬂows closer to the Probit model, and it is never signiﬁcantly
further away.
5.4.2 Calibrated models
Although the diﬀerence between the parameter-equivalent models is a good benchmark, mod-
els are usually calibrated, which might increase or decrease the diﬀerences. Calibration ob-
viously brings the traﬃc ﬂows closer together in the calibrated point (in our case, where no
links are tolled), but this could reduce the predictive power of the models.
Since we are only interested in the diﬀerences between models, and not in determining
which mode best ﬁts a particular dataset, we examine these eﬀects by calibrating the NL and
GNL models to the Probit route ﬂows. Fig. 5.7 shows the ﬂows on four representative links,
resulting from the Probit, calibrated NL and calibrated GNL models.
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Figure 5.7: Link ﬂows in calibrated models
As before, the diﬀerences between the models are small; in fact, the calibration has de-
creased them almost everywhere. It seems that, in this particular setting, a good choice of
model parameters can compensate for the fundamental diﬀerences in the variance-covariance
structure of the models. Moreover, the GNL model is now always closer to the Probit ﬂows
than the NL model is.
5.4.3 Overcalibration
The logit models used above are simple, and only have a few parameters that can be cali-
brated. Since, as we have seen above, calibration can bring the SUE models closer together, it
might be advantageous to use a more ﬂexible logit model with alternative-speciﬁc constants,
as deﬁned in Eq. 5.4. Fig. 5.8 shows the same Probit and NL ﬂows as Fig. 5.7, but in
addition, the ﬂows resulting from a calibrated NL model with alternative-speciﬁc constants.
Naturally, the introduction of more calibration parameters allows the NL-ASC model to
be closer to the Probit model when tolls are zero. If we move away from this calibrated
state, however, the NL-ASC model is signiﬁcantly further away from the Probit model than
any other model we have examined, at least for the tolled link. This happens because the
introduction of ASCs also changes the other calibrated parameters, β and μ. A decrease in
μ makes routes less similar, and thus poorer substitutes. This decreases the price elasticity
of a demand for each route. Conversely, a decrease in β leads to larger diﬀerences in route
costs, which increases elasticities. The introduction of ASCs may change both parameters in
each direction. In this case, both β and μ are lower, but the eﬀect of the latter parameter is
larger, which leads to an decrease in the price elasticity of demand for link 58. Hence, better
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Figure 5.8: Link ﬂows: NL vs NL-ASC
calibration of the initial equilibrium is not always good for out-of-equilibrium predictions,
especially if there is no theoretical foundation (e.g., a correction for the number of left-hand
turns in a route) for the addition of more parameters.
5.4.4 Implications for tolling
Although the diﬀerences in link ﬂows between the various SUE models are small, it is diﬃcult
to say whether these small diﬀerences are important without specifying where these ﬂows are
going to be used for. We therefore examine two situations: one in which link 58 is tolled
(in both directions) by a private operator, which maximizes its proﬁts, and one in which the
toll on this link is set by a social planner, which maximizes social welfare. Other policies,
such as capacity extensions, are likely to give similar results, as they also aﬀect the cost of
using speciﬁc links (although indirectly, through a higher of lower congestibility, rather than
directly).
Fig. 5.9 gives the private operator’s proﬁt, as a function of f58 = f85, for three models:
MNP, calibrated NL, and calibrated NL-ASC. Naturally, the diﬀerences between the models
are only important if they lead to diﬀerent optimal tolls, or aﬀect the choice for tolling as
such. The Probit and NL models result in optimal tolls that are very similar; the proﬁt
levels are also comparable. If the Probit model is the correct model, using an NL model to
obtain tolls would only reduce proﬁts by 0.3%. Using an NL model with alternative-speciﬁc
constants, however, would result in a signiﬁcantly higher toll, and a proﬁt loss of 8.6%, a
direct result of the fact that this model uses a lower β and μ, which lowers the demand
elasticity on link 58.
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Figure 5.9: Proﬁts as a function of tolls
Fig. 5.10 shows the result of a similar exercise, in which a social planner maximizes the
social welfare improvement resulting from tolling, as deﬁned in Eq. 5.18. This ﬁgure is
very similar to Fig. 5.9; again, there is only a minimal diﬀerence in optimal tolls between
the MNP and NL models. If the Probit model is correct, using an NL model to obtain
optimal tolls results in only a 1.2% welfare loss. Using the NL-ASC model, however, results
in a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent toll, and a welfare loss of 5.4% if. This implies that, although
simple logit-based SUE models often give very similar results to more ﬂexible probit models,
overcalibration can have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on policy eﬀectiveness.
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Figure 5.10: Changes in welfare as a function of tolls
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Figure 5.11: Tolling link 1011
5.4.5 Sensitivity
In Figs. 5.9 and 5.10, optimal tolls are higher in the MNP model than in the NL model, and
even higher than in the ASC model. This is, however, not systematic. If, instead of link 58,
another link is tolled, the results are diﬀerent, as illustrated in Fig. 5.11, where we toll the
link between nodes 10 and 11. Although this ﬁgure shows proﬁts only, welfare follows a very
similar pattern.
Because this link is much less central, it is used by fewer markets. Hence, although tolling
still has a local eﬀect, it has a much smaller impact on the other links in the model. As a
result, the diﬀerences between the models are negligible. Although, here, both logit models
result in a higher toll than the MNP model, this diﬀerence is so minor that the use of even
the toll from an NL-ASC model results in less than a 0.04% proﬁt loss if the MNP model is
correct.
Figs. 5.12–5.14 show link ﬂows and welfare for the various SUE models, in a situation where
the congestibility of the links is lower (speciﬁcally, χl = vot · KlSf
(
1 + 0.15 (vl/Vl)2
)
+fl, where
the square replaces the fourth power of the original BPR function). 5 As Fig. 5.12 shows, the
diﬀerences between models are larger than in the base case parameterization. This conﬁrms
that it is congestion that brings the models close together. As before, the GNL ﬂows are much
closer to the MNP ﬂows than the NL ﬂows. Moreover, as Fig. 5.13 shows, NL-ASC ﬂows are
now even further away from ﬂows in the other models; in particular, the price elasticity of
demand is much higher on the tolled link. As a result, the socially optimal NL-ASC toll is
much lower, as Fig. 5.14 shows. If NL-ASC tolls are used while the MNP tolls are correct,
this results in a 78% welfare loss, while using NL tolls would only reduce welfare by 28%.
5Note that this does not only decrease the congestibility of all links, but through that, also aﬀects demand
levels, and hence all demand elasticities.
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Figure 5.12: Lower congestibility – ﬂows
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Figure 5.13: Lower congestibility – overcalibration
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Figure 5.14: Lower congestibility – welfare
5.5 Conclusions
We have shown that, in a small but representative congestible transport network, simple
logit SUE models can give results that are very similar to more general probit models. This
result stems mostly from the fact that transport networks are congestible, which implies
that the systematic utilities that users derive from overlapping routes are correlated, even if
the random utilities corresponding to the routes are not. Moreover, in networks, OD-level
diﬀerences can potentially cancel each other out. The diﬀerences in link ﬂows between models
are not systematic, i.e., one model does not always result in higher proﬁt-maximizing or
socially optimal tolls than another; this depends on the characteristics of the network and
the links on which particular policies are enacted.
Since logit models are much less computationally intensive, this indicates that they might,
at least in heavily congested settings, be a better choice. As logit models need no simulation,
they can lead to more accurate results and allow for studying of more and more complex
policy instruments and games (e.g., tax competition, networks with multiple operators, etc.).
However, we also ﬁnd that models can be overcalibrated, especially when parameters are
introduced that have no theoretical justiﬁcation. This is, for instance, the case if alternative-
speciﬁc constants are introduced in a logit model when there is no theoretical basis for their
inclusion. In that case, signiﬁcant diﬀerences between models can arise, and careful evaluation
of the various possibilities is necessary.
We have focused on a few representative SUE models, and have disregarded others; in
particular, we have not examined any link-based route choice models, (e.g. Baillon and
Cominetti, 2008; Fosgerau et al., 2013). Although these models are very useful for estimation,
their complexity makes them less suitable for many simulation application. They do, however,
have advantages; in particular, they avoid path enumeration, and do not need restricted choice
sets. Further research has to determine how large diﬀerent these models are from existing
logit and probit models in practical situations.
Naturally, our results were obtained for a very speciﬁc situation. We have chosen our
network such as to maximize the possible diﬀerences between models, and have chosen realistic
parameters. It is unlikely that other networks or parameterizations would give signiﬁcantly
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diﬀerent results, and our sensitivity analyses conﬁrm this. The network we have examined,
though small, features a large number of overlapping routes between all OD-pairs; moreover,
many of these routes are used in equilibrium. We therefore do not expect diﬀerent results,
with stronger contrasts, for larger networks.
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6 Modeling the formation of transport
networks and its regulation1
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have focused on short- to medium-term planning decisions in transport
markets: pricing, scheduling, and the regulation of prices and schedules. Using the results
from chapter 5, this ﬁnal technical chapter analyzes long-term investment decisions. It focuses
especially on private investment in transport networks, and the regulation of investment.
Privately constructed and operated railways have a long history, and private investors
are now again increasingly being looked upon to fund the necessary new infrastructure (e.g.
Debande, 2002; Estache and Serebrisky, 2004). The interest in private road supply is also
increasing (Verhoef, 2008). However, if private operators not only control road prices or fares,
but also decide which transport links are built, this could result not only in sub-optimal road
prices or fares, but also in a network that looks much diﬀerent than the social optimum.
Even if, in this setting, regulators can not directly control all relevant variables, such as
investment levels and fares, there may still be some opportunities for regulation; in particular,
regulators may be able to either control the network structure or the fare levels. This chapter
examines how this situation can be modeled, and illustrates, using a numerical example, how
various regulatory strategies can address the allocative ineﬃciencies resulting from private
infrastructure investment.
Three strands of literature have examined similar problems. First, the literature on trans-
port network design, as it has been developed in the engineering and operations research
communities, considers what an optimal transport network is, in certain settings. These
studies usually look at the problem from the perspective of a single planner, which maxi-
mizes proﬁts, or minimizes social or private costs (see e.g. the seminal work by Magnanti and
Wong, 1984). If a social planner cannot directly decide on investment levels or prices, and
these variables are instead set by separate, proﬁt-maximizing operators that compete with
each other, the problem becomes much more diﬃcult; the network is then not designed by a
single entity, but emerges as a result of competition.
Second, the strategic formation of networks has been examined extensively in the context
of social networks (see Jackson, 2004, 2010 for an overview). The models developed in
that strand of literature are often very similar to transportation models, in that links are
constructed strategically by several players, where the construction of one new link eﬀects
payoﬀs in the whole network. However, there is one important diﬀerence: in social networks,
‘node’ is usually synonymous with ‘player’, and hence, if links are constructed strategically,
the nodes themselves decide which links are constructed. In a transportation setting, this
corresponds to a situation in which transport users living in a certain place decide where to
build new transportation links to. Although, in some settings, this may be appropriate (e.g.
1This chapter is based on joint work with Erik Verhoef and Vincent van den Berg. I thank Hugo Silva, and
the participants of the 2013 NECTAR meeting for helpful comments on earlier versions.
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if infrastructure investment is the responsibility of local governments), this is generally not
realistic. Transportation operators instead form a separate modeling level: they maximize
their own proﬁts, and do not directly act in the interests of the users traveling between the
nodes that a new link would connect.
A third strand of literature looks at infrastructure investment from a more theoretical
economic perspective. Most of these studies use simple models, often consisting of only one
or two links (e.g., De Borger and Van Dender, 2006). In these models, investors only choose
how much capacity to construct, and how to price this capacity. Moreover, capacity is usually
assumed to be a continuous, diﬀerentiable variable. In many of these studies, optimal pricing
can induce a ﬁrst-best welfare-optimizing outcome; in some cases, capacity subsidization is
also needed. Even in the few studies that do look at networks (e.g., Silva et al., 2014), this
still holds. In reality, the economics of transport infrastructure investment are more complex.
Network eﬀects play an important role: individual links are complements and substitutes for
others, and cannot always be considered in isolation. In addition, capacity is rarely completely
continuous; at the very least, there are minimum and maximum capacities, and sometimes
(as for railways) capacities may take only a few discrete levels.
Combining parts of these three strands of literature, we propose a modeling methodology
to analyze investment decisions in a network, where capacities are discrete and decided by
proﬁt-maximizing competitors. Speciﬁcally, we examine a situation in which investment
choices are binary variables: either a link is built, and in that case it will have a constant,
exogenous capacity, or it is not built at all.2 We examine several game-theoretical structures:
1. Unregulated equilibria with one or more private investors deciding which links to con-
struct, and subsequently, which fares to charge for access.
2. Fare-regulated equilibria with one or more investors deciding which links to construct,
followed by a second stage in which a social planner decides on fares. We distinguish
between two versions of this game, one in which the operators anticipate the socially
optimal fare, and one in which they naïvely expect to set their own proﬁt-maximizing
fare when deciding on investment. Analyzing these two versions separately will allow
us to isolate the eﬀect of second-stage behavior on ﬁrst-stage choices. Moreover, in
real-world markets, unanticipated regulation is a plausible option.
3. Network-regulated equilibria, in which a social planner decides which links will be con-
structed. This is followed by a second stage, in which one or more private operators set
fares. As with fare regulation, we distinguish between two versions: one in which the
social planner correctly anticipates competitive fares (such that it selects the second-
best network), and one in which it naïvely expects socially optimal fares (such that it
selects a quasi-ﬁrst-network). Again, these two versions allow for a better analysis of
the various eﬀects at play, and also reﬂect the complexities of real-world regulation.
4. Socially optimal investment and fare-setting. Here, social welfare is maximized; this
serves as a benchmark against which we compare the performance of the other games.
With information about the outcomes of these games, it is possible to say which form of
second-best regulation (network or fare) is best in which situation, how eﬃcient they are,
2This assumption helps to decrease the computational burden of our models. It can easily be relaxed, but
in that case, the heuristic solution methods discussed below can not be used; a nonlinear programming
approach is then necessary.
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relative to the ﬁrst-best socially optimal situation, how the networks diﬀer between the games,
etc.
In the next two sections, we explain the building blocks of a model that can be used to
analyze these games, and discuss the economic theory behind the potential outcomes. To
illustrate the challenges and possibilities of this methodology, we construct a numerical model
in section 6.4, using a simple network with a limited number of nodes and potential links,
and use this to simulate the four games listed above. In the numerical simulation, we ﬁx
the number of links, to speciﬁcally examine the allocative eﬃciencies of the games. From the
results of this simple simulation exercise, we can already draw some economic conclusions that
are likely to hold in real-world applications. Most importantly, second-best fare regulation is
not always enough to achieve welfare-maximizing outcomes, even if the regulator can also set
the total amount of capacity that operators build (through, for instance, location-independent
per-unit capacity subsidization – this subsidy can be set such that the optimal amount of
total capacity is attained, but it is unlikely that this capacity is constructed in the correct
location). Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Modeling methodology
6.2.1 User costs and demand
The lowest level of aggregation in most transport models is formed by individual transport
users. To evaluate the eﬀects of pricing or regulation, it is important to correctly model
how users decide whether they will travel, and if so, which route they will take. Hence, the
choice of user cost functions is, naturally, key. There is a wealth of literature on these user
cost functions, mostly for road travel, but also for other modes. One of the most popular
cost functions for road travel is the BPR function (US Bureau of Public Roads, 1964), which
assumes that travel times are a (non-linear) function of the traﬃc ﬂow on a link, given its
capacity. These traveling times can then be multiplied with users’ values of time (VOT) to
obtain user costs.
In a public transportation network, travel times (other than, possibly, boarding times) do
not generally depend on usage levels. Instead users experience diﬀerent forms of congestion
during their trip, including in-vehicle and on-platform crowding. There are many empirical
studies that attempt to estimate the costs of on or both these forms of congestion; for an
overview, see Wardman and Whelan (2011) and Li and Hensher (2011). A popular speciﬁca-
tion, proposed by Whelan and Crockett (2009), uses a crowding multiplier, which multiplies
the value of in-vehicle time, and hence, ignores the relatively unimportant on-platform crowd-
ing. As their analysis shows, a linear speciﬁcation ﬁts the data well once the occupancy rate,
in terms of seats, exceeds 100% (such that all additional passengers stand). As long as there
is still a signiﬁcant number of seats left, crowding costs increase at a much lower rate, but
they are still close to linear. Hence, as long as it is reasonable to assume that a negligible
number of passengers can sit down or a negligible number of passengers stands (as in trains
where a reservation is required), using a single linear cost function seems reasonable. Given
that, the generalized price of using link l, χl is then:
χl = V OT (1 + Avl)Tl + fl (6.1)
where V OT is the value of time, vl the number of users taking link l, fl the fare, Tl the travel
time, and A a parameter. This parameter can be used to calibrate the model, such that
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the ﬂows correspond to actual ﬂows, or such that the crowding multipliers (1 + A · vl) have
realistic values. The empirical studies mentioned above report estimates that are roughly
between 1 and 4, depending on mode-speciﬁc details. It is natural to assume that the cost of
taking a given route r is simply the sum of the the link-based costs over all links that make
up the route:
cr =
∑
l
arlχl (6.2)
where arl = 1 if link l is part of route r, and zero otherwise.
In many cases, the total number of travelers between two nodes will depend on the cost of
travel, and thus, demand is price-sensitive. There are several ways to model this sensitivity
to prices. One way is to express the total travel demand between two nodes as a direct
function of the (expected) cost of travel. Another is to keep the total amount of users ﬁxed,
but to include the option not to travel as a discrete choice in the route choice model. The
latter option is often easier to include in a model, as the next section will show. It may
be diﬃcult to determine what the (exogenous) value of this no-travel alternative should be;
however, ﬁnding the parameters of an explicit demand function will also be diﬃcult. Since
the cost of the outside alternative directly aﬀects the ﬂows on all links, it can be treated as
a calibration parameter. Following the previous chapter, the user equilibrium model below,
and our numerical simulations, will use this no-travel alternative approach, rather than an
explicit demand function that depends on the expected route costs.
6.2.2 User equilibrium
Having speciﬁed route-based cost functions cr, the next building block is a traﬃc assignment
model, which calculates the usage levels of all routes in equilibrium for any set of fares fl.
Here, several approaches are possible. A deterministic user equilibrium can be derived from
Wardrop’s principles (Wardrop, 1952), which specify that all used routes must have the same
generalized prices, which is lower than the cost of all unused routes (i.e. for all routes r and
s, 0 ≤ cr − cs ⊥ vr ≥ 0). Hence, the solution to these conditions gives a Nash equilibrium
if the number of users is large enough: no single users can decrease its costs by unilaterally
choosing a diﬀerent route.
The Wardropian user equilibrium has been proven to exist, and to be unique, for a very
general class of cost functions; it can be approximated using, for instance, a Frank-Wolfe
algorithm (Dafermos and Sparrow, 1969). In some situations, however, its properties are
unattractive. It may result in a large number of unused routes through a network, even
if usage data suggests these routes are used; this disparity is diﬃcult to address through
calibration of the model parameters. Moreover, the usage levels vr are not continuous in
user costs: for every route, there is a point at which costs become so high that suddenly, the
route will cease to be used. This is particularly problematic for the analysis of competition
in networks, because it implies that the exploitation proﬁts of a given link are also not
continuous in route costs. If there is more than one operator, and each operator sets a fare
on its own link, Nash equilibria in fares may be diﬃcult to calculate, or may not even exist.
Partly as an answer to these problems, stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) assignment mod-
els have become popular. In those models, user costs consist of the deterministic costs cr,
and a stochastic term. This stochastic term is not observed, but is assumed to have a known
distribution. It is then possible to calculate the probability that a randomly selected user
will take a given route; summing over all users will give the expected total usage level. An
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attractive property of SUE models is that usage levels will never reach zero, but asymptote
towards it; moreover, they can easily be calibrated to real-world data.
Many diﬀerent SUE models have been developed, each with its own assumptions about the
stochastic part of user costs; several of these have been examined in chapter 5. The simplest
version, the multinomial logit (MNL) model, assumes that the stochastic term of each route
is independent of all others, and follows a Gumbel distribution. The route choice probabilities
are then easy to calculate, and have a closed-form solution. At the other end of the scale,
a multinomial probit model allows for any type of correlation between the error terms of all
pairs of alternatives; this model can only be solved with numerical methods.
In the context of a larger model that analyzes competition, an SUE model that has closed-
form probabilities is preferable, as it allows for much shorter computation times. However, in
a network setting, routes usually partially overlap. This implies that the deterministic route
costs correlate; it is then unrealistic to assume that the stochastic terms are uncorrelated. As
the previous chapter has shown, generalized nested logit (GNL) models oﬀer a useful com-
promise between realism and computational intensity. In this model, the number of nests is
equal to the number of links plus one (for the no-travel alternative); each route may belong
to a number of nests, where the shares of each route attributed to nests are calculated using
free-ﬂow travel times. Route choice probabilities are then given by Eq. 5.7.
If the physical routes only diﬀer in length, and not in other characteristics, it is reasonable
to set all μl = μ. Given Eq. 5.7, the expected total travel ﬂow on each link is
vl =
∑
ij
∑
r
aijralrDijpijr (6.3)
where Dij is the potential demand, or demand intercept.
6.2.3 Operator proﬁts and social welfare
Operator income is the product of fares and link-based demand, summed over all the links
that the operator has constructed. In general, operators also have operating and maintenance
costs, which may depend on the usage levels of the links. In our numerical simulations, we
will disregard these costs, as they unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Naturally, the total
link ﬂow vl is a function of all route probabilities pijr, which themselves depend on the ﬂows
through congestion. It is theoretically possible to substitute the route probabilities in the
proﬁt functions, and to solve to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point. The resulting proﬁt functions will then
be a function of fl only, and can be maximized. Since the route choice probabilities follow
a relatively complex exponential function, it is more convenient to treat all vl as decision
variables, such that ﬁrm x maximizes its proﬁt πx:
πx =
∑
l∈Lx
(flvl − cl) (6.4)
where cl is the investment cost associated with the construction of link l, and to then impose
Eq. 6.3 as a constraint. Since each ﬁrm solves this problem, this will give the same Nash
equilibrium fares.
A social planner instead maximizes social welfare which, in this case, is the sum of the
consumer surplus and the sum of all operators’ proﬁts. In a discrete choice model, such
as the GNL model discussed above, this consumer surplus can be calculated by using the
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logsum, or expected utility. In the GNL, this logsum is given by
1
β
log
(∑
l
(∑
r′
aijr′
(
αr′le−βcr
) 1
μl
)μl
+ e−βC
)
(6.5)
for a user traveling between nodes i and j. If no links are constructed, this simpliﬁes to
log
(
e−βC
)
= −βC. Consumer surplus for the total number of users traveling from i to j can,
therefore, be calculated as the diﬀerence in logsums between a situation in which no links are
built, and the situation of interest3, multiplied by the number of individual decision makers
Dij for that market. Summing these values over all markets gives the total consumer surplus.
Given our assumptions about operator proﬁts. total welfare W is then given by:
W =
∑
ij
Dij
(
1
β
log
(∑
l
(∑
r′
aijr′
(
αr′le−βcr
) 1
μl
)μl
+ e−βC
)
+ βC
)
+
∑
x
∑
l∈Lx
(flvl − cl)
(6.6)
6.2.4 Optimal investment, fares, and regulation
The building blocks explained above can, together, be used to compute usage levels, proﬁts,
and welfare, given a set of fares, and a set of links. This section discussed how operators
and regulators set these variables. We will do this for the four situations mentioned above:
an unregulated setting, where one or more private operators decide which links to construct,
and which fares to set; a setting with network regulation but private proﬁt-maximizing fares;
a setting with a private proﬁt-maximizing network but regulated fares; and a fully regulated
setting, where a social planner decides on fares and investment. In the next section, we will
discuss how the resulting equilibria can be obtained with numerical methods.
No regulation
This is a two-stage game, which can be solved by backwards induction. In the second (pricing)
stage, each operator solves
max
fl,vl|l∈Lx
πx =
∑
l∈Lx
(flvl − Il) (6.7)
s.t. Eq. 6.3 ∀l, where x = 1 if there is one monopolistic operator, and x ∈ {1, ..., X − 1, X}
if there are more, and Il is the construction cost of link l. In our numerical simulations, we
will assume that, if there is more than one operator, X is exogenous. In general, if entry
is allowed, X should reﬂect the maximum number of potential entrants in the market, or
the maximum number of links, whichever is lowest. Each operator independently determines
which fares to charge for the use of its own infrastructure; naturally, since vl is a function
of all fares, its proﬁts are inﬂuenced by its competitor’s decision. In the ﬁrst (investment)
stage, each operator chooses a set of links Lx to maximize its proﬁts.
max
Lx
πx (f∗l , v∗l ) (6.8)
3The logsum is an indicated of users’ expected utility (including utility derived from choosing the no-travel
option; hence, to calculate the beneﬁts of transportation, the expected utility in a setting where all users
decide not to travel is subtracted.
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s.t.
Lx ⊆
⎛
⎝L \ ⋃
x′=x
Lx′
⎞
⎠ (6.9)
where {f∗l , v∗l } is the solution to the second-stage problem. Again, x = 1 if there is one
monopolistic operator, and x ∈ {1, ..., X − 1, X} if there are multiple operators. Constraint
6.9 ensures that each link can only be constructed once. There may be other restrictions on
Lx; each operator may, for instance, only be allowed to construct one link (i.e., |Lx| ≤ 1), as
we will assume in the numerical simulations below.
If there are multiple operators, it is natural to assume that all fares are set simultaneously,
and that {f∗l , v∗l } is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; no operator has an incentive to
unilaterally change its fare.4 Similarly, in the ﬁrst stage, we consider all equilibria in which
no operator has an incentive to unilaterally choose another set of links. Contrary to the user
equilibrium, the network investment equilibrium may not always exist even if cost functions
are highly simpliﬁed. There may also be more than one Nash equilibrium.
Price regulation
Again, this is a two-stage game, which can be solved by backwards induction. Now, in the
second stage, the social planner solves
max
fl,vl
W (6.10)
s.t. Eq. 6.3 ∀l. The ﬁrst (investment) stage problem now depends on whether the operators
anticipated socially optimal prices, or expected to set their own proﬁt-maximizing prices. In
the latter case, they solve the same ﬁrst-stage maximization problem as they would in the
unregulated market. If socially optimal prices are anticipated, they solve a similar problem,
but with {f∗l , v∗l } = argmax
fl,vl
W . In either case, as before, there may be one pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, or none, or several.
Network regulation
Here, as in the unregulated equilibrium, operators maximize their proﬁts s.t. Eq. 6.3 ∀l in
the second stage. The ﬁrst stage, in which the social planner designs the network, depends
on whether it expects to also set prices. If both cases, it solves
max
Lx
W (6.11)
s.t. Lf ⊆ L. When it incorrectly assumes socially optimal pricing will follow (a quasi-ﬁrst-
best situation), it uses {f∗l , v∗l } = argmax
fl,vl
W . If, instead, it selects the second-best network,
{f∗l , v∗l } = argmax
fl,vl
πx
4In our context, mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are diﬃcult to justify. Other equilibrium concepts may be
more realistic alternatives; e.g., a Strong Nash equilibrium, which is also robust against deviations of more
than one player or a Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, which is robust against deviations of more than one
player where these players cannot make binding commitments. In most of the transportation literature,
however, simple Nash equilibria remain the most popular way to model simultaneous decisions.
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6.2.5 Solution methods: mixed-integer programming
The games outlined above can be formulated as mixed-integer problems. These types of
problems are very common in other markets, and consequently, there is a large literature on
solution methods and algorithms.5 The diﬃculty of transport network formation is that is
that each potential link can be built by each potential operator; there is not necessarily any
ownership before investment.
One way to handle this is to deﬁne a variable Ixl, which is equal to one if operator x owns
link l, and zero otherwise.
Ixl ∈ {0, 1} (6.12)
0 ≤
∑
x
Ixl ≤ 1 (6.13)
Moreover, if each operator is only allowed to construct a maximum of one link,
0 ≤
∑
l
Ixl ≤ 1 (6.14)
Further, deﬁne the fares and usage levels as
fl =
∑
x
Fxl (6.15)
vl =
∑
x
Vxl (6.16)
where Fxl and Vxl are variables and
Fxl (1 − Ixl) = 0 (6.17)
Vxl (1 − Ixl) = 0 (6.18)
Naturally, ﬂows also have to be consistent with the user equilibrium, as given by Eq. 6.3.
If there is only one operator, or a social planner decides on all variables, the problem is
then a mixed-integer nonlinear program (MINLP); the operator or or social planner chooses
investment levels I, fares F , and ﬂows V , subject to the user equilibrium constraints, and the
constraints listed above. If there are more operators, it is an equilibrium problem with equi-
librium constraints (EPEC), which is generally very diﬃcult, though not always impossible
to solve. Using the new variables I, F and V , the second (pricing) stage can be replaced by
its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions; these can then be used as constraints in the ﬁrst
stage. Since the KKT conditions represent an equilibrium (i.e., for a given investment level,
there is only one optimal second-stage solution), the feasible region of the ﬁrst-stage problem
is necessarily non-convex, even without the integer constraints. This makes solving the ﬁrst-
stage problem very diﬃcult. Moreover, the user equilibrium constraints involve terms that
are summed over all routes, and the set of routes that serve each market changes with the
network conﬁguration. Formulating the user equilibrium constraints is, therefore, far from
easy.
In many cases, however, the number of potential network conﬁgurations is limited. More-
over, it may be possible to further reduce this number by discarding conﬁgurations that are
5E.g., unit commitment problems in electricity markets, where generators decide which generators to turn
on, and participate in a common market afterwards (Hobbs et al., 2001).
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highly unlikely to be equilibria (e.g., conﬁgurations where one link connects two nodes be-
tween which travel demand is very low, and there are no other links connecting these nodes
to larger markets). In that case, it may be possible to solve the second-stage for each possible
conﬁguration; the ﬁrst-stage problem then reduces to choosing which equilibria lead to the
highest social welfare, or which equilibria are stable to unilateral deviations in investment
decisions. Hence, instead of replacing the second stage of the problem by its KKT conditions,
the ﬁrst stage is replaced by an exhaustive search. We will further explore this method in
the next section.
6.2.6 Solution methods: exhaustive search
If a social planner or a single private operator chooses which links to construct, an exhaus-
tive search over the whole set of potential equilibrium networks is a straightforward way
to eliminate the investment stage, and with it, all integer variables. As explained above,
this set of potential solutions may not be very large, even if the set of all possible network
conﬁgurations is much larger; many network conﬁgurations can be discarded ex-ante. Once
the second (pricing) stage has been solved for all potential network equilibria, choosing the
conﬁguration with the highest proﬁt or social welfare is simple.
If multiple operators invest, an exhaustive search is more complex. In this case simply
solving for all potential equilibria is not enough. Whereas, in the case where one operator
or social planner invests, the network selection simply amounts to choosing the conﬁguration
with the highest proﬁt or social welfare, the selection procedure is more complicated here, as
each operator now has its own proﬁt. If, as we have assumed above, the operators compete
in a Nash setting, a network conﬁguration is an equilibrium if and only if no single operator
has an incentive to change its investment strategy. Hence, to examine whether a network
conﬁguration is indeed an equilibrium it is not only necessary to solve the pricing stage for
that conﬁguration, but also for all conﬁgurations in which one of the operators chooses a
diﬀerent link or set of links. If at least one of these unilateral deviations is proﬁtable for
the operator that deviates, the original allocation is not a Nash equilibrium. In most cases,
however, it is not necessary to solve the pricing stage for all possible deviations; as soon as
one proﬁtable deviation is found, it is not necessary to look further. Hence, in a situation
where the investment stage is competitive, the exhaustive search can be performed as follows:
1. Deﬁne a set of potential network equilibria S, containing all allocations L that might
be Nash equilibria. Here, each allocation describes which operators constructs which
links. The set of links constructed by an operator may be empty; naturally, this implies
that its proﬁts are zero.
2. Solve the second (pricing) stage for all allocations in S. This step can easily be paral-
lelized.
3. Check the allocations in S against each other; if any allocation represents a unilateral
deviation from another, and this deviation is proﬁtable for the operator that deviates,
this other allocation is not a Nash equilibrium, and can be discarded.
4. Deﬁne the set of equilibria that have not been discarded as S1 ⊆ S.
5. For each L in S1, sequentially solve the second stage for all allocations that represent
a unilateral deviation from L. If a deviation is proﬁtable, discard that L, and move
to the next. Note that leaving the market and not constructing any links may also be
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a proﬁtable deviation for an individual operator; the same is true for the decision to
construct a link by an operator that, in the original L, did not construct any links.
These last two types of deviations therefore also need to be checked.
6. If one or more L are left, they are Nash equilibria.
Although the pricing stage will have a unique equilibrium for any reasonable set of congestion
cost functions, the investment stage could have a single equilibrium, several equilibria, or no
equilibrium at all. In our numerical simulations, we always ﬁnd a single unique equilibrium,
but this is at least partially because we limit the number of operators. In a large network,
with many operators, it is more likely that multiple network equilibria exist.
6.3 Theory
Before we illustrate the uses of the above models in a numerical example, it is useful to brieﬂy
consider which results might be expected, based on economic theory. Two types of results
are of interest here: the performance of monopolistic and competitive markets, relative to
the social optimum, and the eﬃciency of the various regulatory strategies.
Naturally, a monopolistic market, in which one operator invests in new links and subse-
quently sets fares, will not achieve the maximum social welfare. If the capacities of new links
were continuous variables, a monopolist, using the same investment rule as a social plan-
ner but setting higher fares, would always invest less than optimal (see Small and Verhoef,
2007); this happens because the monopolist, ignoring any consumer surplus, evaluates the
investment rule at a lower usage level. The monopolistic markup decreases with the price
elasticity of demand. In our user equilibrium models, this elasticity is a function of the cost
of the no-travel alternative, the marginal utility of money, and the nesting coeﬃcient. If the
no-travel alternative is more costly, demand for travel is less sensitive to fare levels; the same
is true if the marginal utility of money is lower. Moreover, if overlapping routes are perceived
as very similar alternatives, users are more likely to choose the no-travel alternative, relative
to a situation in which the routes are unrelated.
In our models, capacities are discrete. Compared to the continuous case, this may increase
or decrease social welfare. If, for a given link, the monopolist’s optimal capacity choice in
a setting where capacity was a continuous variable is lower than the capacity that can be
chosen in a discrete setting, it can choose not to construct the link, which will decrease social
welfare, or it can choose to construct it at the higher capacity, which will increase social
welfare.
A competitive market, in which several operators construct links and set fares, may lead
to a higher social welfare than a monopolistic market. However, depending on the network
structure, it could also lead to a lower social welfare. In the pricing stage of the models,
the existence of parallel links will decrease fares and increase social welfare, since parallel
links are direct substitutes for each other, and this substitutability increases competition.
If competing operators own serial links, which are complementary to each other (i.e., some
travelers use two or more to get to their destination), this increases fares relative to the
monopoly, as operators disregard the negative eﬀects of a fare increase on other operators’
proﬁts (Economides and Salop, 1992). This, in turn, decreases welfare. Naturally, in a larger
network, links can be substitutes for some users, and complements for others; in that case,
the net eﬀect depends on the relative sizes of the markets.
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In our settings, however, the network structure is endogenous. Whereas, in a monopolistic
market, the degree of parallelity will generally be low (as the construction of a link parallel
to another will negatively eﬀect proﬁts on the original link), it may be much higher on a
competitive market (as competitors disregard this negative eﬀect). Conversely, the degree of
complementarity will be lower with competition: competitors disregard the positive eﬀects
of the construction of a new link on the proﬁts made on other links that connect to it.
Moreover, the threat of entry by other operators generally increases total investment levels
(Schmalensee, 1978; Scotchmer, 1985; van der Veer, 2002). All this suggests that the positive
eﬀects of competition may, in equilibrium, outweighs the negative eﬀects. Whether this is
true or not for a given network depends on the demand parameters mentioned above, and
on the set of possible links: if it is only possible to construct links that are complements for
most users, for instance, competition may not increase welfare. Moreover, since capacities
are decided on before fares are determined, competitors may be able to avoid competition
through underinvestment, because high levels of congestion make fares less important (de
Palma and Leruth, 1989). As in the monopolistic case, the discreteness of link capacities
may make things worse or better, depending on the available capacities and their costs.
Naturally, if regulators can set fares and decide which links will be constructed, the ﬁrst-
best social optimum can be achieved. The same is true if regulators set fares and subsidize
investment by posting a separate subsidy for every link. If ﬁrst-best regulation is not possible,
there are three types of distortions: the total amount of capacity may be suboptimal, the
capacity may not optimally located in the network, and fares may be too high. Capacity reg-
ulation would ﬁx the ﬁrst two; fare regulation would directly address the third, but indirectly
also aﬀect the network formation. A blanket capacity subsidy, independent of location, could
optimize the total capacity, but not its location, nor fares that are charged for access.
Whether network regulation or price regulation is better depends on the model parameters.
Network regulation has one important advantage in competitive markets: it eliminates the
probability that a highly undesirable Nash equilibrium network will emerge. Since, as we
have seen, it is possible that multiple networks are Nash equilibria, operators may get stuck
in an equilibrium that is very far away from the optimum. Fare regulation cannot address
this directly. If the distortion in total capacity investment is small, fare regulation is likely
to be more eﬃcient. When operators decide which links to construct, their objectives are not
perfectly aligned with those of the social planner, but they are similar. Operators want to
invest in places where they can make the highest proﬁts, while social planners would invest
in places where the highest social surplus gains can be achieved; both of these conditions are
likely to hold in the largest markets. When operators decide on fares, however, there is a
much larger diﬀerence in objectives. By deﬁnition, quasi-ﬁrst best network regulation, which
ignores the fact that fares will be set competitively, can never result in a higher social welfare
than second-best network regulation. Similarly, non-anticipated second-best price regulation
can never be worse, and is likely to perform much better, than anticipated regulation.
The discrete nature of investment does make a diﬀerence for regulation. It has been
shown that, in many cases, optimal fares can often restore ﬁrst-best outcomes if capacities
are continuous (see e.g Silva et al., 2014); if fare regulation is not enough, the addition a
location-independent capacity subsidy will usually ﬁx everything. If investment is discrete,
this is not longer the case, as allocative ineﬃciencies may still remain. Given the partial
alignment of private operators’ and social planners’ objectives, however, these ineﬃciencies
are likely to be small; we will further explore them in the numerical simulations below.
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6.4 Numerical simulations
To illustrate how the model proposed in the above sections behaves, and which economic
conclusions can be drawn from it, this section will present the results of a numerical simula-
tion, using a small but representative network. To limit the computational intensity of the
models, we only consider the allocative ineﬃciencies of the various market structures. To
that end, we assume that construction costs are the same for all links, and that the total
number of links is ﬁxed. We then examine where these links are constructed, and which fares
are charged for access, in each of the four situations mentioned above (no regulation, price
regulation, network regulation, full regulation), with myopic and forward-looking agents, in
a monopoly and an oligopoly where each operator only owns one link. The ﬁxed number
of links can represent a situation in which the regulator has decided on the optimal total
capacity level, and subsidizes capacity at a rate which induces operators to invest at this op-
timal capacity, without spatially diﬀerentiating the subsidies.6 We use the exhaustive search
approach outlined above, solving the second stage of the models using the KNITRO nonlinear
solver (Byrd et al., 2006) in Wolfram Mathematica 8.
6.4.1 Parameterization
We test our models on the simple eight-node network shown in ﬁgure 6.1. In this ﬁgure, lines
represent possible connections, and the sizes of the nodes indicate their actual sizes in our
base case parameterization. Although this network is relatively small, it still features a large
number of possible routes, many of which partially overlap. These routes not only exist in
theory, but are also used by a signiﬁcant number of passengers in the equilibria we examine.
A smaller network would not be suitable for our purposes; the number of links and routes
would be too limited to properly examine competition between operators. The middle node
is purposely slightly oﬀset, to avoid situations in which the equilibria are not unique only
because links have exactly the same expected costs and beneﬁts; the average link length is
40km.
1 2 3
4
5
6
7 8
Figure 6.1: Network
The realized demand for travel on any constructed link will, of course, depend on prices,
6In general, the optimal number of links may depend on the market structure; our setup ignores this, and
ﬁxes the number of links across all models.
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Parameter Value
Si
⎡
⎢⎣ 150000 0 120000225000 200000 375000
375000 250000
⎤
⎥⎦
A 1/8000
B 1/50000
C 40 $
V OT 10 $/h
V 120 km/h
β 1
μ 1/2
Table 6.1: Base case parameters
and the levels of congestion, as shown below. We use a simple gravity model to calculate the
‘potential’ demand, or demand intercept Dij , for travel between nodes i and j, such that:
Dij = B
SiSj
Lij
(6.19)
such that the potential demand between two nodes increases with each node’s size Sn, mul-
tiplied by a parameter A and decreases with the Euclidean distance Lij between the two
nodes. Travel costs are assumed to increase linearly in the usage levels,7 and route choices
and actual numbers of travelers are modeled with a GNL SUE. Travel times Tl are calculated
by dividing the link length by the travel speed V . All parameters are summarized in table
6.1.
6.4.2 Monopoly
We ﬁrst consider a situation in which there is only one operator (X = 1), who chooses which
four links to construct out of all possible links shown in Fig. 6.1. As explained above, this
implies that the results will only show the eﬀects of potential suboptimal capacity locations,
not of a possible suboptimal total capacity. Starting with the base case equilibrium, we
increase the size of the central node, node 5, examining in particular the social welfare in
the various regulated and unregulated monopolistic equilibria, relative the social welfare in
the ﬁrst-best equilibrium where the both the set of links and the fares are socially optimal.
Fig. 6.2 shows the results of this exercise; the vertical axis measures social welfare relative
to welfare in the ﬁrst-best situation for the ﬁve cases: an unregulated monopoly (Private),
anticipated and unanticipated second-best fare regulation (SB f-A and SB f), and quasi-ﬁrst-
best and second-best network regulation (QFB net and SB net). We plot this relative welfare
for six diﬀerent values of S5.
Several interesting observations can be made here. First of all, for a wide range of S5,
second-best fares are not enough to achieve the ﬁrst-best solution. Since the relative welfare
is smaller than one, there is still some allocative ineﬃciency: the network conﬁguration is
suboptimal. Since we assume that the total capacity equals the optimal number of links this
means that even capacity subsidization and second-best pricing together are not suﬃcient.
7See the appendix for an overview of the crowding multipliers in various simulations.
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Only if capacity subsidies are diﬀerent for each potential link can the ﬁrst-best welfare be
attained. This is due to the discreteness of investment. Fig. 6.3 shows the two networks
that are used in the various equilibria. If node 5 is very small (S5 ≤ 100000), both a private
operator and the social planner would choose network (a). If we increase the size of this
central node, it becomes socially optimal to instead construct network (b), connecting node
3. The private operator, however, maximizing only its own proﬁts, continues to prefer network
(a) in the whole range of S5 examined in Fig. 6.2. Only if S5 were to increase even further
would the private operator’s network coincide with the social optimum.
However, although the ﬁrst-best situation can not always be achieved, the welfare losses
are small: the private operator has no incentives to construct a network that is very far away
from the optimum. Even in the worst case, with S5 = 20000, the welfare in an unregulated
situation is only a few percent lower than the ﬁrst-best welfare. Note that the number of links
is ﬁxed here: there are no ineﬃciencies in the total amount of investment. If these would be
taken into account, the monopolistic outcomes would probably be much further away from
the optimum.
Secondly, quasi-ﬁrst-best network regulation can decrease welfare, relative to an unreg-
ulated situation. This has important policy implications: network regulation can only be
successful if the regulator knows exactly how fares will be established after the network has
been constructed.
Thirdly, in this particular example, second-best fare regulation always results in a higher
social welfare than second-best network regulation. Although, for most of the parameter
space, the private network is not optimal, this can to a large extent be corrected with second-
best fares; the other way around, it is more diﬃcult to pre-empt suboptimal fares with the
limited amount of options for second-best network investment that are available. Naturally,
this result depends on the model parameters, and as we will see below, the opposite might
happen. Anticipation of fare regulation has no impact here, because of the highly discrete
nature of capacity investment, and because, given the price-regulation, the monopolist always
chooses the optimal network in this parameterization.
To see how these results depend on the model parameters, we ﬁx the size of the central
node to 200000 and vary the value of time from its initial value of 10$/hr; Fig. 6.4 shows the
results. As the value of time increases, the monopolist sets higher fares, and still chooses a
network that is sub-optimal; the relative performance of an unregulated monopoly decreases.
Interestingly, however, as the value of time increases, network regulation also becomes more
attractive, and for a value of 11$/hr, second-best network regulation is even better than
second-best fare regulation. This implies that, in the second-best optimal network, private
operators set fares that are closer to the optimum as values of time increase, even though,
in the private network, private and optimal fares diverge further. Naturally, this result is
speciﬁc to this particular model, but it does show that one second-best regulatory strategy
does not always dominate the other, and that these results are parameter-sensitive.
6.4.3 Competition
Fig. 6.5 shows the results of a similar exercise as Fig. 6.2, but this time for a situation
in which there are four competing operators (X = 4). Each operator chooses which link
to construct, out of all the possible links in Fig. 6.1 The results are very similar; in most
cases, allocative ineﬃciencies are still present, even if second-best fares are implemented.
The network choices are diﬀerent: in an unregulated Nash equilibrium, network (b) in Fig.
6.3 emerges if node is 5 smaller than 250000, while network (a) emerges for larger S5. This
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Figure 6.2: Monopoly – varying S5
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Figure 6.3: Monopoly – networks
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results in situations where welfare in an unrestricted competitive market is lower than in
an unrestricted monopoly. This has everything to do with the network structure: given the
small network, and the small number of links, there are few opportunities to build parallel
links. Hence, the networks that emerge are exclusively serial. As discussed above, serial
competition increases fares, as operators disregard the negative eﬀects of a fare increase on
their competitor’s proﬁts; this decreases welfare, relative to the monopoly. Although this
does not directly aﬀect the games in which fares are set by the social planner (SB f and SB
f-A), it does reduce welfare in the games where operators set fares.
In this competitive case, anticipation does play a role: ﬁrst-best outcomes can sometimes
be achieved if operators expect to set competitive fares, but are faced with regulated fares
after they have chosen their links. The range in which this happens is relatively small,
however; if S5 is very large or very small, the fare-setting mechanism does not inﬂuence
ﬁrst-stage decisions. Quasi-ﬁrst-best network regulation can still decrease welfare, relative
to the unregulated case. The results are highly parameter-sensitive, more so than in the
monopolistic case: although the ﬁrst-best can be achieved if S5 = 150000, this is not the case
if the size of node 5 is decreased to 100000 or increased to 200000.
Fig. 6.6 illustrates the parameter sensitivity of the model further; in this ﬁgure, we again
ﬁx S5 to 20000 and vary the value of time. Whereas, in the monopolistic case, a small change
in the value of time only had a small impact on the relative performance of the various
games, the sensitivity in this competitive case is twice as large. An increase in the value of
time increases the relative welfare of an unregulated equilibrium because, in this particular
case, it decreases the diﬀerence between private and socially optimal fares. It aﬀects the
performance of anticipated fare regulation in a non-monotonic fashion. As in Fig. 6.5, there
are parameter values for which the network that emerges is the same regardless of whether
fares are set by the regulator or the operators, but there are also parameter values for which
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Figure 6.5: Competition – varying S5
competitive fares and ﬂows diﬀer from second-best optimal fares and ﬂows in such a way that
operators choose another network.
The ﬁrst data point in Fig. 6.6 also further illustrates the diﬀerence between second-best
and quasi-ﬁrst best network regulation. Even though, if V OT = 9, the private network
that emerges is the same as the ﬁrst-best socially optimal network (as unanticipated fare
regulation archieves the ﬁrst-best outcome), the regulator can archieve a higher social welfare
by choosing another network, which will result in fares that are closer to the optimum. Hence,
the second-best network is diﬀerent from the private network, even if that private network
would be optimal in a ﬁrst-best setting.
6.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have proposed a two-stage methodology that captures the strategic forma-
tion of transport networks by one or more private operators. Speciﬁcally, we have examined a
situation in which investment capacities are discrete: links can be constructed or not, rather
than constructed with any chosen capacity. The models we have developed can be used to
analyze settings where transport networks are not designed by a single actor, but emerge as
a result of competition. We have examined several settings: an unrestricted monopolistic
or competitive market, a market where only fares or networks are regulated, and a fully
regulated setting. Underlying the investment and fare setting stages is a user equilibrium
model, which determines how many users travel, and which routes they will take through the
network. These models are diﬃcult to solve, but, in some cases, integer programming or a
smart exhaustive search can go a long way.
We have illustrated this methodology with a simple example, in which we have analyzed the
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Figure 6.6: Competition – sensitivity to V OT
allocative ineﬃciencies of private transport infrastructure investment in a small network. As
we have shown, these allocative ineﬃciencies are relatively small in a monopoly: although the
private operator’s objectives are not fully aligned with social planner’s, the operator has no
incentive to construct a network that is very diﬀerent from the optimum. In our simple model,
the same holds in a competitive market, where multiple operators own links; this, however,
does not generalize to larger networks, where multiple equilibrium network conﬁgurations
may exist, some of which are likely to be much further away from the optimum conﬁguration.
The numerical simulations also show that, even if the total number of links is ﬁxed to
its optimum, and fares are set by the social planner, ﬁrst-best outcomes cannot always be
achieved. Because of the discrete nature if infrastructure investment, some allocative ineﬃ-
ciencies remain; these can only be addressed with direct network regulation. If second-best
fare regulation is not anticipated, the parameter space in which the ﬁrst-best optimum can be
achieved without network regulation increases. If network- and fare regulation cannot both
be implemented, the model parameters determine which second-best regulatory strategy is
best.
Naturally, this is only a start. Although our simple model can already be used to draw
some general economic conclusions, larger, more sophisticated models are needed to fully
understand the impact of private investment in transport networks. The methodology we
have discussed will, hopefully, be useful for this.
Appendix
Fig. 6.7 shows the distribution of crowding multipliers, over all routes and all examined
network conﬁgurations, for the diﬀerent sizes of node 5 that have been examined.
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Figure 6.7: Distribution of crowding multipliers
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7.1 Results and implications
In general, two diﬀerent types of conclusions can be drawn from the results presented in
economic theses like this one. First, there are practical conclusions, which can inform policy.
Second, there are theoretical conclusions, which conﬁrm or disprove existing theories or ar-
gue for the development of new ones. These conclusions have have implications for further
academic research. Given the theoretical nature of this thesis, theoretical conclusions and
implications for further research are more prevalent, although most chapters also have policy
implications.
The most important conclusion, which is important both for further academic research and
for policy, is that the industrial organization of transport markets matters. The technical
chapters above have each analyzed a speciﬁc competitive setting, but in each case, this com-
petitive setting turned out to be important. Transport operators can use price discrimination
to increase their proﬁts, and this has implications for social welfare. In a multi-modal net-
work, the fact that users can change their departure times aﬀects the nature of competition,
and the desirability of various competitive structures. Operators also use their departure
times strategically, and change their investment strategies depending on the competitiveness
of the market. Hence, when analyzing transport markets, it is crucially important to decide if,
and how, the industrial organization of the markets will be modeled. In many cases, assum-
ing that markets are perfectly competitive, or monopolistic with a perfectly elastic demand,
such that market participants are still price takers, may not be appropriate. Similarly, when
trying to address a policy issue, it is important to consider the full complexity of the speciﬁc
transport market in question. Previous analyses of other markets, with diﬀerent levels of
competition, diﬀerent demand structures, or other, perhaps on ﬁrst sight small diﬀerences,
will not always be helpful.
More speciﬁc conclusions can be drawn from the individual chapters of this thesis. Chap-
ter 2 analyzed price discrimination and price diﬀerentiation in transport networks. This
analysis has shown that it is important to make the distinction between diﬀerentiation and
discrimination in a transportation context, especially if users have diﬀerent values of time,
or marginal costs diﬀer for other reasons. Enforcing uniform or non-discriminatory pricing
policies may improve social welfare in some cases, but decrease welfare in others. Hence,
the stylized models do highlight the need for careful, situation-based analysis to evaluate the
potential beneﬁts of restrictive pricing policies. Importantly, policies that may be considered
to be the most ‘fair’ by users, such as a ban on discriminatory pricing, are not always better
for society as a whole than others such as a ban on price diﬀerentiation, even if users have
diﬀerent marginal costs.
Apart from these policy conclusions, chapter 2 has implications for further modeling, too.
As it has shown, network structures can have a big impact on the model outcomes. In a
network with serial links, a monopolistic operator may be able to discriminate based on
users’ origins and destinations. This is not qualitatively diﬀerent from a single-link network
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where discrimination is only based on values of time or marginal external costs. There are
quantitative diﬀerences, though, which means that a model with link-based pricing may not
approximate a real-world situation well if, in reality, pricing is OD-based. In a network with
parallel links, operators may discriminate based on route choices, and this is both qualitatively
and quantitatively diﬀerent than OD-based pricing.
Chapter 3 looked into the eﬀect of travel time dynamics on competitive market outcomes,
in a setting where an unpriced road ran parallel to a priced railway line. As shown in this
chapter, the dynamic nature of the problem causes serial competition to inﬂuence fares, even
in the absence of elastic demand. This results from the fact that, in a dynamic model,
commuters have possibilities for intertemporal substitution, even if they do not have the
option to not travel. Therefore, a fare change on one rail link changes not only the number of
rail commuters relative to the number of road commuters, but also their trip timing decisions.
If demand is ﬁxed, the number of rail passengers will not necessarily aﬀect anyone traveling
on other links in the network, as was shown with a simple static model, but the changes
in trip timing will change passengers ﬂows in the whole network and through those, other
operators’ patronages and proﬁts. Naturally, a monopolistic operator internalizes the eﬀect
a price increase on one link has on the patronage of the other links, but a Bertrand-Nash
operator disregards this, which leads to diﬀerent, and potentially higher fares. For transport
policy, this implies that, even in markets where demand is relatively price-insensitive, it may
still be bad to have separate operators owning transport links that are complementary for
most users.
Again, this chapter also has theoretical and practical implications for further research.
Under the assumption that fares are time-invariant, it has proposed an alternative formulation
of the problem, such that rail operators optimize their fares and the boundaries of arrival
time intervals, rather than the commuter ﬂows. Using these variables, closed form solutions
can be obtained, which makes subsequent calculations considerably easier, although general
analytical solutions are still diﬃcult to obtain. The chapter has also shown that travel time
dynamics are important in analyzing the beneﬁts or costs of competition; hence, the decision
to either use a dynamic model or a much simpler static model needs to be taken carefully.
Chapter 4 proposed a methodology to model the scheduling decisions of competing trans-
port operators, using a Hotelling horizontal diﬀerentiation model, generalized to include
price-sensitive demand and asymmetric schedule delay costs. This asymmetry represented
the fact that it is usually more costly for travelers to be late than to be early. As was shown
in the chapter, transport operators can schedule their services in a strategic manner, to avoid
head-on competition. This implies that, next to fares and frequencies, departure times should
also interest public transport regulators. If the socially optimal departure times and fares
are not attainable, regulating one of these two variables can result in a modest eﬃciency
improvement; travelers’ values of schedule delay determine which of the two results in the
greatest gain. The chapter also concluded that regulation can create equilibria in situations
where an unregulated market fails to do so. This suggests an additional beneﬁt of regulation
in this particular market: it can improve welfare, relative to competitive equilibria, but it
can also create stability in situations where competitive equilibria do not emerge naturally.
Chapter 4 also has implications for modeling, even beyond a transportation context. The
models that were developed generally have stable equilibria, which are interior: they do
not necessarily result in minimum diﬀerentiation, and never in maximum diﬀerentiation.
This is an attractive property, as these types of interior equilibria can be observed in many
real-world markets. Moreover, the chapter has also shown that asymmetric distance costs
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can be included in horizontal diﬀerentiation models. These asymmetries are also present in
other settings, such as in the scheduling of TV programs, or in contexts where producers can
diﬀerentiate their products in a quality dimension. Hence, this result opens up possibilities for
applications in other markets. Asymmetric transport costs do result in asymmetric equilibria,
with producers charging diﬀerent prices, and hence, determining where these equilibria lie is
much more involved. For some parameters, no stable equilibria may exist, due to the presence
of possibilities for proﬁtable undercutting.
Chapter 5 compared several methods to determine the stochastic user equilibrium (SUE)
traﬃc ﬂows through a congested network. This chapter is more methodological than the
preceding chapters, and it therefore has fewer direct policy implications. Indirectly, however,
its implications are important. As shown in this chapter, simple logit stochastic user equi-
librium models can give results that are very similar to more general probit models. This
result stems mostly from the fact that transport networks are congestible, which implies that
the systematic utilities that users derive from overlapping routes are correlated, even if the
random utilities corresponding to the routes are not. Moreover, in networks, OD-level diﬀer-
ences can potentially cancel each other out. The diﬀerences in link ﬂows between models are
not systematic, i.e., one model does not always result in higher proﬁt-maximizing or socially
optimal tolls than another; this depends on the characteristics of the network. Since logit
models are much less computationally intensive, this indicates that they might, at least in
congested settings, be a better choice. As logit models need no simulation for the calculation
of choice probabilities, they can lead to more accurate results and allow for studying of more
and more complex policy instruments and games (e.g., tax competition, or networks with
multiple operators). However, they do have one important caveat. SUE models can easily be
overcalibrated, for instance, through the introduction of alternative-speciﬁc constants that
have little theoretical justiﬁcation. These overcalibrated models will ﬁt the existing data
better, but, when they are used to evaluate the eﬀects of changes in model parameters, they
can lead to large diﬀerences between the various SUE speciﬁcations. Careful calibration is
therefore always necessary, and the ﬁt of the model with existing data should not be the
main, or at least not the only criterion.
Finally, chapter 6 proposed a two-stage methodology to capture the strategic formation of
transport networks by one or more private operators. The models developed in this chapter
can be used to analyze settings where transport networks are not designed by a single actor,
but emerge as a result of competition. The chapter examined several settings: an unrestricted
monopolistic or competitive market, a market where only fares or networks are regulated, and
a fully regulated setting. In each case, a stochastic user equilibrium model determines how
many users travel, and which routes they will take through the network. These models are
diﬃcult to solve, but, in some cases, integer programming or a smart semi-exhaustive search
can go a long way. From a policy perspective, the most important conclusion that can be
drawn from this chapter is that, even if both the the total amount of capacity and the fares
can be regulated, ﬁrst-best outcomes still cannot always be achieved. Even if the total amount
of capacity is optimal, this capacity will not necessarily be located in the correct part of the
network: allocative ineﬃciencies remain. These allocative ineﬃciencies are likely to be small,
since private operators do not have incentives to construct a network that is very diﬀerent
from the optimum. In simple numerical models, the same holds in a competitive market,
where multiple operators own links; this, however, does not generalize to larger networks,
where multiple equilibrium network conﬁgurations may exist, some of which are likely to be
much further away from the optimum conﬁguration. If only fares or only network structure
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can be regulated, the model parameters determine which of the two strategies is best.
7.2 Avenues for future research
This book has explored the industrial organization of transport markets. Naturally, it is
impossible to answer all possible questions about such a broad subject in just one book.
Moreover, for every question that is answered, several new ones usually arise; this is deﬁnitely
true for what has been discussed above. Of the many avenues for future research, the following
three are especially worth mentioning.
Theoretical work
First, although the theoretical models developed in this book provide valuable insight into
how competition in transport networks can be modeled, and what the results of these models
mean for real-world problems, there is scope for the development of other theoretical models.
In particular, multi-level models with more levels than those developed above could be very
useful. Assuming that a regulator can directly inﬂuence the behavior of transport operators,
who in turn directly interact with users, is, in most settings, unrealistic. In reality, there are
usually various levels of local government, station operators, separate infrastructure owners,
etc. Interactions between all those market participants may well have a big impact on the
way the market should be regulated.
Another dimension that has not been explored in this book is the eﬀect of uncertainty and
risk aversion. In most transport markets, there is a large amount of uncertainty about short-
term variables, such as travel times, and even more uncertainty about long-term variables
such as long-term demand trends, fuel prices, investment costs, and the regulatory environ-
ment. This will inﬂuence the decision making process of all market participants, particularly
if, as is usually the case, they are risk averse. A complication here might be that the vari-
ous market participants do not all have the same level of risk aversion: consumers may, for
instance, be less risk averse than infrastructure investors or regulators. This will make the
modeling of the market much more complex, but the results may also be very informative.
This book has assumed that regulators are synonymous with governments, and simply
maximize social welfare. In reality, regulators are separate entities, and their objective is
not necessarily the maximization of social welfare. They may, instead, minimize the cost of
regulation, or the probability of a particular outcome. This has, so far, not received a lot of
attention in the transportation literature. The behavior of regulators is, however, crucial, so
there is a clear need for further analysis there.
Applied work
Secondly, there is a need for more applied work. Theoretical models, such as those developed
in this book, are certainly useful. However, when, for instance, an actual regulator needs to
determine what its optimal strategy is in a particular situation, these models will usually need
to be applied to the real-world market in question. In the case of transportation markets,
this is not trivial. Large-scale traﬃc assignment models are straightforward to build, and
have indeed been developed for many real-world transportation networks. Including more
realistic market representations, such as transport operators that compete with each other
through prices and investment levels, is much more diﬃcult.
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Many of the models developed in this book are very computationally intensive, despite the
small size of the networks, and the many simplifying assumptions. More powerful computers
would be able to solve larger, more complex problems, but there is also a need for the
development of new models that can be solved eﬃciently for large networks. Unfortunately,
multi-level nonlinear models are notoriously diﬃcult to solve. Advances in the operations
research literature (importantly, the PATH solver (Dirkse et al., 2014), which can solve mixed
complementarity problems, a common way to model imperfectly competitive markets with
multiple levels) are creating new opportunities. Using the theoretical models developed in
this thesis, it may be possible to analyze much more complex real-world markets. The results
of these analyses would be of direct relevance for regulators, but can also inform the academic
debate about the eﬀects of competition in transport networks.
Empirical work
Finally, the models that have been developed in this book are mostly theoretical. It will be
very interesting to see whether the theoretical conclusions that have been drawn from them
can be backed up with more real-world evidence. Chapter 3 of this book has, for instance,
argued that if travelers choose departure times, serial competition will aﬀect proﬁts and usage
levels through departure time choices, not just through demand levels. There are transport
networks where several operators own links that are used as complements (the Sydney Orbital
Network is just one example), and hence, it may be possible to empirically verify whether the
theory holds. Although this is outside the scope of this book, these types of empirical veriﬁ-
cation are important, especially in a ﬁeld where there are often many competing assumptions
or theories. Given the increasing levels of privatization that can currently be observed in
many transport networks, the availability of data about the performance of various market
structures should increase, which will create more opportunities for this type of work than
there have been in the past.
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
De industriële organisatie van transportmarkten: prijzen,
investering en regulering in spoor- en weggennetwerken
Economen houden zich bezig met de distributie van schaarse middelen, zoals tijd of geld. Deze
distributie vindt vaak plaats in markten: concrete of abstracte plaatsen waar consumenten en
producenten elkaar ontmoeten. Markten zijn vooral interessant als ze niet de best mogelijke
resultaten opleveren. ‘Best mogelijk’ kan, in dit geval, meerdere dingen betekenen, zoals een
Pareto optimum (een situatie waarin niemand er op vooruit kan gaan zonder dat iemand
anders er op achter uit gaat) of sociaal optimum (zodat de maatschappij als geheel er niet op
vooruit kan gaan). In beide gevallen geeft een marktuitkomst die lager ligt dan het optimum
overheden een reden voor interventie; de vraag is dan, uiteraard, welke interventie het meest
geschikt is om het marktevenwicht terug te brengen naar het optimum.
Er bestaan meerdere situaties waarin markten niet optimaal functioneren; deze worden
collectief ‘marktfalen’ genoemd. Een situatie die in transportmarkten vaak voorkomt is de
aanwezigheid van externe eﬀecten: kosten of baten van, in dit geval, reizen, die niet door de
reiziger maar door anderen worden gedragen. De extra ﬁledruk die iedere automobilist op
andere automobilisten uitoefent is bijvoorbeeld een negatief extern eﬀect. Externe eﬀecten
worden vaak in isolatie onderzocht, waarbij de aanname is dat er geen andere vormen van
marktfalen bestaan. Veel studies nemen bijvoorbeeld aan dat markten perfect concurrerend
zijn, zodat geen enkele producent of consument invloed kan uitoefenen op marktprijzen.
In de praktijk kunnen zowel consumenten als producenten marktprijzen vaak wel in hun
voordeel beïnvloeden: monopolisten kunnen meer winst behalen door hun prijzen te ver-
hogen als de vraag naar hun product niet perfect elastisch is, en oligopolistische producenten
beheersen een dusdanig groot gedeelte van de markt dat ook zij invloed kunnen uitoefenen
op prijzen. Dit kan leiden tot marktfalen, en in veel situaties kunnen deze eﬀecten niet
worden genegeerd. Deze dissertatie bestudeert daarom de industriële organisatie van trans-
portmarkten: dat wil zeggen, de beslissingen die worden genomen door economische agenten
in markten die niet volkomen concurrerend zijn, de implicaties van die beslissingen, en de
manieren waarop overheden ze kunnen beïnvloeden. In deze dissertatie worden methodes gep-
resenteerd die gebruikt kunnen worden om zulke beslissingen te modelleren. Deze methodes
worden vervolgens toegepast om prijsstrategiën, de keuze van bus- en treintijden, invester-
ingsbeslissingen en reguleringsstrategiën te analyseren. In contrast tot een groot deel van
de bestaande literatuur wordt hierbij de netwerkstructuur van transportmarkten expliciet
meegenomen.
Economische modellen zijn vereenvoudigde voorstellingen van de werkelijkheid, en maken
altijd aannames. Het is zelden het geval dat een enkel model volstaat om een complexe
markt te analyseren; het is vaak nodig verschillende modellen te gebruiken, die verschillende
aannames maken en gebruikt kunnen worden om verschillende aspecten van de markt te be-
lichten. Deze dissertatie bestaat daarom uit vijf aparte hoofdstukken, naast de introductie
en conclusie. Ieder hoofdstuk belicht een belangrijk aspect van een of meerdere transport-
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markten. Ieder hoofdstuk heeft een dubbel doel: eerst worden nieuwe methodes ontwikkeld
om de industriële organisatie van transportmarkten te bestuderen, en vervolgens worden deze
methodes in de praktijk gebracht om conclusies te kunnen trekken over mogelijke beleidsin-
terventies.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op de eﬀecten van prijsdiﬀerentiatie en prijsdiscriminatie door een
monopolistische vervoerder, die opereert in een netwerk waarin congestie kan optreden. In
drie verschillende ruimtelijke modellen wordt nagegaan wat het eﬀect is van het verbieden
van prijsdiﬀerentiatie (zodat alle reizigers voor het zelfde reisproduct het zelfde betalen)
en/of prijsdiscriminatie (zodat prijzen alleen mogen variëren met de marginale externe kosten
van reizigers). Doordat de drie modellen verschillende ruimtelijke structuren hebben kun-
nen prijsdiscriminatie en prijsdiﬀerentiatie op basis van gebruikersgroep, route, en herkomst
en bestemming apart worden geanalyseerd. Dit hoofstuk generaliseert de bestaande liter-
atuur over prijsdiscriminatie, waarin gebruikersgroepen doorgaans alleen verschillende ti-
jdswaarderingen hebben, door toe te laten dat groepen ook verschillende marginale externe
kosten hebben. Prijsdiscriminatie en prijsdiﬀerentiatie zijn daardoor niet langer het zelfde.
Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat het verbieden van prijsdiscriminatie en prijsdiﬀerentiatie soms
welvaartswinst kan opleveren, maar soms ook tot welvaartsverliezen leidt. Het verbieden van
prijsdiﬀerentiatie kan beter zijn dan het verbieden van prijsdiscriminatie, ondanks het feit
dat die laatste optie als eerlijker gezien kan worden.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt netwerken waarin meerdere oligopolistische vervoerders actief zijn.
Het analyseert de strategische beslissingen van marktdeelnemers in netwerken waarin naast
openbaar vervoer ook onbeprijsde wegen bestaan, en waarin sommige gebruikers meerdere
treinen of bussen nodig hebben om hun bestemming te bereiken. Het hoofdstuk contrasteert
twee modellen: een waarin een monopolistische aanbieder al het openbaar vervoer bezit,
en een waarin iedere individuele verbinding door een aparte aanbieder wordt geexploiteerd.
Gebruikers kiezen niet alleen hoe ze reizen, maar ook wanneer; de modellen zijn dynamisch.
Deze dynamiek is belangrijk, zoals het hoofdstuk laat zien. In tegenstelling tot wat in de
bestaande, op statische modellen gebaseerde literatuur te zien is, kan in de modellen die in dit
hoofdstuk gepresenteerd worden seriële concurrentie prijzen verlagen, in plaats van verhogen.
Hoofdstuk 4 heeft, net als hoofdstuk 3, betrekking op reistijdstipkeuzes. In dit hoofdstuk
wordt speciﬁek ingegaan op de manier waarop oligopolistische vervoerders hun vertrektij-
den bepalen, en vooral op hoe deze vertrektijden strategisch gebruikt kunnen worden. Om
deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden ontwikkelt dit hoofdstuk een gegeneraliseerde versie van
Hotelling’s model van horizontale diﬀerentiatie, waarin de vraag naar vervoer prijsafhankelijk
is, en waar afstandskosten asymmetrisch zijn. In dit model kiezen twee concurrenten prijzen
en vertrektijden binnen een vast tijdsinterval; reizigers zijn uniform verdeeld over dit interval,
en de locatie van een reiziger geeft de vertrektijd aan die zijn of haar voorkeur heeft. Dit
hoofdstuk laat zien dat vertrektijden strategisch gebruikt kunnen worden om winst te maxi-
maliseren, en bespreekt welke strategieën het beste gebruikt kunnen worden om de markt te
reguleren.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de routekeuze van reizigers behandeld. In de routekeuzeliteratuur
worden verschillende modellen voorgesteld; dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe groot de verschillen
tussen drie van deze modellen (multinomial probit, nested logit, and generalized nested logit)
zijn. Om dit te kunnen bepalen worden de modellen toegepast op een klein maar repre-
sentatief netwerk waarin congestie kan ontstaan. Ze worden vervolgens gebruikt om belei-
dskeuzes te evalueren. Zoals dit hoofdstuk laat zien zijn de implicaties van de keuze voor
een bepaald model voor beleidskeuzes klein, mits de modellen goed gecalibreerd zijn. Het is
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daarom verdedigbaar om simpelere modellen, zoals het nested logit or generalized nested logit
model te gebruiken, in plaats van meer realistische maar ook meer computationeel intensieve
modellen zoals het probit model.
De resultaten van hoofdstuk 5 worden gebruikt in hoofdstuk 6. In dit hoofdstuk wordt
een generalized nested logit model wordt gebruikt als de basis voor een lange-termijn in-
vesteringsmodel, waarin private oligopolistische vervoerders zels nieuwe verbindingen kunnen
aanleggen. Dit model wordt vervolgens gebruikt voor de evaluatie van beleidsinterventies
die als doel hebben de formatie van transportnetwerken te reguleren. In tegenstelling tot
de meeste bestaande literatuur zijn investeringen in nieuwe vervoerscapacitiet discreet: een
verbinding wordt aangelegd of niet. Dit heeft belangrijke implicaties; vooral omdat, in dit
geval, prijsbeleid niet langer afdoende is om het sociaal optimum te herstellen.
Samen geven deze hoofdstukken een breed overzicht van de verschillende kwesties die be-
trekking hebben op de industriële organisatie van transportmarkten. De belangrijkste con-
clusie die uit deze dissertatie getrokken kan worden is dat deze industriële organisatie belan-
grijk is. De verschillende hoofdstukken behandelen elk een speciﬁeke marktvorm, en in ieder
hoofdstuk blijkt dat het modelleren van het strategische gedrag van vervoerders en reizigers
cruciaal is. Vervoerders kunnen prijsdiscriminatie en prijsdiﬀerentiatie toepassen om meer
winst te behalen, en dat heeft implicaties voor het maatschappelijk welzijn. In multimodale
netwerken heeft de reistijdstipkeuze van reizigers een belangrijk eﬀect op de manier waarop
vervoerders concurreren, en op de relative eﬃciëntie van verschillende marktformen. Vervo-
erders kunnen ook hun vertrektijden op een strategische manier gebruiken om zo meer winst
te behalen, en ook dat heeft implicaties voor het maatschappelijk welzijn en daarmee ook
voor beleid. Het is daarom bij elke analyse van transportmarkten van cruciaal belang om de
industriële organisatie correct te modelleren, met de juiste hoeveelheid detail. In veel gevallen
zal het niet afdoende zijn om simpelweg aan te nemen dat de markt volkomen concurrerend
is. Hetzelfde geldt voor beleidsanalyses: ook daar is het belangrijk om de complexiteit van
de markt niet te negeren. Bestaande beleidsanalyses van andere markten, die meer of minder
competitief zijn, een andere vraagstructuur hebben, of die op een andere, wellicht op het
eerste gezicht kleine manier verschillen zullen vaak niet afdoende zijn.
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